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Performing National Identity in Postcolonial Indonesia 
 
Since the first independence movements began in the early twentieth century 
Dutch East Indies, much energy has been devoted to the development of an 
Indonesian identity that both differentiates the new nation from its colonizers and 
links people separated by geography, history, ethnicity, language and class. Such 
national self-imagining is commonly articulated spatially through state designed or 
designated landscape and through the performances of national identity by its 
citizenry. Through an examination of work, education and play, this thesis broadly 
seeks to understand the spatiality of performance and explore the relationship between 
landscape and the performance of national identity. My research is focused around 
three main objectives. First, I seek to understand the role of performance in the 
formation, dissemination, and enforcement of official national identity in postcolonial 
Indonesia.  More specifically, I intend to analyze how the national landscape 
functions as a cultural practice and expose the strategies employed by the state to 
encourage citizens to perform various identities within the context of power 
relationships embedded in national landscapes. Second, I intend to examine the ways 
in which performances of national identity have and have not changed over the course 
of the Old Order and New Order and into the present. Third, I will explore how 
national identities are understood, accepted, resisted and reinterpreted by the citizenry 
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Chapter 1  – Introduction: Performing the Nation 
 
1.1 Outlining the research  
When visiting Indonesia, I am always impressed by the vastness of the country 
and how remote and unconnected it all seems. At the same time, I am struck by the 
fact that wherever I am, no matter how long I have been on a ferry or bus, and no 
matter how far from Jakarta or how remote the village, I nearly always notice some 
tangible evidence of state presence. This evidence often appears as a sign listing the 
five tenets of Pancasila, promoting family planning, or conveying other such state 
ideology in a standardized concrete marker or mural. Evidence of the state also 
consistently appears in the form of performances such as the singing of national 
songs, the recitation of a national pledge, doing public group callisthenics, or the 
performing of scheduled ‘national’ rituals such as the weekly Upacara Bendera, or 
Flag Ceremony. The state also surfaces through the more intimate scale of the body in 
national birth control programs and clothing, such as in the uniforms worn by civil 
servants and school children and the free political t-shirts given out by parties at 
election time. These official identifiers of Indonesia can be seen alongside informal, 
non-state-derived symbols of national identity such as eating Indomie1 and dangdut, a 
widely popular Indonesian music style.  
A common thread that ties these observations together is the element of active 
citizen performance, the doing aspect of national identity that, through repetition, 
serves to confirm national membership, to normalize and naturalize the authority of 
the state, and to inculcate the appropriate version of national identity. Broadly 
defined, performance is a useful way in which to understand how official national 
                                                          
1 A popular instant noodle produced in Indonesia 
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identities are created by the state and then propagated. My approach is based on the 
premise that performances are spatial in the sense that they occur somewhere. In this 
way, my project seeks to explore the relationship between these performances of 
national identity and the spaces of national identity.  
The cultural and political construction of Indonesia, the intrusive role of the 
state, and its attempts to shape its citizens have been the focus of a number of recent 
academic investigations (Pemberton 1994; Widodo 1995; Parker 2003; Bodden 2007). 
However, no analysis of Indonesia to date has dealt specifically with the creation of 
national identity through everyday performances and space. This thesis seeks to fill a 
gap in current research by exploring the relationship between landscape and the 
performance of national identity in the context of postcolonial Indonesia. My 
objectives are threefold. First, I seek to understand the role of performance in the 
formation, propagation, and enforcement of official national identity in postcolonial 
Indonesia. More specifically, I intend to analyze how the landscape functions as a 
cultural practice and expose the strategies employed by the state to encourage citizens 
to perform various identities within the context of power relationships embedded in 
national landscapes. Second, I aim to examine the ways in which performances of 
national identity have and have not changed over the course of the Old and New 
Order and into the present. Third, I am interested in understanding how official 
national identities are understood, accepted, resisted, reinterpreted and ignored by the 
citizenry through performance, non-performance or alterative performances in a 
variety of landscapes, particularly at the level of the village. While performances of 
national identity are interpreted in varied ways by villagers, they are conceptually 
linked to spectacular places in Jakarta and are intended to function as miniature, 
scaled-down versions of their ‘parent’ in the national capital. The value in a village 
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study is to examine the interplay between Jakarta and the village and to understand 
how a remote village, far from the nation’s capital, has been ‘incorporated into the 
totalizing and homogenizing Indonesian nation-state’ (Parker 2003: 11). As much of 
the scholarship on postcolonial Indonesia has accentuated differences between Old 
and New Orders and the post-New Order era, another contribution I hope to make in 
this thesis is to explicitly examine the extent to which changes in leadership affect 
national landscapes and citizens’ sense and performance of national identity. 
With regard to theory, the broad aim of my research is to contribute to current 
understandings of the spatiality of performance by formulating a workable notion of 
‘performance’ itself. This will be achieved by drawing upon theoretical and 
methodological work in landscape studies, cultural geography, feminist theory, 
poststructuralism, postcolonialism and Indonesian studies. In my specific empirical 
case, I seek to understand official notions of the ideal Indonesian citizen and the 
strategies by which this ideal is constructed, propagated and reproduced at the village 
level, particularly through repetitive performance.  
Based on the belief that architecture, facilities, infrastructure and citizens’ 
bodies can function as stages on which to exhibit performances of national identity, 
my research explores how the state envisions the ideal citizen and then how it goes 
about creating / designating ‘national’ landscapes to actualize this ideal. Since an 
ideal can never be completely realized, I seek an understanding of how citizens 
reinterpret, renegotiate and disrupt this ideal. 
Theoretical tools I employ in this study include various approaches to the 
analysis of performance and Foucault’s concept of governmentality. These concepts 
are complementary in many ways and also share, in my view, some similar problems. 
Much of the work on performativity, though not inherently spatial, reveals some key 
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insights about the social construction of identity. While much of the work focuses on 
performing gender and sexuality, I believe some of the ideas can be extended to a 
study of the performance of national identity. Foucault has made valuable 
contributions in his work on surveillance, governance, social control and in 
articulating how built space can control and discipline citizens and help shape 
identity. The concept of governmentality is particularly useful in thinking about the 
power relations embedded in landscape and how they affect performance in that 
landscape. While these concepts are useful ways to think about the relationship 
between space and performance, both fail to attribute adequate agency to the 
‘performers’. These theoretical influences and others will be covered more 
extensively in Chapter Two, in which I also articulate my conceptual framework. 
1.2 Context of Study 
In this section I provide a brief contextual overview of the development of 
Indonesian nationalism, some of the competing views of Indonesian nationalism, and 
a general summary of the respective regimes of Sukarno and Suharto and the 
subsequent presidencies. This section also provides an overview of my field site, 
Pulau Penyengat, and the national capital of Jakarta. 
What is now Indonesia was colonized in stages starting in 1605 by the Dutch, 
who were seeking domination of the lucrative spice trade. By the early 20th century, 
the Dutch had consolidated rule over all of the territory (with the exception of East 
Timor) that consitutes the post-independence borders of Indonesia, referring to it as 
the ‘Dutch East Indies’. The earliest nationalist movements in the Dutch East Indies 
began in the early 1900s and Indonesians have since struggled to develop a national 
identity that distances themselves from their colonial past and unites people separated 
by geography, history, ethnicity, class, and language. While Indonesia was quickly 
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accepted as a legitimate state by world powers after World War II, there were fierce 
internal struggles over power and competing leadership claims. Meanwhile, the state 
struggled to create an air of legitimacy and convince its new citizens that being united 
under ‘Indonesia’ was not only the natural state of the archipelago but was to the 
benefit of all. The boundaries of the nation have been contested continuously by 
various groups since independence, requiring the state to justify its existence and 
domination through the invention of a national identity along with a set of national 
myths and traditions. Despite attempts to distance themselves from the Dutch 
colonizers and the Japanese Occupation (1942-45), aspects of each period have been 
integrated into the identity of the new nation. 
 The earliest national imaginings among people in the Dutch East Indies 
emerged in the early 1900s and have been outlined by many scholars (Kahin 1952; 
Zed 1991; Pemberton 1994; Siegel 1997; Mrázek 2002; Laffan 2003). They have 
explained Indonesian nationalism as the result of a complex range of influences 
including the development of a lingua franca (Bahasa Indonesia), the introduction of 
certain technologies (railroads, asphalt, radio, newspaper), higher levels of education 
for indigenous people, changes in Dutch colonial policies, and broad philosophical 
changes in Europe. It was in the early decades of the 20th century that the national 
language (bahasa Indonesia), the flag (Merah Putih, or ‘Red and White’), the national 
anthem and other symbols of ‘Indonesia’ were decided upon by nationalist groups. 
Despite the early unity shown in such decisions, fiercely contested views of 
nationhood between different groups underscored the tensions and struggles as 
various groups vied for power during the decades prior to Independence in 1945. The 
ultimate triumph of Sukarno and the Republicans may now appear inevitable, but 
their victory was by no means assured as various Muslim, communist and nationalist 
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parties grew powerful and competed with the Republican vision of Indonesia (Zed 
1991; Effendy 2003; Friend 2003).  
As this thesis spans Sukarno’s Old Order (1950-65), Suharto’s New Order 
(1965-98) up until the present, here I will provide a brief contextual overview of 
Sukarno’s and Suharto’s reigns and of events that have taken place since the fall of 
Suharto. Referred to now in Indonesia as the ‘Father of Indonesia’, Sukarno was 
originally trained as an architect at a Dutch technology institute in Java and was one 
of the few locals to receive a higher education by the Dutch. As a die-hard nationalist 
who believed in an Indonesia free from foreign influence and domination, Sukarno 
attempted to create a nation that was inclusive of religious and ethnic diversity while 
melding nationalism, aspects of Islam, and communism. With a reputation as an 
eternal revolutionary, Sukarno emerged as a dynamic and influential leader in the 
struggle against Dutch rule. Japan’s WWII expansion into Southeast Asia led them to 
take power of the Dutch East Indies in 1942. The Japanese controlled political life by 
confining all political activity to Java, by appointing all political leaders, and by 
setting the political agendas (Owen 2005). Recognizing Sukarno and future vice-
President Hatta as popular leaders, the Japanese selected them to lead Japanese-
created local political organizations in the hopes that it would help pacify the 
population. Sukarno and Hatta in turn saw an opportunity to accelerate Indonesian 
independence by cooperating with the Japanese. The Japanese occupation of 
Indonesia (1942-45) played an important role in fostering Indonesian nationalism 
(Kahin 1952). They encouraged anti-European sentiments, facilitated the development 
and widespread use of Bahasa Indonesia, and established many of the national rituals 
that were carried out after Independence, thus setting the tone for official national 
identity. During the Japanese occupation, those who sought independence based on 
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ethnic lines were cut off from Java and the nationalists, and hence from nationalist 
political activity. As Japanese-appointed leaders of various political organizations, 
Sukarno and Hatta were well-positioned to seize power after the defeat of the 
Japanese (Owen 2005). Just two days after the emperor of Japan announced surrender, 
Sukarno and Hatta announced Indonesia’s Independence on August 17, 1945.  
Soon after, British forces, which had been fighting in the region, arrived in 
Indonesia to reclaim the Indies on behalf of the Dutch and to supervise the surrender 
of the Japanese (Poulgrain 1998). Until enough Dutch forces arrived from Europe, the 
British guarded Dutch interests in the Indies by suppressing independence movements 
while trying to prevent such revolutionary ideas from spreading to their colony of 
Malaya. The Dutch and British economies were in tatters after WWII and both sought 
to revive them in part by assuming control of their colonies. A four-year military 
struggle ensued, in which the Dutch attempted to reconstruct their pre-WWII colony 
by weakening nationalists through killing and imprisonment. Sukarno, Hatta, and 
others in the Indonesian government were imprisoned by the Dutch, a move that 
acknowledged their power and popularity, thereby unintentionally legitimizing their 
claims to leadership. Sukarno and Hatta conducted interviews with the foreign press 
from prison and continued to gain international attention and sympathy. As Europe 
and North America preached sovereignty and freedom from imperialism at home, it 
became more difficult for the Dutch to deny that same freedom to their former colony. 
Nationalists who supported a united and independent Indonesia increasingly gained 
external support for their revolution, which led to several negotiations and ultimately 
a timetable for Dutch withdrawal in 1949. Once again, Sukarno and Hatta declared 
Independence. This time, they had the support of the international community and 
Indonesia was formally recognized as a state by the United Nations.    
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During Sukarno’s presidency, ties with China were strengthened, Communist 
Party members within the government increased, and Indonesia accepted Soviet aid. 
Relations with the Netherlands were severed over the disputed control of West Papua. 
During the period of military confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia (1963-
66), the U.S. ended military aid to Indonesia2.  International relations further 
deteriorated until Sukarno withdrew Indonesia from the U.N. Security Council and 
severed remaining links with the capitalist world (International Monetary Fund, 
Interpol, World Bank) in 1965. The economy was stagnant under Sukarno and 
standards of living in Indonesia were among the lowest in the world. 
 Sukarno faced numerous challenges to his leadership by the military in the 
1950s and survived a number of assassination attempts. As a result, Sukarno 
established what he called ‘Guided Democracy’ in an effort to restore order. While he 
maintained a multi-party parliament, he wielded progressively more executive powers 
until 1963, when he declared himself president for life. Unsurprisingly, his arrogance 
and ineptitude in stabilizing the country angered many competing powers vying for 
control of the state. 
In 1965 six anti-communist generals were murdered in an ‘attempted coup’, 
supposedly by communists in order to cleanse the government and give momentum to 
the revolution (Owen 2005). General Suharto took the initiative to crush the coup, 
identifying the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) as the perpetrators and Sukarno as 
complicit. Sukarno was placed under house arrest until his death in 1970 and 
                                                          
2 The Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia from 1963-66, or Konfrontasi as it is more commonly called, 
was the culmination of long-term hostility between Indonesia and the British colonial authorities that stemmed 
from the end of WWII when British troops had attempted to reclaim the Indies on behalf of the Dutch. According 
to Poulgrain (1998), Konfrontasi began with Britain purposely provoking Indonesia in 1963. After WWII, Britain 
relied upon Malaysia, Singapore and North Kalimantan as a source of badly-needed income. To ensure this income 
continued to flow, Britain felt the area needed to be rid of all Indonesian influences. Britain proceeded to conduct a 
series of land and air provocations in Kalimantan, Sumatra, and Riau. This, combined with Indonesia’s deep 
suspicion that the Federation of Malaysia was nothing but a puppet for the British, led Sukarno to order navy ships 
into Malaysian waters. Konfrontasi created a threat to Singapore, Malaya and Borneo, and ultimately served to 
unite the three states under the Federation of Malaysia (Poulgrain 1998). 
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members (or suspected members) of the Communist Party were purged from the 
government by the military. For almost two years, General Suharto promoted an 
atmosphere that encouraged civilians, particularly on Java and Bali where the 
Communist Party was centred, to massacre communists, suspected communists and 
those believed to be communist sympathizers. While the official Indonesian state 
version of the massacre maintains that the PKI was responsible for the murder of the 
generals, there has been much scholarly speculation that Suharto, aided by the United 
States, coordinated the assassinations to remove rivals and destroy the increasingly 
powerful Communist Party. The United States government is believed to have played 
a key role in this anti-communist activity due to its deep fear of the ‘domino effect’, a 
process that would cause one state after another in Southeast Asia to adopt 
communism as their central political ideology (Vatikiotis 1993; Ricklefs 2001). In 
keeping with its Cold War strategy, the U.S. supported the military as well as 
encouraged popular retaliations against the communists (Anderson and McVey 1971; 
Friend 2003). It is estimated that by 1966 over half a million Indonesians, mainly 
rural civilians, had been killed by the military, anti-Communist Suharto supporters, 
and civilians (Ricklefs 2001). After waiting patiently for two years, Suharto extracted 
a transfer of presidential powers from Sukarno and a purged national assembly 
confirmed Suharto as president in 1967.  
Suharto established what he termed the Orde Baru, or New Order. He 
immediately abandoned ties with the communist world and focused on strengthening 
relations with the West and the United Nations. Within Indonesia, he disbanded 
labour organizations and controlled the media. As the state bureaucracy greatly 
expanded during Suharto’s presidency, the citizenry was increasingly brought into 
contact with state ideology through social programs, policing, schooling, leisure 
10 
 
activities and urban symbolism. Citizens were increasingly encouraged to join state-
controlled organizations such as women’s groups, volunteer and gotong-royong 
groups and mass youth organizations. 
While the economy improved and stabilized under Suharto, nagging issues of 
legitimacy plagued his rule and corruption and military brutality were rampant during 
the New Order. The election of 1997, the most violent of the Suharto regime (Ricklefs 
2001), was a focal point for social and political unrest. Combined with the economic 
crisis of 1997-98, opposition mounted against Suharto until he was forced, after 
thirty-two years, to heed the widespread demands for his resignation in May of 1998. 
Suharto’s chosen successor, B. J. Habibie, faced a public eager for change and 
suffering greatly from conditions caused by the monetary crisis, which caused the 
Indonesian economy to shrink by 13.5% in 1998 after decades of steady growth. 
Habibie resigned after a turbulent year and a half in office, announcing just two days 
before the elections of October 1999 that he would not seek another term. This 
decision was favorably received by reformers who claimed he was simply a puppet of 
the former regime. During his short presidency, Habibie consistently protected 
Suharto, failed to curb government corruption or improve the economy, and was 
unable to halt the violence in Aceh and Maluku and prevent the bloodbath in East 
Timor which followed the referendum on independence. However, while president 
Habibie also pushed for decentralization and allowed for democratic elections. 
Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur), was 
slightly more successful at fighting corruption and significantly reduced the military’s 
role in politics, yet he was not able to strengthen Indonesia’s devastated economy or 
stem the growing separatist movements in the outer provinces. While Gus Dur’s 
pluralistic democratic vision was widely praised, he was unable to unite the 
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population behind a sense of common national purpose. More importantly, he did not 
effectively address the most glaring social issue threatening Indonesia’s stability: the 
growing gap between the rich and poor. After serving only eighteen months of his 
four-year term, the People’s Consultative Assembly impeached Wahid and gave 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, his former vice president, the presidency. A daughter of 
Indonesia’s first president Sukarno who had enjoyed immense popular support during 
Suharto’s presidency, Megawati’s presidency was no more successful than Wahid’s in 
confronting Indonesia’s myriad problems. 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (popularly called ‘SBY’) was the dark horse 
candidate who emerged as the victor in the 2004 run-off election against President 
Megawati. While many Indonesians were initially relieved that a former military man 
was taking the helm after what many considered a disastrous experiment with civilian 
leadership, SBY has struggled with little success to improve the daily lives of the 
masses of poor and to effectively curb government corruption. His presidency has 
also coincided with many tragic national events (earthquakes, tsunami, volcanic 
eruptions, airplane and ferry accidents). Many Indonesians are increasingly 
considering SBY as cosmically incompatible with holding the title of president, a 
superstitious view which assumes that larger forces will ensure the continuation of 
tragedies as long as SBY is president. With this national context in mind, I now turn 
to discussion of my particular field site within Indonesia. 
1.3 Field site 
In this section, I will provide a brief overview of and rationale for choosing 
my field site of Pulau Penyengat, a small village within the province of Riau Islands 
(see Figures 1.1 and 1.2). I will also provide some contextual background about the 
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national capital of Jakarta as national landscapes at the village level are closely 
connected to developments in Jakarta.  
 










I selected the Riau Islands in part because it was not located in Java or 
Sumatra, both of which were key sites of struggle in the Indonesian Revolution (1945-
49) and have long and complex relationships with national identity issues. Java, as the 
most populous island and home to the national capital, is thought of domestically (and 
elsewhere) as having the ‘highest’, most refined culture in Indonesia. All but one of 
Indonesia’s presidents have come from Java and the rest of Indonesia often feels in 
the shadow of Java’s cultural and political dominance. The Riau Islands have been 
considered peripheral in the state’s construction of Indonesia and are officially 
categorized as ‘Outer Islands II,’ the most remote category3. The province of Riau 
Islands (Propinsi Kepulauan Riau, or Kepri) has approximately 1 million residents, an 
extremely small number when compared with the tens of millions found in some of 
the provinces in the ‘Inner Islands’ such as West Java, Central Java, and Bali.  
 Pulau Penyengat is located a short boat ride off the west coast of Bintan (see 
Figure 1.2). After the Portuguese conquered Melaka in 1511, the Melaka sultanate 
moved first to Johor, and then to the islands of Riau, which were considered a 
strategic location for sea trade and easily protected. The Sultan had a fortified base, a 
palace, and places of worship on Pulau Penyengat. When the Dutch annexed the area 
in 1911, the Sultan ordered most of the structures to be destroyed rather than see them 
fall into colonial hands. The Sultan and his family then fled to Singapore in 1911 
where he lived until his death in 1930.  
                                                          
3 There are three official geographical categories dividing Indonesia, largely based on socially 
constructed notions of centrality. The first is the ‘Inner Islands’, consisting of Java, Bali, and parts of 
Sumatra bordering Java, the most highly populated areas of the country. The category ‘Outer Islands I’ 
consists of islands considered by the state to be less central to the political core yet still somewhat part 
of national politics with relatively high populations. The category ‘Outer Islands II’ consists of islands 
with extremely low populations, located a great distance from Jakarta, and of peripheral importance to 
the economic or political operations of the state. This system of categorization stems from how the 
Dutch organized the Indies in the later stages of colonization, based upon the economic value, 
productivity and centrality of the land. 
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Imagined by both the Malaysian and Indonesian states as a hearth of Malay 
culture and considered the homeland of Bahasa Indonesia, Pulau Penyengat was 
listed as a National Heritage Site in the 1980s after which it began to receive attention 
and a trickle of funds from the federal government to develop the remnants of the 
sultanate into a tourist attraction. Currently, there is a small but steady tourist industry 
comprised of Malaysians and primarily local tourists, particularly workers from 
across Indonesia employed in factories in Batam who make day trips on their days off 
to various local tourist sites. On occasion, people staying in the high-end resorts in 
north Bintan take a guided tour of Bintan Island that includes a short trip to Pulau 
Penyengat and local authorities are keen to expand this market. The average tourist 
visits Pulau Penyengat for just an hour or so and spends little. Visitors pay about 
20,000 rupiah (about $4 SGD) for an autorickshaw tour of the island and perhaps buy 
a bottle of water or cup of tea. While residents and state officials see tourism potential 
in the island, there is uncertainty as to how tourism can economically benefit the 
islanders and local state authorities. 
The entire population of Pulau Penyengat is just over 2,000 residents living in 
several villages scattered around the periphery of the island. Inhabiting a small island 
just two kilometres long with unfertile soil typical to Riau, villagers have traditionally 
been involved primarily in the fishing industry. A small handful work as guides, 
rickshaw drivers, or operate pompong, small passenger boats to and from Tanjung 
Pinang. An increasing number of residents work as civil servants or school teachers 
either on Pulau Penyengat or in Tanjung Pinang.  
 Until recently, the ethnic composition of Pulau Penyengat’s residents has been 
a mix of Malay, Bugis, Arab, Chinese, Indian and others, some of whom had 
intermarried over several generations and some of whom claimed a more ‘pure’ ethnic 
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heritage. The state’s push in recent years to develop Pulau Penyengat as both a Malay 
cultural hub and as a tourist destination has influenced the ethnic composition on the 
island. In casting Pulau Penyengat as a homeland for Malays and in tandem with an 
agenda of modernization, the state has relocated orang laut, or sea nomads, to remote 
villages in the Riau Islands. Ethnically Chinese residents have been given incentives 
to move to a Chinese-dominated village nearby. The majority of the remaining 
residents self-identify as Malay, a complex and flexible identity that is based on 
religion (Islam), language and culture rather than on ethnicity (Barnard 2004). The 
Indonesian state, along with influences from the broader Dunia Melayu [Malay 
World], has largely succeeded in constructing ethnicity on Pulau Penyengat in the 
homogeneous image of how it imagines a Malay homeland to be. 
 
 











Figure 1.4 - Main jetty on Pulau Penyengat with the historical mosque (upper right) 
 
 
Figure 1.5 - A stretch of village between the two jetties 
 
While seemingly remote, Pulau Penyengat has felt the impact of state efforts 
to ‘nationalize’ the landscape at the village level and to encourage the performance of 
national identity. Due to Pulau Penyengat’s location in a border region, its status has 
shifted from being almost off the state’s radar to being a key national frontier. While 
the Riau Islands are still officially categorized as ‘Outer Islands II’, the recent 
development of a booming manufacturing industry on Batam Island, Riau’s key role 
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in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT)4, and the lucrative 
oil industry in Natuna have all served to invite an increasing amount of state 
intervention. While there has been much discussion about whether the IMS-GT has 
contributed to a ‘borderless’ condition (Parsonage 1992; Ohmae 1994; Macleod and 
McGee 1996; Gill 1997; Peachey, Perry, and Grundy-Warr 1997; Naidu 1998; Chang 
2001) or whether the IMS-GT actually reinforces national boundaries for residents of 
the Riau Islands (Grundy-Warr, Peachey, and Perry 1999; Debrah, McGovern, and 
Budwar 2000), this thesis does not attempt to analyze the degree to which Riau is or is 
not moving towards a state of borderlessness. It accepts that the political reality of the 
border is inescapable and that the process of nationalization, though often influenced 
by outside events to varying degrees, continues to be significant despite regional and 
global economic relationships. Since the fall of Suharto and the implementation of 
decentralization policies, in many ways Riau Islands has been the focus of more state 
attention than it received prior to 1998. For these reasons, Pulau Penyengat is an 
instructive example of how shifting national policies affect ordinary citizens’ lives in 
terms of what they do and the spaces they inhabit. 
As will be explored in this thesis, national landscapes at the village level 
reflect national developments in Jakarta. Therefore, in discussing the process of 
nationalization in Pulau Penyengat I will frequently refer to policies and philosophies 
devised and constructed first in Jakarta as national showpieces. Even before 
Independence, Jakarta was considered by Indonesian nationalists to be the capital city 
of the Republic. During the Indonesian Revolution (1945-49), the capital shifted 
temporarily to the central Javanese city of Yogyakarta but was moved back to Jakarta 
in 1949 immediately after the Dutch formally surrendered. As the national capital in a 
                                                          
4 See Figure 1.2 – Singapore, Johor and Batam form the three corners of the Growth Triangle 
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highly centralized system of government, Jakarta was, and continues to be, the focus 
of much attention in the nation-building process. As with most capital cities, it is the 
site for national imaginings, the showpiece of the nation, and the place for 
pedagogical monuments intended to instruct the general populace about the nation’s 
values and ideology. It was intended as a beacon of modernity and the primary place 
for leaders to show off their aspirations for Indonesia and to legitimize their rule to 
the populace. The creation of a new set of national iconography, or ‘imaging’ the 
nation, was an important process in the struggle for internal legitimacy. The years 
following Independence can be characterized by an intense period of national 
construction in the form of monuments, federal buildings, and urban design. Sukarno, 
who once boasted in his later days as president about being a ‘megalomaniac 
architect’ (Leclerc 1993: 54), found expression for the new nation in International 
Modernism with the ultimate goal of making Jakarta on par with the great 
metropolises of the world. This program of modernization was advanced not simply 
to display Indonesia’s potential for modernization and internationalism but can be 
viewed as stages intended to encourage a set of ‘modern’ behaviours in citizens. 
While Suharto was also focused on monuments and architecture as a way to express 
national ambitions, he found expression in a style that attempted to connect with 
indigenous design traditions and encouraged a corresponding set of behaviours in the 
citizenry.   
 
1.4 Thesis structure 
  Having set the thesis in a broader context of geography and Indonesian 
studies, laid out the rationale and contribution of the research, and presented my key 
questions and objectives in this chapter, Chapter Two, Power, Performance and 
Identity, provides a critical review of several strands of literature organized into four 
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sections. First, I briefly examine how geographers have studied ideology and power 
relations in landscape. Second, I critically review how performance has been used as 
an analytical tool. I examine its origins and appeal, how geographers have employed 
varied interpretations of performance and performativity, some of the challenges and 
limitations of using performance and performativity in analysis and end the section 
with a discussion as to how performance can fruitfully be reformulated. Third, I 
examine various scholars’ approach to power in an Indonesian context and critique 
the domination / resistance binary that pervades much research on the (particularly 
New Order) Indonesian state. Foucault’s concept of governmentality is discussed as a 
key way in which power can be understood in the context of performances of national 
identity. Fourth, I examine the literature on nationalism in Indonesia since 
Independence, ending with a discussion of some of the neglected perspectives in the 
literature.  
 Chapter Three lays out the methodology that has guided this research. I outline 
the informational requirements needed to address my research objectives then discuss 
the particularities of my research context, how I went about gaining access to the 
community and explain my rationale for selecting interviewees. I examine how an 
analysis of both my positionality and personality helped me craft my methodology 
and affected my interactions in the field. The chapter then details the qualitative 
methods I adopted.   
In Chapter Four, Colonial Influences on Indonesian National Identity, I 
examine how and to what extent the groundwork for Indonesian identity was 
established during the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods. This information is drawn 
from published sources as well as from the memories of villagers in Pulau Penyengat. 
This chapter demonstrates that a large number of the Indonesian nation’s 
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characteristics were developed by colonizers, often as a way to ideologically control 
the colonized. I also examine how aspects of Dutch and Japanese colonial ideology 
have been borrowed in the crafting of the Republican administration’s strategies of 
nationalization. 
Chapters Five, Six, and Seven are empirical chapters that each examine a 
realm of life in Pulau Penyengat that has featured significantly in the state’s strategies 
of nationalization. Each conceptual category is closely linked to citizens’ 
performances of national identity: work, learn, and play. The chapters are arranged in 
a progression from the most exclusive of places to the most inclusive. While Chapters 
Five and Six examine aspects of citizens’ lives in which they are conscious of 
performing an official national protocol, Chapters Seven examines aspects of citizens’ 
lives that tend to be less consciously understood by citizens as serving the state’s 
ideological purposes. Each of the empirical chapters explores how citizens are 
expected and encouraged to perform a particular identity in various aspects of their 
lives and at various times. As citizens are not required to perform in the same ways all 
the time, I explore how these performances are place-specific.  
Several common threads run through these landscapes. First is the interplay 
between the village level and Jakarta. Second is the understanding that the process of 
nationalization is ‘fractally’ organized, in other words developments at the village 
level are intended as scaled-down, miniature versions of those found in Jakarta. Third 
is the slippage that occurs between Jakarta and the village—with a radical change in 
scale, context and location comes a host of unintended reinterpretations and 
contestations. Fourth, being a village study, there is an implicit focus on the day-to-
day rather than the spectacular. Finally, through each empirical chapter the body 
emerges as a key site upon which the state inscribes and legitimizes its ideology.  
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Chapter Five, The Nation at Work, examines how (certain) citizens are 
encouraged to perform national identity in the context of the workplace. I begin by 
reviewing the literature that links work and identity and then provide an overview of 
pre- and post-Independence work to demonstrate continuities and changes in 
workplace performances. I then explore how particular workplaces have been used to 
propagate and enforce official national identity. Through an investigation of civil 
servants, non-state workers and ‘volunteers’ on Pulau Penyengat, I illustrate how 
workplace performances of national identity are uneven across the population by 
looking specifically at workplace uniforms, workplace national rituals, and workplace 
organizational hierarchies. I examine for whom these standardized national work 
performances are mandatory and for whom they are not. This chapter also examines 
how employees ignore or assign alternate meanings to mandatory performances of 
national identity. Furthermore, it considers how certain groups of non-state workers 
have enthusiastically imitated versions of state spaces and performance for a range of 
purposes.  
 Chapter Six, Educating the Nation, examines how, since Independence, 
performance has played a key role in propagating official versions of national identity 
in the context of education. For many people on Pulau Penyengat, school is the only 
time in their lives that they are asked to participate in official national rituals, making 
education a formative interaction with the nation. In this chapter, I review how 
scholars have examined the connections between education and nation-building. After 
providing a brief overview of pre-Independence education, I then examine how 
education has changed since Independence and the regular national ritual 
performances that are coordinated in places of learning across the country. Through 
an in-depth investigation of an elementary school on Pulau Penyengat, I analyze how 
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nation-building is carried out through the bodies and actions of school children and 
investigate ways in which national identity is inculcated in students through various 
performances, including school uniforms, morning exercises, the weekly flag 
ceremony, and ‘ethnic’ education.  
Chapter Seven, The Nation at Play, explores how the state has extended its 
agenda of nationalization to the recreational activities of its populace. Since 
Independence, the state has introduced pastimes that were ideally intended to 
contribute to the overall development and strength of the nation by ‘improving’ the 
quality of citizenry by, for example, teaching discipline, ‘modernity’, and culture, and 
by strengthening their bodies. This chapter explores two ways in which national 
identity has been, and continues to be, performed through state recreational strategies 
since Independence, namely through sports and performing arts. First, I will examine 
national sports programs as key recreational areas in which citizens are frequently 
encouraged to perform national identity. I will examine how various waves of state-
built sports infrastructure on Pulau Penyengat have reflected national sports 
development in Jakarta, shifting from a European-derived fitness culture to include 
local, ethnicized sports intended to reflect regional ethno-cultural identities. I examine 
the ways in which the national sport program is maintained, in part by educators at the 
village level who are sent for training by fitness instructors at the national level in 
order to effectively synchronize fitness programs across Indonesia. Second, I examine 
the emergence of state-driven performing arts on Pulau Penyengat, also a key way in 
which citizens are encouraged to actively perform a version of national identity in 
their free time with the use of state-funded facilities. While these performing arts 
programs in the village are just as much a part of official notions of national identity 
as more formally regulated performances, they are understood by villagers as being 
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more voluntary and enjoyable than those in spaces of work and learning. In the 
context of the recreational pursuits of sports and performing arts, it is more relevant to 
examine participation, non-participation and local adaptation rather than framing the 
analysis in terms of resistance. 
 This thesis concludes with Chapter Eight, Conclusion, in which I review how 
each chapter addresses the research questions and has contributed to the existing 
literature theoretically and empirically. I then provide an overview of the key 



























This chapter seeks to situate my research within existing literatures on 
landscape, performance, and nationalism and power in Indonesia. Through discussion 
of these often overlapping areas, I will provide background on the relevant literature 
and a theoretical justification for my empirical research. In selecting and reviewing 
the literature, three areas of inquiry emerged that directly link to my thesis objectives: 
1. How does a powerful entity such as the Indonesian state make its presence 
felt across the archipelago, across language groups, across a range of scales, and to a 
largely illiterate or semi-literate populace? What role does performance play in the 
formation, dissemination, and enforcement of official national identity in postcolonial 
Indonesia? How does the national landscape function as a cultural practice? What 
strategies does the state employ to encourage citizens to behave as ‘Indonesians’?  
2. How have the state’s strategies changed over the course of the Old and New 
Orders and into the present? What continuities are there?  
3. How have citizens responded to state efforts? How has the state’s vision of 
‘Indonesia’ been understood, accepted, resisted and reinterpreted by the citizenry? 
How have responses varied depending on the scale and location? How have citizens 
developed their own sense of national identity independent of, or in spite of, state 
efforts?  
I am interested in examining these questions specifically through an analysis 
of landscape and performance and have sought out literature that asks similar 
questions about national identity, power relations between citizens and the state, and 
ideology in the form of landscape and performance. In this chapter I provide a critical 
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review of several overlapping strands of literature organized into four sections. The 
first set of literature broadly relates to how ideology, values and power are expressed 
through and embedded in landscape. I outline some of the approaches cultural 
geographers and others have taken and examine existing literature related to 
landscape in an Indonesian context. Second, I critically review how performance and 
performativity have been used as analytical tools, with particular focus on the work of 
geographers. I examine the origins and appeal of the concepts, how geographers have 
employed varied interpretations of performance and performativity, some of the 
challenges and limitations of using performance and performativity in analysis, and 
end the section with a discussion about how performance can fruitfully be 
reformulated. Third, I examine various scholars’ approaches to power in an 
Indonesian context and critique the domination / resistance binary that pervades much 
research on the (particularly New Order) Indonesian state. I then provide a brief 
overview of the main ways in which power has been theorized in the literature on 
Indonesian politics and society. Foucault’s concept of governmentality is discussed as 
a key way in which power can be understood in the context of performances of 
national identity. Fourth, I examine how scholars have approached the study of  
Indonesian nationalism.  
 
2.2 Ideology and power relations in landscape 
Many scholars have observed that power, identity, ideology, and values are 
expressed through landscape (Zukin 1991; Baker and Biger 1992; Daniels 1993; 
Mitchell 1994; Johnson 1995; Schein 1997; Mitchell 2000; Hénaff and Strong 2001; 
Kong and Yeoh 2003; Bunnell 2004). Landscape has been recognized as playing a 
key role in the construction and contestation of national identity. Scholars emphasize 
that ‘landscape’ is a cultural, social and political construct which ‘masks the artifice 
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and ideological nature of its form and content, making what is patently cultural appear 
to be as natural as possible’ (Kong and Yeoh 2003: 14-15; see also Barrell 1980; 
Duncan and Duncan 1988; Duncan 1990; Mitchell 1994). As a technology of control, 
states deploy landscape as a strategy of power to ‘incorporate, categorize, discipline, 
control and reform’ their citizens (King 1990: 9). Cultural geographers have worked 
to decode messages embedded in landscape to show that ideology and power leading 
to control and surveillance are very much in operation (see for example, Hopkins 
1990; Goss 1993; Jackson 1998). The dominant group (such as the state, males, 
heterosexuals, particular races) expresses and maintains power through the creation, 
‘control and manipulation of landscapes and the practises of everyday life’ 
(Winchester, Kong, and Dunn 2003: 67).  
Ways in which landscape both reflects and legitimizes ideology has been 
examined in the context of various social identities. Feminist and queer geographers 
have examined ways in which the dominant ideology is embedded in landscape and 
how places and spaces are deliberately gendered and sexed for the purpose of 
exclusion and inclusion and to legitimize the heterosexual ‘norm’ (see Greed 1992; 
Monk 1992; Winchester 1992; Bell et al. 1994; Bell and Valentine 1995; McDowell 
1999; Podmore 2001; Bondi and Rose 2003; Little and Panelli 2003; Doan 2007; 
Oswin 2008; Visser 2008). Scholars have also looked at the body as a landscape of 
power, paying particular attention to clothes and adornment as strategies used to 
legitimize the ideology of the dominant group (McDowell and Court 1994; Nash 
1996; Nast and Pile 1998; Dwyer 1999; Longhurst 2000; Zelinsky 2004; Longhurst 
2005b, 2005a; Mohammad 2005). Others have examined how the state has used 
landscape as a hegemonic tool to naturalize and legitimize its power in the 
construction and maintenance of public space and the employment of particular urban 
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design principles (see King 1976; Kowinski 1985; Cosgrove 1988; Ley and Olds 
1988; Agnew and Duncan 1989; Chua 1991; Zukin 1991; Hershkovitz 1993; 
MacDonald 1995; Yiftachel et al. 2001; Cuthbert 2003; Staeheli and Mitchell 2006). 
The inscription of class on landscape has been explored in the context of how the elite 
have sought to establish cultural legitimacy through architectural manifestations of 
their power and desired sophistication (Domosh 1989; King 1996; Bunnell 1999, 
2004). These studies all examine how landscape is used by powerful groups to 
legitimize their dominance and present uneven power relations as the natural order. 
Cultural geographers have long considered landscape a way of seeing, 
structuring and giving meaning to the world and have focused on the symbolic 
qualities of landscape and how these qualities produce and perpetuate social meaning. 
Since the early 1980s, more interpretive methodological approaches stemming from 
linguistics and semiotics have replaced older descriptive approaches of analyzing 
landscape. In The City as Text: the Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the 
Kandyan Kingdom (1990), James Duncan applies post-structural ideas drawn from 
literary theory to provide a methodology for interpreting landscapes as ‘text’ to be 
read or interpreted as one would a written document. He understands landscape as a 
signifying system embodying cultural practices and a cultural production, integral to 
the reproduction and contestation of political power. Like written texts, images 
(including landscape) must be understood as complex, with powers to deceive and 
naturalize their constructedness. Whatever the medium, any representation is imbued 
with meaning mediated by social considerations. The metaphor of landscape as ‘texts’ 
has been extended to include linguistic analogies such as the grammar, similes and 
syntax to attempt to understand general rules of landscape. 
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 In the last decade or so, some scholars have shifted to understanding landscape 
as a process. W. J. T. Mitchell (1994: 1) suggests changing ‘landscape’ from a noun 
to a verb in order to think of landscape ‘not as an object to be seen or a text to be read, 
but as a process by which social and subjective identities are formed’. Don Mitchell 
(2000; 2003) and others (see Corner 1999; Shurmer-Smith 2002) go beyond enquiring 
what landscape ‘is’ or ‘means’ by asking what landscape does and how it functions as 
a cultural practice.  
A number of scholars from various disciplines have studied the power 
relations and ideology embedded in the landscape in an Indonesian context (Nas 
1992; Leclerc 1993; MacDonald 1995; Errington 1998; Cairns 2005). Their main 
contributions include the identification and documentation of national landscapes and 
monuments and explanations of their symbolic meaning. However, like Duncan 
(1990) and others, their main concern is with what the landscape represents rather 
than what the landscape does. Their work tends to focus largely on the same 
spectacular state expressions of national identity located almost exclusively in and 
around Jakarta: the national monument (MONAS), national public statuary, Taman 
Mini Indonesia Raya5 (‘Beautiful Indonesia in Miniature Park’, the national theme 
park), and the international section of the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport. Also 
focusing exclusively on Jakarta, Cairns (2005) adopts Francis Bacon’s terminology 
‘arts of transmission’ to explain the urban practices through which ideas are 
articulated, distributed, and passed on. Bacon argues that what we know depends 
upon the transmission of knowledge through various mediums, or ‘materialities of 
communication’. Cairns extends Bacon’s inventory of knowledge transmitters beyond 
printed material, sound and film to include architecture and urban form in an approach 
                                                          
5 See page 112 for a fuller discussion.  
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that begins to examine what the landscape does. Abidin Kusno (2000) provides a rich 
look into the political history of architecture and urbanism in Jakarta and, going 
beyond the symbolism and meaning behind national monuments found in Nas (1992) 
and Leclerc’s (1993) work, seeks to examine how urban space plays a constitutive 
role in creating national subjects. 
While landscape, monuments and urban form are understood as tools of 
communication for the state, there is little exploration into how citizens accept, reject, 
reinterpret or ignore these efforts or how citizens in turn can constitute the landscape. 
Also, attention is paid neither to landscapes at the provincial or village level nor to the 
everyday, unspectacular ‘nationalized’ spaces. There is a lack of dynamism to these 
studies accentuated by a lack of exploration into what people do in relation to the 
design and underlying power relations in landscape. One outstanding example in 
which the landscape is seen to affect the bodily performance of visitors can be found 
in anthropologist Shelly Errington’s (1998: 215) discussion of the Indonesia Museum 
in Taman Mini: 
…the grand entrance portal to the building was ostentatiously locked with a 
large chain and lock – it is used only for ceremonies, said a nearby guard – 
making it necessary to stoop down to enter through a small, low door to the 
side of the main entrance. This entrance device converts ordinary visitors into 
humble penitents, by obliging them to bow towards the structure upon the act 
of entering. In contrast to the large locked entrance portal, this diminutive 
doorway is, in effect, the servants’ entrance to the sacred space. 
 
This excerpt nicely conveys how landscape and performance intersect: the landscape 
regulates the performance, and the performance in turn constitutes the landscape. 
While cultural geographers in recent years have explored the more performative 
aspects of landscape and how landscape is made meaningful by human performance, 
there is a significant gap in the literature which reveals the need for an in-depth 
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empirical study relating to landscape and the performance of Indonesian national 
identity.  
 
2.3 Performance and Performativity 
...we can better understand cultural identity not by studying the artifacts of 
museums or libraries, but through observing emergent performances. Thus, if 
we desire to understand more about human and cultural identity, we must turn 
to the study of human action. (Fine and Speer 1992, Performance, Culture, 
Identity) 
 
During the past decade, scholars in the social sciences and humanities have 
turned from examining text, language, and representation towards a scrutiny of 
performance and practices. This shift can be observed in cultural geography in the 
recent increase in the number of papers published and conferences held that attempt to 
understand and utilize performance and performativity as conceptual frames for the 
analysis of a variety of issues. Performance and performativity are seen as important 
conceptual tools with which to ‘denaturalize taken-for-granted social practices’ and, 
particularly, to displace the heteronormativity of gender and sex (Butler 1990). It is 
also seen as increasingly important for understanding how dominant ideology and 
values are enacted and maintained and how space is made meaningful through human 
performance. Broadly, ‘performance’ can be defined as what ‘individual subjects do, 
say, [and] ‘act-out”’ and ‘performativity’ is defined as ‘the repeated actions which 
perpetuate and/or destabilize discourse’ (Gregson and Rose 2000: 434).  
This section is divided into four parts. First, I examine the origins and appeal 
of performance and performativity as analytical concepts. I then provide an overview 
of the ways in which performance has been used by geographers. This will be 
followed by an outline of some of the challenges and limitations in performative 




2.3.1 Origins and appeal   
The study of performance and performativity emerged from the disciplines of 
philosophy, sociology, linguistics, anthropology, and literary, theatre and cultural 
studies. Performance has been theorized in different ways that depend on particular, 
contrasting understandings of agency, subjectivity, and power.  
In the 1950s, the sociologist Erving Goffman pioneered the study of 
performance by using metaphors derived from drama and theatre to view social 
interaction as a series of performances with actors, scripts, sets and audience members 
who interpret actions, and in turn enact these performances themselves (Goffman 
1959). The anthropologist Victor Turner (1974) was also a key figure to employ 
dramaturgical metaphors to understand social relations. In his work he developed the 
idea that the performance of rituals function as both cultural agent and social process. 
Performance and performativity have since been employed as analytical tools to 
‘extraordinary cross-purposes’ (Parker and Sedgewick 1995: 1) by theorists in a range 
of disciplines. Several key theorists and their approaches to performance and 
performativity will be examined in this section, namely, Goffman; Irigaray, a feminist 
and philosopher; Riviere, a psychoanalyst; and Butler, a queer theorist.  
Performance and performativity respond to the desire to go beyond the 
analysis of texts and visual presentation, which, while useful, have been criticized as 
reflecting an inaccurately static world. Thus, part of the appeal of ‘performance’ lies 
in its connotations of dynamism, movement, and the temporal, the actual doing. 
Performance and performativity also offer possibilities for thinking about social 
identities as acted out, as performed, as constructed in and through social action rather 
than existing anterior to social processes.  
Goffman was one of the more prolific scholars to explore the human 
performance of various identities. Goffman (1959) cites a passage from William 
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Sansom’s (1956) novel A Contest of Ladies that exemplifies the kinds of everyday 
performances in which we all engage. It is worth quoting this passage at length as it 
effectively conveys Goffman’s contention that the constructed, the theatrical, 
contextual, and nonverbal kinds of daily communication are both intentional and 
unintentional. This passage describes the performance of Preedy, an Englishman on 
vacation in coastal Spain for the first time:  
But in any case he took care to avoid catching anyone’s eye. First of all, he 
had to make it clear to those potential companions of his holiday that they 
were of no concern to him whatsoever. He stared through them, round them, 
over them – eyes lost in space. The beach might have been empty. If by 
chance a ball was thrown his way, he looked surprised; then let a smile of 
amusement lighten his face (Kindly Preedy), looked round dazed to see that 
there were people on the beach, tossed it back with a smile to himself and not 
a smile at the people, and then resumed carelessly his nonchalant survey of 
space.  
But it was time to institute a little parade, the parade of the Ideal 
Preedy. By devious handlings he gave any who wanted to look a chance to see 
the title of his book – a Spanish translation of Homer, classic thus, but not 
daring, cosmopolitan too – and then gathered together his beach-wrap and bag 
into a neat sand-resistant pile (Methodical and Sensible Preedy), rose slowly to 
stretch at ease his huge frame (Big-Cat Preedy), and tossed aside his sandals 
(Carefree Preedy, after all). 
The marriage of Preedy and the sea! There were alternative rituals. The 
first involved the stroll that turns into a run and a dive straight into the water, 
thereafter smoothing into a strong splashless crawl towards the horizon. But of 
course not really to the horizon. Quite suddenly he would turn on to his back 
and thrash great white splashes with his legs, somehow thus showing that he 
could have swum further had he wanted to, and then would stand up a quarter 
out of the water for all to see who it was. 
The alternative course was simpler, it avoided the cold-water shock 
and it avoided the risk of appearing too high-spirited. The point was to appear 
to be so used to the sea, the Mediterranean, and this particular beach, that one 
might as well be in the sea as out of it. It involved a slow stroll down and into 
the edge of the water – not even noticing his toes were wet, land and water all 
the same to him! – with his eyes up at the sky gravely surveying portents, 
invisible to others, of the weather (Local Fisherman Preedy).  
 
As the primary scholar who theorized an intentional, knowing, active, prior 
subject, Goffman’s work is helpful in understanding aspects of human activity that 
require agency and intentionality. He sees human behaviour as a ‘system of theatrical 
performances … enacted by intentional agents in a given social context’ (Hyndman 
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and de Alwis 2005: 38). The individual can be understood as a manipulative, strategic 
self who reveals only what he/she desires to be seen. Particular performances are 
enacted in public spaces, which can be halted in private. Hyndman and de Alwis 
(2005) observe that while there are obvious limitations to Goffman’s separation of 
public and private space, his metaphor is useful in understanding practices adopted by 
certain people in certain places. Hyndman and de Alwis contend that people actively 
construct their identities in certain contexts to avoid drawing attention to themselves 
and to reduce harassment and / or alienation, and for personal gain. In line with 
Goffman (1959), they argue that the strategic presentation of self in everyday life can 
be key to one’s survival and advancement. Jeganathan (1998: 98-100) has described 
such strategic presentations of self as ‘tactics of anticipation’. To live then as an 
Indonesian, as a woman, or as any other social identity requires a ‘repertoire of 
tactics’ or performances that can be deployed depending on the context.  
It is important to emphasize that Goffman concentrates on revealing the day-
to-day performances in which we all perpetually engage with varying degrees of 
conscious intent. As can be seen from the above passage, Goffman attributes a large 
degree of agency to the subject and their awareness of an audience, which in turn 
informs the type of performance that is put on. While Goffman understands 
performance as being carried out by an active, prior and conscious self, subjects are 
not completely free agents who perform as they please. Instead, they perform 
identities that are shaped by hegemonic discourses. According to this formulation, 
humans have agency within the confines of broadly scripted social roles.  
In contrast, in their work on the feminine identity of women, Joan Riviere 
(1986) and Luce Irigaray (1985) both suggest that femininity is a mask worn at all 
times in all social situations. They claim that there is no difference between the 
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woman and the mask and that there is no active, conscious human agent behind the 
mask of femininity. This point is also made by the famous cross-dressing Indonesian 
dancer, Didik (Mrázek, 2005), who dons a physical mask for many of his 
performances and believes that even when his physical mask is removed, a 
metaphorical mask remains. Like Irigaray and Riviere, Didik argues that no single, 
stable self exists and that there is no separation between the mask and the performer. 
One’s face, according to Didik, is just another mask, no different from his material 
masks. Didik and Irigaray both argue that we wear multiple masks, or identities, 
which are dependent on the social situation. These views question the existence of a 
fixed individual identity. As Didik suggests, ‘these mask-like identities are not 
superficial disguises, but the real thing’ (Mrázek, 2005: 7). 
Judith Butler sparked widespread interest in performance with her book, 
Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990) in which she 
introduced her theory of performativity. In Gender Trouble, she provides a way to 
think of gender identities as socially constructed, arguing that the dominant discourses 
of gender and sexuality are endlessly perpetuated through constant repetition. Butler 
is primarily concerned with sexuality, gender, and heteronormativity, exploring how 
social roles are not predetermined but are a complex series of roles enacted to 
maintain power structures. Her concept of performativity  
recognizes that “the subject” is constituted through matrices of 
power/discourse, matrices that are continually reproduced through processes 
of resignification, or repetition of hegemonic gendered (racialized, sexualized) 
discourses’ (Nelson 1999: 337).  
 
In Gender Trouble (1990) Butler argues against the notion of a self that is 
independent of power/discourse matrices.  
As feminist theorists developed the concept of performance to understand how 
gender identities are constructed and actively maintained, the body became a key 
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scale at which to observe this process. This scale can be seen as crucial in the analysis 
of performances of national identity, which often comes into being through the body 
of the citizen. In other words, the state often acts as a regulator and reproducer of 
national identities by articulating ideology through the bodies of its citizens.  
Butler contends that there is no authentic, inherent man or woman that 
precedes culture, society, and language, arguing that gender identity is a social 
performance and not a biological reality. While others have made similar observations 
about the constructedness of identities, by using the concept of ‘performance’, she 
emphasizes the repetition necessary to maintain identities. By endlessly referencing 
the conventions and ideologies of the social world around us, we individually enact 
our reality by internalizing and then performing it with our bodies. However, that 
‘reality’ nonetheless remains a social construction and by citing it, we perpetuate the 
social constructedness of our world. Our social reality is a naturalized construction, an 
imitation with no original (Butler 1990). Butler argues that what we assume to be 
‘natural’ about our gender identity is almost non-existent, and that gender, rather than 
being a binary division based on biological difference, is instead a persistent 
impersonation that passes as real. Being a woman, for example, is not a ‘natural fact 
but a cultural performance [in which] “naturalness” [is] constituted through 
discursively constrained performative acts that produce the body through and within 
the categories of sex’ (Butler 1990: 30). In other words, the process of doing gender 
or sexuality involves repetition (resignification through performance) and that identity 
is something repeatedly performed and therefore naturalized rather than something 
inherent. Following this logic, the way that dominant discourses are displaced or that 
change occurs is through accidental and unintentional ‘slippages’ in the process of 
repetition (Butler, 1990: 30).  
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In Butler’s theorization of ‘performance’ she narrowly confines her work to 
gender performances, leaving others to speculate as to how her theories might address 
more consciously-performed identities, such as those relating to employment or 
nationality6. Butler’s assumption of how social change occurs is similarly rigid, 
making it difficult to apply her work to scenarios that involve active, conscious 
agents. Even Butler’s insistence that gender and sexuality are subconsciously 
performed is narrowly explained. For example, while females may not be aware of 
acting ‘female’, they are however aware at times that femininity is a kind of act, as 
seen in the common expression ‘to put on one’s face’ to refer to a woman applying 
her make-up. This expression clearly communicates a level of consciousness in 
gender performance that is unaccounted for in Butler’s theorization. The mask of 
femininity in such a scenario is understood to some degree by the actor to be a 
performance. Butler specifically points to drag balls as an example that makes 
‘explicit the way in which all gender and sexual identifications are ritually performed 
in daily life’ (Nelson 1999: 339). By parodying dominant norms, drag balls expose 
the fact that heterosexuality is always a performance, and attempt to ‘idealize its own 
idealizations’. The aim of this fabrication is the production of a coherent identity, 
bounded and constituted by the political forces that impose a compulsory 
heterosexuality.  
The key ideas in Butler’s understanding of performance are the social 
construction of identities, the sustaining of these identities through repeated 
‘performances’, the occurrence of change in the form of unintentional ‘slippages’, and 
the absence of an active, prior subject. Employing Butler’s theories usefully requires a 
rigorous critique and reworking of performativity and an understanding of the 
                                                          
6 While she does not make it explicit, it is possible that she would not deny that there are some 
identities that are consciously performed and, by extension, intentional. This, however, is not 
elaborated in Butler’s writing. 
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shortcomings of the concept. According to Nelson (1999), scholars such as Bell et al. 
(1994) and McDowell and Court (1994) falsely read intentionality into Butler’s 
performativity. According to Butler, ‘to posit a subject that is aware or critical of 
dominant discourse (one that she assumes is then ‘outside’ of it) capitulates to the 
autonomous masterful subject of liberal thought’ (Nelson 1999: 343). In other words, 
since we are all situated within multiple discourses, we can never assume to be 
neutral, knowing subjects. Change can only be brought about through unintentional 
slippages that occur through repeated performances of dominant identities.  
While Butler focuses primarily on gender and sexual identities, her concept of 
identity as a social performance has recently been extended by human geographers 
and others to include identities relating to nationhood, race, culture and class (these 
will be elaborated upon in the next sub-section). However, as Nelson (1999: 343) 
points out, directly applying Butler’s notion of performance to geography is 
challenging as Butler provides ‘no handles for thinking about the spatial / temporal 
location’. Butler has set up a dichotomy between either a masterful Enlightenment 
subject or the subject as a site for subconscious, unintentional performances of 
dominant discourses. Lise Nelson (1999: 350) problematizes this dichotomy, arguing 
for an understanding of the self that is  
both constituted by discursive processes and potentially aware of them, 
potentially able to actively appropriate, reject or reshape the subject 
position(s) offered by dominant discourse(s).  
 
Borrowing from both Goffman and Butler, Nelson recognizes a more comprehensive 
version of the self that is more satisfying with regard to the performance of national 
identity. This will be more fully examined in sub-section 2.3.5, in which I provide my 
own conceptual reworking of performativity for the purpose of examining how 
national identity is performed. 
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2.3.2 Performance and performativity in geography 
Some geographers increasingly see potential in performance and 
performativity as conceptual tools for a critical human geography, arguing that they 
need to be thought about in relation to space: ‘space needs to be thought of as brought 
into being through performances and as a performative articulation of power’ 
(Gregson and Rose 2000: 434). Human geographers view performativity as a way to 
understand the constructedness of identity, social power relations, and the ways in 
which these are spatially articulated. Performativity has been helpful in developing 
theories about the ‘constructedness of identity, subjectivity, and agency’ (Gregson and 
Rose, 2000: 434), particularly in relation to sexuality and gender. Since performativity 
cannot be viewed as a singular act but as a norm or set of norms that are naturalized 
through repetition (Nash 2000), the theorizing of sexuality, gender and other identities 
as performative ‘can transform static, pre-discursive notions of space and place’ 
(Nelson 1999: 335) and thus contribute to new understandings of place, space, 
identity, gender and sexuality. The notion of performance is ‘indeed crucial for a 
critical human geography concerned with understanding the construction of social 
identity, social difference, and social power relations, and the way space might 
articulate all of these’ (Gregson and Rose 2000: 434).  
Similarly, recognizing a need to ‘make [geographies] alive’, Thrift and 
Dewsbury (2000: 411) have suggested that the metaphor of performance offers 
geography an alternative to more static representation-based approaches to place and 
landscape. Thrift (2000b; 2000a; 2000c; Thrift and Dewsbury 2000; 2004) also sees 
performativity as a way for geography to renew and reinvigorate itself, something he 
feels geography urgently needs to do. His work on ‘nonrepresentational theory’ also 
highlights his desire for new and challenging directions for cultural geography that 
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turn ‘away from the analysis of texts, images and discourses, and towards 
understanding the micro-geographies of habitual practices, departing from 
deconstructing representations to explore the non-representational’ (Nash 2000: 656).  
The concepts of performance and performativity are used by geographers in 
two separate and rarely overlapping ways. Scholars are generally divided into two 
schools: the ‘dance’ school, dominated by the concepts advanced by Nigel Thrift, and 
the ‘performed identity’ school, dominated by the writings of Judith Butler and 
Erving Goffman. There is little dialogue between the schools, as can be seen by the 
list of references in papers dealing with performance, which tend to cite work 
produced exclusively by one or the other school but very rarely both. In his 
engagement with performativity, Thrift turns to the performing arts and to dance in 
particular as a ‘“concentrated” example of the expressive nature of embodiment’ 
(1997: 125).  He approaches performativity through what he calls 
‘nonrepresentational theory or the theory of practices’, an attempt to explore the realm 
of body practices which cannot be represented in texts, images and discourses. 
However, as Nash (2000) points out, in favouring practices over words, Thrift relies 
on a division between thought and practice, which associates the apparent rationality 
of texts to masculinity and the apparent unknowability and instability to femininity 
(Foster 1998). Furthermore, his use of dance is problematic as it treats dance as a 
natural, unmediated, authentic engagement with the world rather than as a cultural 
form, itself embedded in power relations. For the purpose of this thesis, Thrift’s 
‘dance’ approach is less applicable so I will move on to discuss how the work of 
Butler and Goffman has been used by cultural geographers. 
If identity is constructed and maintained through discourse, performance, and 
everyday actions, it must be understood as being context-dependent, as different 
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performances occur in different locations. As Pamela Shurmer-Smith has argued 
(2002), performance is spatial in that it takes place somewhere. Shurmer-Smith also 
points out that there are spatial politics in every action: in aggressively pushing or 
politely standing back in a shop; in considerately making oneself as small as possible 
or comfortably spreading one’s legs in tourist class airplane seats; in covering one’s 
window in voile or displaying one’s life to the world. The place-specificity of 
performance has been studied by feminist and queer theorist geographers who argue 
that places are encoded with messages about who belongs, what behaviour is 
expected, and what other axes of social division are made concrete in space. 
Goffman’s sense of anterior agents, his separation of performer and 
performance, the sense of performances occupying particular pre-given kinds of 
spaces, and his notion of a (constraining) script all recur in geographers’ discussions 
of performance, even in writing that does not specifically cite his work. Nicky 
Gregson and Gillian Rose (2000) form a consensus around Goffman’s view of 
interaction as an engagement between individual(s) and audience(s), to whom 
individuals perform and who, in turn, interpret their actions (like Preedy on the 
beach). Although their respective works draw on Butler’s theory and vocabulary of 
habitually repeated, performed identities, they ultimately support Goffman’s theory 
that there exists an active, prior, consciously performing self.  
Gregson and Rose (2000: 433) extend the scope of Butler’s work, arguing that 
spaces also need to be viewed as performative and ‘more needs to be made of the 
complexity and instability of performances and performed spaces’. Gregson and Rose 
(2000) illustrate what they mean by the ‘performative qualities of space’ with 
examples from their individual research projects on community arts workers and car-
boot sales, respectively. In their empirical study of car-boot sales, they argue that 
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while conventional spaces of exchange (high street, malls, and so on) and car-boot 
sales occupy different physical spaces, the spaces are linked through interrelational 
performance. For example, they observe that aspects of conventional spaces of 
exchange infiltrate car-boot sales in the form of pricing strategies, haggling decisions 
and the concept of the ‘bargain’. Likewise, the presence of car-boot sales on high 
street is seen in individuals who visit high street to price check against goods sold in 
car-boot sales. Rather than performances simply being located in space, the car-boot 
sale and high street can be understood as relational and articulated through 
performance. The main contribution of their paper is their attempt to ‘take Butler 
elsewhere’ through challenging existing work which assumes that performances take 
place on already existing locations, or ‘stages’ which preexist their performers. In 
contrast, Gregson and Rose argue that it is specific performances (such as a car-boot 
sale) which bring these spaces into being. 
Phil Crang (1994) employs the metaphor of performance to illustrate how 
staff, management, and customers in a popular diner-style restaurant follow scripts 
governing speech, dress, and behaviour. Crang conceptualizes the dining room and 
open-concept kitchen as the ‘stage’ in which a particular set of performances are 
required, in contrast to what he refers to as the ‘backstage’ or ‘behind-the-scenes’ 
areas where employees can stop ‘performing’. Crang argues that the ‘audience’ also 
follows scripted roles. In these performances, the categories of ‘audience’ and 
‘performer’ in Crang’s restaurant collapse and all involved become actors and 
audience simultaneously.  
Crang’s use of performance as an analogy for the everyday activity of dining 
in a restaurant is a simple but useful example of how the concept of performance can 
aid in understanding intentional social behaviour. In this example, the theatre 
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metaphor helps to describe human action in relation to space in a way that 
underscores the contextual nature of performance. Similarly, in their analysis of the 
violent conflict in Sri Lanka, Jennifer Hyndman and Malathi de Alwis (2005) 
examine how national identity is performed strategically as a survival mechanism in 
particular contexts. They observe that at checkpoints in Sri Lanka certain groups 
‘actively construct their identities in ways that will reduce harassment and threats – 
either perceived or real’ (Hyndman and de Alwis, 2005: 39). In this case, Tamils 
strategically downplay and maintain ambiguity around their Tamil ethnicity/nation in 
certain places. 
Rather than exploring the more abstract, theoretical dimensions of 
performance, in Landscape and Englishness David Matless (1998) examines the 
performance of Englishness and the space in which this identity is enacted. He 
effectively describes how a particular perception of a homogenous, timeless and 
stable rural Englishness is maintained through conscious7 performances of citizenship 
such as dance, exercise, walking, hostelling, and map reading. Such specific 
nationalistic ‘performances’ were encouraged by the state as part of campaigns to re-
build and strengthen the ‘British nation’ between the world wars and after WWII. By 
partaking in officially-sanctioned activities, one could show support for England. His 
performances of Englishness rely upon an aware and conscious subject which 
‘perform’ in context-specific ways. While neither Crang nor Matless explicitly refer 
to Goffman, their respective research parallels points made in The Presentation of Self 
in Everyday Life (1959).  
                                                          
7  The degree to which individuals are conscious they are performing is never clear and varies from person to 
person. What is more important is that the state promoted these activities by creating or designating the spaces in 
which they could occur. While many of these activities had been carried out prior to their official sanctioning as 
‘national’ activities, the meaning of them changes once they are organized and encouraged by the state. 
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Several scholars follow Butler in seeking primarily to disrupt dominant 
understandings of gender and sexuality while attempting to spatialize Butler’s 
performativity (Bell et al 1994; McDowell and Court 1994; Gibson-Graham 1996; 
Lewis and Pile 1996; Longhurst 2000). They examine how space is heteronormative 
and discourages performances of homosexuality, pregnancy, or other minority bodily 
behaviours. Longhurst (2000) also uses Butler’s concept of performativity in the 
context of a beauty pageant for pregnant women, in which heavily pregnant women 
parody a conventional beauty contest meant for young, single and therefore sexually 
available women. She claims that in so doing, these women confound societal 
expectations that the pregnant body should be hidden or disguised and that pregnancy 
and the sexuality of pregnant women is a private matter.  
In her paper ‘Tricking the border guards: Performing race’, Mahtani (2002) 
adopts aspects of Butler’s performativity to explore the process of racialization, an 
aspect not examined in Butler’s model of performance. In her study of self-identified 
‘mixed race’ women, Mahtani departs from Butler’s performativity in her 
understanding of subjects as critical and conscious of their racialized identities. 
Mahtani examines ‘mixed race’ people through the lens of performativity in order to 
demonstrate that, like gender, racialized categories can also be understood as 
‘regulatory fictions’ which are ‘actively performed and masqueraded’ (Mahtani 2002: 
428). Like other scholars adopting Butler’s concept of performativity, however, 
Mahtani assumes a conscious and strategic subject that purposefully performs in 
particular ways. Her interviewees intentionally disrupt racial stereotypes as a way of 
liberating themselves from them, an approach more in line with Goffman’s notion of 
performance than the ‘regulatory fiction’ put forth by Butler. 
44 
 
McDowell and Court’s (1994) paper ‘Performing work: Bodily representations 
in merchant banks’ examines the scripting and performance of gendered identities in 
merchant banks and how dominant identities are performed daily by workers. They 
explore how the media deploys, and therefore reinforces, hegemonic identities of the 
dominant group (white male professionals) which is then perpetuated by both male 
and female employees. They observe that required performance of workers such as 
office dress and behaviour is scripted and completely conscious. While citing Butler, 
McDowell and Court argue that gender roles (e.g. the flirtatious, feminized 
stockbroker) are consciously chosen and performed for personal benefit, a stance that 
is in fact more in line with Goffman’s conscious subject and separation of performer 
and performance.  
Bell et al. (1994) have employed Butler’s performativity in their analysis of 
queer urban space, highlighting the tensions which arise from the performed identities 
of ‘lipstick lesbians’ and ‘gay skinheads’. The ‘feminine’ appearance of ‘lipstick 
lesbians’ generates tension both among some members of the lesbian community and 
among the straight community who feel they are being deceptive about who they are. 
The appearance of gay skinheads also causes tension among non-white gays who 
question whether gay skinheads support the racist philosophies of skinheads or are 
simply dressing like them. In this case, subversion is not always a result of ‘slippages’ 
inherent in citation, or the repeated referencing of prior actions. The subversion of 
heterosexual identity rests on the ‘active appropriation’ of straight space by gays and 
lesbians, or on the ability to ‘infiltrate’ it (Bell et al 1994: 32). These acts also suggest 
an agency that Butler’s theorization does not include.  
Turner and Manderson (2007) employ the concepts of performance and 
performativity to examine the microgeography of how law students are socialized into 
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the law profession through weekly informal ‘Coffee House’ gatherings. At these 
gatherings, the students make a show of acting like lawyers in how they eat, drink, 
dress and socialize, an act that was both polished and reinforced after repeated 
performances over time. Turner and Manderson argue that through repetitive 
performances at Coffee House, students are socialized into the law profession and 
learn to successfully behave like lawyers through unconsciously acting out dominant 
behaviour patterns expected of an aspiring lawyer.   
In their study of women at Carnival in Rio, Lewis and Pile (1996) argue that 
participants consciously perform femininity, albeit within roles determined by 
masculinist regimes of power. They observe that the women in the parade are hired 
for their beauty and perform gender roles within artistic performances in the parade, 
in a complex, multi-layered set of performances. The performers consciously try to fit 
meet the beauty standards expected at Carnival through diet, exercise, and tanning, 
which Lewis and Pile (1996: 24) argue demonstrate that the women are ‘actively 
performing and masquerading femininity’. Furthermore, they note that lascivious 
embraces of males are met with detachment, suggesting that for a hired female 
performer, ‘her body is not her’, at least in the context of Carnival (Lewis and Pile, 
1996: 36). Despite a level of strategic awareness in the women, ‘ideals of womanhood 
are imposed during the carnival’ (Lewis and Pile, 1996: 34) as well as other social 
values such as family morality, sexuality, and nationality. The performances of 
identities are consciously acted out within actual performances. Through ‘highly 
stylized performances’ at Carnival, the female body can be understood as 
performative: it is reproduced through the citation of identities that are familiar to 
both performers and audience. Lewis and Pile (1996) theorize the female body itself 
as a costume, a position that tacitly assumes that there is an independent subject 
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within the costume who is aware of the performance, an idea more in line with 
Goffman’s theorizations of intentionality and agency than with Butler’s. However, 
Butler’s performativity also emerges in their analysis through the citation and 
repetition of dominant gender norms.   
2.3.4 Challenges and limitations of performance and performativity 
Nelson (1999) calls for a more thoughtful and nuanced use of performativity, 
arguing that it has been accepted enthusiastically but uncritically by geographers 
when it warrants more intensive theorization about its potentials and limitations. She 
argues that while an increasing number of geographers have been adopting the 
vocabulary of performance, there has been a distinct lack of critique directed towards 
the concept itself. Performativity, as theorized by Butler, provides ‘no space for 
theorizing conscious reflexivity, negotiation or agency in the doing of identity’ 
(Nelson 1999: 331). Nelson’s (1999: 339) main critique of Butler’s theorization of 
performativity is that it ‘forecloses inquiry into why and how particular identities 
emerge, their effects in time and space, and the role of subjects in accommodating or 
resisting dominant, fixed subject positions’.  
Another critique of performance and performativity is the deeply theoretical 
approach taken by many who use it, a reflection of criticism directed at cultural 
geography more generally. Many have commented that cultural geography is not only 
getting wordier but so deeply theoretical that only an exclusive and shrinking 
academic clique is able to participate in the discourse. Marcus (2004:13) speaks for 
many when he criticizes the cultural turn as being ‘indulgently theoretical’ while 
Hamnett (2003: 1) claims that the rise of the post-modern has led geography into a 
‘theoretical playground where its practitioners stimulate or entertain themselves and a 
handful of readers, but have in the process become increasingly detached from 
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contemporary social issues and debates’. The concept of performativity is considered 
by some to be one such playground, with many geographers employing an 
unnecessarily baffling style (Latham, 2003). Furthermore, geographers who engage 
the concept of performativity such as Thrift offer ‘more theoretical guidance for 
considering practices over representations rather than strategies for bringing them 
together’ (Nash, 2000: 661). In other words, Thrift offers theory then leaves it to 
others to figure out how it can be applied empirically. Such theorizations seem to 
discourage visual and textual forms, which poses problems if you are trying to study a 
geography in which the people are dead (Nash, 2000) or if ‘performers’ are not 
directly observable. The analysis of performance and performativity presents a 
problem in its emphasis on unintentional, day-to-day actions which makes it difficult 
to formulate a methodology, as will be discussed in Chapter Three. Nash (2000: 662) 
questions whether ‘precognitive, habitual, everyday practices within “non-
representational theory”’ are in fact knowable and whether or not ‘the effort to 
understand and communicate is abandoned in favour of abstract theorizing of the 
nonrepresentable.’ If the preverbal and inexpressible are emphasized over textual and 
verbal sources, the position of those who are voiceless and marginalized is neither 
addressed nor improved and the approach is stripped of any political potential. Also, it 
is impossible to know many things about people’s behaviour and thoughts except 
through representations which are imperfect and subject to interpretation. 
Thrift and Dewsbury (2000) recommend that performance should not be 
limited to the objects of academic study, but should also be deeply integrated into 
academic work itself. Citing the famous sociologist Howard Becker who presented his 
research as a play, they suggest conference presentations could be ‘enlivened’ if given 
as plays, dance or performance art. Tempting as it was to ‘enliven’ this literature 
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review by performing it as a piece of interpretive dance, I decided that conventional 
text would more likely be understood.  
 While performativity is clearly an inspiring and dynamic concept, theorization 
has outpaced empirical analysis and the gap seems to be getting wider. However, as 
discussed, a welcome body of work has recently emerged which, to varying degrees, 
tests the theory in the ‘real’ world. As I have outlined, aspects of performativity are 
problematic and contribute to its inaccessibility, ambiguity, and perceived elitism 
among some human geographers. Ideally, the growing interest in performativity will 
be reflected in an increase in empirical work that will test, modify, and ultimately 
strengthen the theory.   
2.3.5 Reformulating performance: layering and intentionality 
With the exception of Lewis and Pile’s (1996) paper, there is an unaddressed 
ambiguity in how geographers employ the concept of performance relating to the 
degree of consciousness, agency, intentionality, and audience role, a grey area 
between what we think intuitively as conscious ‘performance’ and day-to-day 
naturalized actions. Rather than simply picking and choosing aspects of Butler and 
Goffman’s work, it is more helpful to conceptualize their work as addressing 
theoretically different aspects of social action that operate simultaneously at different 
‘levels’. This multilayered understanding of performance frees us from the dichotomy 
of performance being either intentional acts by aware subjects or unintentional acts 
which are habitually repeated and recognizes a varying level of consciousness and 
agency in performers.  
A broader understanding of performance that encompasses aspects of existing 
formulations and grounds theory in empirical work is key to moving forward. I would 
agree with the theatre director and scholar Schechner (1988) in his claim that 
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‘performance is an inclusive term’ and not seek to draw boundaries between what is 
and what is not performance. To Schechner, performing arts should be considered as 
only one node on a continuum of performances which includes everything from 
performances of everyday life such as greetings, displays of emotion, family scenes, 
professional roles, and so on through to sports, parades, theatre, dance, ceremonies, 
rites and other formal, organized performances. Although conceptualizing all 
performances as being part of a continuum makes them potentially difficult to 
analyze, it is inaccurate to imagine art performances and everyday performances as 
mutually exclusive. Schechner (1988: xv) provides a useful way of bridging art 
performances with everyday performance by considering art performances to be ‘an 
illusion of an illusion and, as such, might be considered more “truthful”, more “real” 
than ordinary experience’. In other words, staged performances can usefully reveal 
values, identities and power structures that are more subtly disguised in everyday life. 
Citing Aristotle’s opinion in his Poetics, he contends that ‘theater did not so much 
reflect living as essentialize it, present paradigms of it’ (Schechner 1988: xix). In 
examining performance in this thesis, I am not seeking to reveal what performance 
‘really’ is but to use it as an analytical category for understanding the embodied, 
performative side of nation-building.  
 While theorizing the self in contrasting ways, both the ‘Goffman’ and the 
‘Butler’ conceptualizations of performance are embedded in a larger discourse that 
focuses on the embodiment of identities. I suggest that these seemingly conflicting 
conceptualizations of performance can each provide important insights that are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. As Nelson argues, performances of identity need to be 
thought about in terms of thinking subjects who ‘sometimes appropriate dominant 
identities and who sometimes contest or change [or reinterpret] them’ (Nelson 1999: 
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345). As Hyndman and de Alwis (2005) point out, there are times when we 
consciously and strategically perform an identity, depending on the context, ‘stage’ 
and audience. As Pile and Lewis (1996) argue, we have varying degrees of 
consciousness about the identities we perform and on one level, we may be 
unconsciously reproducing dominant norms while on another level we are 
simultaneously performing another identity in a conscious and strategic way. For 
example, while it is considered more natural for a woman to wear make-up than for a 
man, an assumption that is taken for granted and naturalized, there are times when a 
woman is conscious of the fact she is performing a role as a particular woman, when 
she purposefully and strategically affects a heightened femininity. Butler’s work 
needs to be taken one step further to understand how dominant discourses are remade 
through daily practice, requiring a creative re-thinking of the importance of historical 
and geographical context, subjectivity, and agency (Nelson, 1999).  
While Butler tends to overlook the range of daily activities that require 
varying degrees of agency, Goffman avoids analysis of naturalized social categories. 
Both of these positions provide a valuable way to consider performance and there is 
adequate common ground to move forward. Both approaches see human identity as 
formed through societal norms. Whether conscious and intentional, as in Preedy’s 
performance on the beach of Spain, or subconscious as in Butler’s theory of gender 
performance, identity is always socially constructed and citational: it always ‘cites’, 
or refers back to, recognizable norms. If the action is not citational, then the 
performance loses its social meaning and hence its ability to be recognized. What is 
needed is more empirically grounded work which incorporates a broader 
understanding of performance and the common ground of Butler and Goffman to 
examine the spatialities of performance in a more linguistically accessible way. The 
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way in which performance has been deployed (as either completely intentional or 
completely unintentional) can be reconceptualized as a multi-layered act, in which 
deep, unconscious performances of naturalized identities are enacted along with – or 
even within – conscious, strategic performances. Individual acts consist of an ‘upper’ 
intentional layer that coordinates or assembles a ‘lower’ layer consisting of 
naturalized, unconscious practices8.  
 
2.4 Indonesian Nationalism 
Over the past two decades, the nation has been theorized in a number of ways 
that are helpful in understanding Indonesian nationalism. As Jackson and Penrose 
(1993: 1) powerfully argue, the concept of the ‘nation’ (and race) is a social 
construction, the ‘product of specific historical and geographical forces, rather than 
biologically given ideas whose meaning is dictated by nature’. This ‘imagined 
community’ (Anderson 1991 [1983]) relies upon a set of ‘invented traditions’ 
(Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) which often cite selected historical rituals and symbols 
to legitimize the leadership and to link heterogeneous groups with little in common. 
These invented traditions can be spectacular and operate on a grand scale or they can 
be vested in the more banal places and practices of everyday life (Billig 1995). The 
nation is characterized by the quest for a unified apparatus of power and a desire for 
the interchangeability of its citizens (Anderson 1994). For example, in Indonesia a 
civil servant from Sulawesi is interchangeable with a civil servant from Sumatra in 
that they both speak the same language, have had the same education and can hold the 
same position anywhere in the national bureaucracy. The inherent constructedness of 
nations means that they require constant maintenance (Parker 2003) through the 
                                                          
8 These terms denote upper and lower levels of awareness rather than referring to the priority or 
importance of layers. 
52 
 
deployment of particular strategies aimed at regulating, controlling and governing 
subjects (Philpott 2000). 
 Much of the work on the Indonesian nation investigates the emergence of 
nationalism in the decades leading up to Independence and examines why it took the 
form it did. In his seminal text Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (1952), 
George Kahin provides an in-depth examination of the history of Indonesian 
nationalism up to the end of the Revolution in 1949. Writing from the unique position 
of having been the only American to be in Indonesia during the Revolution, Kahin 
offers great insight into the development of the early nationalist movement, 
competing nationalist visions and the ultimate triumph of the Republicans as the post-
Independence national leaders. Clive Christie (1996) traces the process of 
decolonization in Southeast Asia and the rise of nationalisms, arguing that many 
analyses (including Kahin’s) tend to view nationalism through the eyes of the state in 
a way that naturalizes the nationalist vision of the winners and treats the ‘losing’ 
nationalist movements as pathological problems, rather than having their own logic 
and justifications. James Siegel (1997) is concerned with the use of language in 
Indonesia’s revolution and how an understanding of nationalism was created through 
a sense of modernity engendered in the adoption of music, clothing, language and 
books which translated into a new ‘Indonesian’ cultural world. 
 Influenced by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s (1960) Religion on Java, 
Indonesia scholars in subsequent decades tended to read Indonesian politics and 
nationalism through the lens of ‘culture’. For example, rather than comparing post-
WWII Indonesia to early modern Europe, Harold Crouch (1978) and Benedict 
Anderson (1990) look to earlier Java-based empires, drawing comparisons between 
contemporary political cultures and Majapahit and Mataram predecessors. Others 
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adopt the metaphor of Javanese wayang kulit [leather shadow puppets] to explain 
Indonesian nationalism with the president as the dalang, or puppet master, or draw 
comparisons between the presidents and sultans, rather than with other dictators 
(Widjanarko 1974; Loveard 1999; MacDonald 1999). Lele (1993) critiques this 
tendency to view the Indonesian nation and leaders through a ‘cultural’ lens as 
orientalising, arguing that this approach assumes a deterministic relationship between 
‘culture’ and certain styles or forms of politics used exclusively outside ‘the West’. 
Similarly, Jenkins (1984) contends that it is more appropriate to compare Suharto 
with Napoleon, arguing that Javaneseness is a mere smokescreen that disguises the 
similarities he has with other leaders.  
The construction of a national culture is an essential part of nation-building in 
Indonesia (Hooker 1993) and several scholars have examined the relationship 
between local / regional cultures and the national culture. Hooker observes that the 
New Order has been active in promoting and moulding a national culture to 
emphasize that ‘development will not be at the expense of cultural life; on the 
contrary, they are inextricably linked’ (Hooker 1993: 4). Cultural life, as it relates to 
the nation, is profitably studied through Taman Mini, the national theme park. 
Errington (1998) examines how Javanese dominance over other cultures is expressed 
through the design of the park. 
A number of scholars have examined how Indonesian nationalism is expressed 
materially through architecture and built space. Their work provides insight into how 
the state’s national ideology is spatially expressed and represented to the citizenry. 
Nas (1992) examines the symbolism of Jakarta and the elite’s production of ‘official’ 
symbols in the urban landscape, treating the city as a sort of container for meaning. 
Similarly, Leclerc (1993) examines Jakarta’s grand monuments created for nation-
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building purposes. Errington (1998) examines the way in which the New Order 
sought to replicate both past forms that evoked a sense of continuity and specifically 
Javanese royal forms, with the aim of projecting an air of legitimacy to the populace. 
MacDonald (1995) examines how Indonesian nationalism has been expressed through 
the national monument in Jakarta. Using methods in ‘new’ cultural geography, 
MacDonald examines the ideas, meanings, and representations embedded in the 
landscape, analyzing what is represented in the Indonesian landscape and how.  
One limitation of this literature lies in its exclusive focus on spectacular 
monuments in Jakarta rather than on the more modest-scale monuments at the 
provincial and even the village level. However, while scholars describe various 
nationalistic environments and what they symbolize, they do not focus their analysis 
on what these environments actually do to encourage and discourage the behaviour of 
visitors and how visitors may resist or reinterpret official meanings of these spaces.  
Nationalism is not necessarily emancipatory as not all members of the nation 
benefit from or imagine themselves to be part of the same ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson 1991 [1983]). With Indonesia’s diversity of cultures, Reid (2005) points to 
some of the problems in reconciling local histories with the national ideal, for while 
the state’s nationalism is the most dominant, there are a range of alternate 
nationalisms in Indonesia. Reid (1979) argues that the development of Indonesian 
nationalism was a conscious quest for justification using selective interpretations of 
history as the foundation for the nation. The new nation focused exclusively on 
historical claims which served to unite the nation rather than to ‘inquire further into 
their diverse social structures, belief system, and economies’ (Reid, 1979: 290). In a 
more recent essay, Reid (2005) examines how state nationalism has been an obstacle 
in attempting to write the history of an independent Indonesia. As the state accepts 
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only one version of nationalism, local, social or alternative histories were untold and 
rebellion or conflict was dismissed as deviations (Mulder 2000; Reid 2005). In 
Bertrand’s (2004) book Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in Indonesia, he examines 
how regional cultures as well as Islam are challenging and reinterpreting the national 
model to the extent that the very definition of the Indonesian nation has been placed 
under scrutiny.  Others examine the successful independence of East Timor and 
continuing campaigns in Aceh, Riau, Maluku and Irian Jaya as alternate ‘imagined 
communities’ to Indonesia (Browne 1998; Colombijn 2003; Ping 2005).   
 As Wang Gungwu (2005) argues in Nation-Building: Five Southeast Asian 
Histories, while much has been written about nationalism leading up to independence 
in Southeast Asia, little has been written about what national leaders actually did after 
independence. However, several recent studies in the context of Indonesia examine 
how the individual subject is produced through state policy. Lyn Parker’s (2003) book 
From Subjects to Citizens: Balinese Villagers in the Indonesian Nation-State is an 
excellent addition to the literature on nation-building in post-Independence Indonesia. 
Parker meticulously examines processes of nationalisation in the context of a village 
in Bali to examine how the state, through its ‘bureaucratic arrangements, national 
ideologies and development programmes, has intimately penetrated the daily lives of 
Balinese villagers’ (2003: 1). While much of the work on nation-building has centered 
on the ‘inner islands’ (Java and Bali) and Jakarta in particular, Noboru Ishikawa 
(1998, 2003, 2008) has examined the process of nation-building in a rural border area 
in Borneo. Ishikawa provides valuable insight into how the Indonesian nation affects 
the everyday lives of Indonesians who live along the border with Malaysia. Ishikawa 
and Parker both provide rich empirical material to examine how policies crafted in 
Jakarta are enacted in everyday life at the village level, a contrast with much of the 
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literature on Indonesian nationalism which tends to focus on Jakarta and on more 
ideological issues or tends towards ‘introverted, sometimes precious cultural studies’ 
that ignore the Indonesian state and how it affects citizens’ lives (Parker 2003: 12). 
 One of the problems with much of the current literature on Indonesian society 
and nationalism is the tendency to overstate the differences between the Old and New 
Orders without examining the continuities between the two. The massacre of the 
communists in 1965-66 and the subsequent power change has become a landmark 
event in the study of Indonesia that may obscure many similarities between the two 
regimes, despite the fact that anti-communist violence occurred almost exclusively on 
Java and Bali. The two Orders also tend to be contrasted in terms of general political 
practices and the actions of the elite, leaving a gap in terms of how people’s everyday 
lives, daily routines, and understandings of their identity actually changed over time. 
Furthermore, many prominent academics who researched in Indonesia during the Old 
Order experienced difficulties and restrictions on their activities during the New 
Order. The most infamous example is Benedict Anderson’s ban from Indonesia by the 
Suharto regime for contradicting the official New Order take on the communist 
massacre of 1965 in a paper9 he co-wrote with fellow Cornell Indonesianist, Ruth 
McVey (Friend, 2003). This may have served to bias their research to some degree in 
favour of the Old Order and to emphasize distinctions rather than similarities between 
the Orders. While I do not deny that significant differences exist between the Old and 
New Orders, many of the national imaginings, performances, and everyday life 
experiences of the populace may not have changed in predictable ways that simply 
mirror political change in Jakarta. 
                                                          
9  This now-famous paper, referred to as the ‘Cornell Paper’, analyzed Suharto and the military’s role in the 1965 
coup, claiming that Suharto deliberately began military action against the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) 
without approval from his superiors in order to eliminate his rivals and destroy the powerful Communist Party 
(Anderson and McVey, 1971). 
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2.5 Approaches to understanding power in Indonesian Society 
The analysis of power and domination on the one hand, and movements of 
resistance on the other, has attracted much interest across the social sciences, 
including in geography (Yeoh 1996; Sharp 2000; Rose 2002). In studying different 
ways in which dominant power is responded to, Rose argues that many theorists 
endeavour to ‘recognize the ongoing deconstruction of systems’ yet simultaneously 
reify the dominant power as primary (Rose 2002: 383). Despite cultural geographers’ 
understanding that contestation is part of any system of power, they have relied upon 
structuralist understandings of power, conceiving of the system as ‘something 
originally stable upon which deconstructive forces act’ (Rose 2002: 384). Agents are 
conceptualized as responding to a dominant power in a dualistic tit-for-tat 
relationship. In an effort to understand such systems of power, scholars further reify 
the system as a pre-established force, as something real and already present, rather 
than something continually coming into being. Following Gibson-Graham (1996), 
Rose (2002) questions whether framing studies in terms of ‘resistance’ limits our 
understanding of social practice and actually serves to reinforce the very systems of 
power that practices of resistance are thought to undermine.  
While there have been many attempts to understand, recognize and categorize 
‘resistance’, there are two divergent challenges. On the one hand, by too narrowly 
selecting criteria of resistance (e.g. that which is openly expressed and clearly 
articulated such as protests, defacement, etc.) we risk overlooking certain forms of 
contradictory practice (e.g. not paying attention/wilful ignorance, reinterpretation of 
official meanings). On the other hand, if every moment of contradictory practice is an 
example of resistance (such as washing your car on a Sunday), the term becomes 
stripped of any practical use (Rose 2002). 
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 Criticism has been levelled at scholars of Indonesia for failing to theorize 
power in Indonesian society with the complexity of other disciplines  (Taylor 1993; 
Philpott 2000). In fact, in his essay ‘What does post-modernism do in contemporary 
Indonesia’ Heryanto (1995: 40) argues against elite theorizing of power in the New 
Order: 
 Power presents itself in excessive violence and naked brutality. No 
Indonesian needs any erudite philosophy or cultural criticism, French or 
otherwise, to tell them power is everywhere or how carceral their schools, 
offices, and factories can be. 
 
While many scholars argue that the issue of power is a neglected aspect of studies of 
Indonesia (and Southeast Asia more broadly), Heryanto is dismissive of the need to 
discuss power because it is ‘everywhere’. Philpott (2000: 161) argues that the absence 
of debates about power ‘implies widespread acceptance that power is universally 
negative and censorious in Indonesian political life’. In what follows, I provide a brief 
overview of the key ways in which power has been theorized in Indonesia before 
discussing how power can be helpfully understood in the context of nationalization in 
Pulau Penyengat society. 
Scholarly work on Indonesia has commonly taken an approach which relies 
upon structuralist understandings of power, in which the state, most frequently the 
New Order, is conceptualized as a dominant, stable, homogeneous system. A binary 
distinction is perpetuated which emphasizes the dominant and romanticizes the 
resistant. In the case of Indonesia, power has been approached using several standard 
analytical frameworks. The first is Geertz’s aliran model which contends that there 
are three distinct channels of power in Indonesia (priyayi, abangan, and santri) which 
he relates to particular socio-political forces. Priyayi, according to Geertz, represent 
the intellectual and court ideology based on Hindu-Buddhist and Javanese mystical 
thinking. This group has been connected to modern bureaucratic officials and the 
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political party PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia, National Party of Indonesia). Abangan 
consists of the Javanese masses and is based on popular syncretic ideology and 
Javanese animism. Geertz has associated the abangan strain with the political party 
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia, Communist Party of Indonesia). The santri, 
representing the pious Islamic world view in the outer islands as well as Java, have 
been connected with the Muslim political party Masyumi10, landowners, and 
indigenous merchants (Geertz 1959). This theorization of power has re-emerged as an 
explanatory tool in analyzing political corruption in Indonesia (Heidenheimer 1993), 
in understanding the New Order government as priyayi (Liddle 1996), in 
understanding internal problems of the PKI (Ricklefs 2001: 294), and the various 
Muslim practices in Indonesia (Schwarz 1994).  
The second approach to understanding power in Indonesia is Anderson’s ‘idea 
of power in Javanese culture’ which he argues is different from that in the ‘West’ 
(Anderson 1990). The basic differences are that in the Javanese tradition, power is 
concrete, exists independently of different rulers, and power is homogenous, rather 
than being unique to particular rulers. The amount of power in the universe is 
constant, so more power gained by one group is power lost by another. Finally, power 
does not raise questions of legitimacy as it simply exists outside of questions of 
ethics, morality, good and evil. Philpott (2000) has critiqued Anderson’s reliance 
upon culture to explain power as being deterministic and Orientalist. Anderson’s 
approach stabilizes the category of ‘Java’ and constructs a ‘unified’ image of power 
with troubling consequences. First, it fails to account for dissent in New Order 
politics. Second, it presumes the existence of an underlying, static tradition that 
functions as a societal reference point. Liddle critiques the approach as providing ‘no 
                                                          
10 Masyumi (the Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was created in 1943 by the Japanese in order to 
bring prominent Islamic leaders under surveillance. After independence, it became an important Islamic political 
party (Effendy 2003). 
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tools with which to analyze the historical process by which a set of ideas presumably 
dominate in pre-colonial times maintains its influence in post-colonial Indonesian 
political thought’ (Liddle 1997:1-2).   
The third approach is taken by Liddle, who takes a ‘key actor’ approach to 
understanding power relations in Indonesia, which assumes that particular individuals 
are pivotal in determining events rather than events being determined by broader 
forces. According to Liddle, the Indonesian president was able to act autonomously 
and was relatively free to craft his own political strategy. Liddle’s approach basically 
maintains Anderson’s ‘Javanese cultural lens’ and, in relying upon the agency of the 
president, neglects the class and gender dimensions of politics. While an undoubtedly 
powerful individual, Suharto did not act independently from culturally embedded 
notions about class and gender in his decision-making.  
Several Indonesia scholars have engaged Foucault’s contributions to the study 
of power in ways that deconstructs the total hegemony of the state that Heryanto 
claims (Philpott 2000; Langston 2001). Significantly, Foucault’s governmentality 
does not consider civil society and the state as binary opposites:  
Power is not so much a matter of imposing constraints upon citizens as 
‘making up’ citizens capable of bearing a kind of regulated freedom. Personal 
autonomy is not the antithesis of political power, but a key term in its 
existence, the more so because most individuals are not merely subjects of 
power but play a part in its operations. (Rose and Miller 1992: 174) 
 
Through a complex of images, practices and ‘knowledges’, the dominant justify and 
naturalize their dominance (Foucault 1977). Significantly, Foucault discusses the 
body as being directly involved in power relations, as power operates through bodies 
as ‘bio-power’, consisting of ‘diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of 
bodies and the control of populations’ (see also Foucault 1978; Dreyfus and Rabinow 
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1983). These techniques involve surveillance and self-regulation over force and 
coercion. 
Scholars who take a Foucauldian approach seek to understand how the 
individual citizen internalizes the dominant discourse to regulate his or her conduct. 
Langston (2001) argues that simply examining the authoritarian configuration of the 
New Order Regime provides an incomplete understanding of power in Indonesia. 
Drawing on Philpott’s (2000) work, Langston believes that Foucault’s concept of 
governmentality is valuable in theorizing how the role and bodily performance of the 
individual is part of the process of government. According to Foucault (1980: 220), 
‘power’ refers to the relations between free agents as a ‘structure of actions’. The state 
is seen to have certain principles or ‘rationalities’ which it seeks to convey through 
various ‘technologies’, ultimately employed with the aim of regulating the behaviour 
of the individual (and by extension, the population). For effective government, the 
state relies upon individuals to self-regulate their conduct in line with the state’s 
principles to become the ideal national citizen. Foucault places importance upon the 
role of the populace in how power operates, arguing that the governed emerge to 
become part of the state structure. While Parker (2003) does not explicitly cite 
Foucault, her empirical work challenges assumptions about power in Indonesia that 
rely upon dichotomies between the state and the people, suggesting that  
despite the dark totalitarian forces of military intelligence and surveillance, the 
threat of violence and the intrusions of government, villagers’ experience of 
the Indonesian state has not been one of menace and coercion. (Parker, 2003: 
265) 
 
Far from how the Indonesian state is frequently conceptualised, it is not simply a 
powerful, monolithic decision-making elite who implement state policy; it is also 
regular people who implement state policy through attending school, voting, getting 
immunised or paying taxes. In this way, Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’ can 
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be employed as a tool to understanding the relationship between power, space and the 
performance of the individual national citizen in Indonesia. 
In their writing on the media in Indonesia, Sen and Hill (2000) examine power 
as it is enacted through the media. They emphasize that ‘censorship does not work if 
the censors and programmers, the creators of cultural texts and their consumers 
interpret differently’ (Sen and Hill 2000: 10). For example, the military’s internet web 
page does not serve as propaganda if no one turns to it for information or opinions. 
They also recount how MacGyver, a character from an American TV adventure 
drama from 1980s, is interpreted by many Indonesians as being a ‘defender of human 
rights’. By citing this example, Sen and Hill make the point that the social, political, 
and cultural context of reception is crucial. Furthermore, rather than being passive 
consumers of state ideology, citizens often reinterpret nationalistic ideas, landscapes, 
and performances in ways that the state neither comprehends nor controls.  
 
2.6 Summary 
In this chapter I have critically reviewed the literature and drawn together key 
ideas that underwrite and support the rest of my thesis and help guide me through the 
analysis and interpretation of my empirical chapters. While I am reading from a 
diverse set of literature, there are several common strands that help to conceptualize 
my thesis. The first is a general shift from analysis that assumes static conditions 
towards a greater emphasis on understanding dynamism, movement, process and 
performativity. Where culture, landscape, identity, and power were once thought of as 
stable, recent scholarship is increasingly placing more priority on how they are 
created and maintained, what they do, their performative qualities and their 
inconsistencies and unevenness. 
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The second theme stems from a feminist-inspired turn towards the everyday. 
Power operates simultaneously through many media, including landscape and 
performance, and at many scales, from the global, national, and the city, down to the 
home and the body. Though there is value in theorizing spectacular events, 
monuments, architecture and landscapes, this should not be done to the exclusion of 
the everyday spaces and actions that constitute people’s lives. Since most Indonesians 
do not live in Jakarta, examining only official national landscapes and monuments in 
the capital is a limited way of understanding the processes and tools of 
‘nationalization’.  
The third theme is related to the deconstruction of dichotomies. While such 
binaries as power / resistance, subject / object, human / non-human have been 
traditional frames for analysis, scholars in recent decades argue that not only do these 
dichotomies create an inaccurate reading of the world, they narrowly structure the 
field of inquiry, implying that everything must be understood as, for example, ‘power’ 
or ‘resistance’, with less exploration of negotiation, compromise or multiple 
interpretations.  
The current literature on performance provides a useful approach to 
understanding how identity is something that is always coming into being and 
maintained through repetitive actions, rather than something that is inherent. 
However, there is an unaddressed complexity in current formulations of performance 
that do not take into account the multiple ‘layers’ of identities that we simultaneously 
perform with varying degrees of consciousness. As identity is multi-faceted and is 
performed on many levels of consciousness depending on the context, Butler’s 
theorization of an always unconscious subject and Goffman’s theorization of an 
always active, aware subject occur simultaneously at any given time. For example, 
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Preedy on the beach in Spain is aware he is performing as he consciously connives to 
look like an experienced traveler. However, as Butler would argue, he is also enacting 
deeper social performances of gender and sexual roles revealed in his behaviour, dress 
and mannerisms on the beach as well as class and societal roles in his decision to 
travel to coastal Spain for his vacation. Similarly, citizens perform a multitude of 
roles which can be conceptualized as being on different levels of consciousness 
simultaneously.  
This literature review has provided justification for this research through 
identifying several gaps in existing research on ideology and power relations in 
landscape, performance and performativity, and the study of Indonesian nationalism 
and power in Indonesian society. Few scholars have examined how national identity 
is performed and how performances can be encouraged through landscape. Despite 
massive attempts by the Indonesian state to socially engineer its populace, there is a 
surprising lack of work theorizing how citizens’ actions and their bodies are 
mobilized for nation-building goals. While these are broad areas that require extensive 
research, my thesis begins to fill some of these gaps in the research.  
Having reviewed the relevant literature and related it to my research, in the 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology  
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology that has guided my research. In 
section 3.2, I consider the particularities of conducting research in Indonesia in 
general and Pulau Penyengat in particular in order to then discuss the methods 
appropriate for the research topic and context. In section 3.3, I examine the 
informational requirements needed to address my research objectives. Based on the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter Two, I examine the methodology used in 
previous studies of performance and performativity, before providing an overview of 
and justification for each method selected and some of the problems I encountered 
using each. Section 3.4 examines ethical issues of my thesis, followed by a chapter 
summary (3.5). 
  
3.2 Fieldwork context 
In formulating my methodology, it was important first to understand the 
fieldwork contexts (Patton 2002). Gaining an understanding of Indonesian society and 
bureaucratic culture as well as the social dynamics of Pulau Penyengat and Tanjung 
Pinang11 would help determine the most appropriate and effective methods to pursue. 
Several early visits to Pulau Penyengat, Tanjung Pinang and Jakarta, as well as prior 
experience in Indonesia, helped to narrow down the options of possible methods. The 
following two sections examine the major challenges posed and opportunities 
presented in conducting research in Indonesia and in Pulau Penyengat in particular.  
 
                                                          
11 Because Tanjung Pinang is located near Pulau Penyengat and is the provincial capital, it was 
important for me to spend some time there in order to understand the dynamics between the two. 
Furthermore, some civil servants and all high school students commute daily to Tanjung Pinang, 
making the city an important part of many people’s lives.  
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3.2.1 Conducting research in Indonesia  
While the particularities of conducting field work in Indonesia are widely 
discussed informally among researchers, little has been published on research 
experiences or on qualitative methodology in Indonesian contexts. Several key 
opportunities and challenges for foreign researchers exist in Indonesia that can affect 
fieldwork strategies and methods.  
As in any fieldwork, it is crucial to tap into extensive networks of social 
connections and to be flexible and responsive to changing fieldwork conditions. As 
Cloke et al (2004: 185) emphasize, networking is something that needs to be done 
from the beginning of a project. They write that researchers 
have to learn how to work through networks, to make appropriate connections 
and to ‘go with the flow’ when preconceptions come to light and alternative 
interpretations begin to make more sense. So it is not a good idea to follow the 
‘standard three-stage ... read-then-do-then-write’ model of research design 
(Cook and Crang 1995: 19) to prepare for such an unpredictable process. 
 
This advice is particularly helpful in Indonesia where obtaining information through 
official channels is challenging and where tapping into networks is the most 
productive way to obtain information, contacts, and data. The Indonesia scholar 
Takashi Shiraishi has commented on the uniqueness of research in Indonesia, noting 
that despite myriad frustrations and setbacks, it is usually possible to gain access to 
important government authorities through an informal chain of contacts (unpublished 
work, cited in Siegel 1997). Shiraishi describes Indonesia today as a network of 
connections comparable to huge tribes; once you know one person in a ‘tribe’, others 
within that ‘tribe’ will be able to put you into contact with anyone within the ‘tribe’s’ 
sprawling connections. The following excerpts from my field journal capture my 
experiences of the possibilities that networking in Indonesia can bring if one remains 
flexible enough to take advantage of unpredictability:  
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This morning I sat in the Chinese kopitiam [coffee shop] to organize my notes 
and figure out what needed to be done. ... Lots of journalists gather here in the 
morning and I started chatting with a group of them. ... They were going to an 
event at the Governor’s office soon and asked if I would like to join them to 
meet the Governor. Within half an hour someone had dug up a borrowed baju 
kurung [Malay women’s tunic and skirt set] for me to wear and I was soon 
sitting side saddle on the back of a motorbike wearing pink polyester on the 
way to meet the Governor... (Tanjung Pinang, 10 February, 2006) 
 
The National Archives had an anniversary party today. The archives were 
open but no one was working so I couldn’t request documents or get 
photocopies made. The friends I made at the archives brought me outside to 
the huge buffet lunch. ... lots of corny entertainment and hundreds of archival 
workers from provincial archives across the country. ... Rendra [famous 
Indonesian poet and activist] was the invited celebrity speaker. ... I chatted 
with his assistant who happened to date a former classmate from my high 
school while she was living in Yogya in the mid-90s. ... I ended up spending 
the afternoon at Rendra’s artist commune in Depok and refusing offers to stay 
the week there. (Jakarta, 18 May 2006)  
 
 A second condition in Indonesia is the high level of red tape, bureaucracy, 
bribery, corruption and inefficiency, all problems that are so pervasive that, depending 
on the research topic and information sought, they can potentially pose a serious 
obstacle to conducting fieldwork. In contrast to the ease with which researchers can 
tap into many informal networks to find information and contacts, they face serious 
challenges obtaining information and even permission to research from official 
sources. As has been noted by Dean Forbes (1988) in his essay on conducting 
research in Indonesia, the process of obtaining a research visa requires months and 
lots of paperwork: a letter of recommendation from the Indonesian Embassy in 
Singapore, several weeks in Jakarta to activate the visa in various offices around the 
city (Police, Immigration, City Hall, LIPI, the government-run Indonesian Institute of 
Sciences which sponsors foreign rsesearchers), a week in Jakarta to renew it after six 
months, and a week to deactivate the visa. At any time in the process, one of many 
offices can raise problems and decide not to issue permission to research. For 
example, after holding a research visa for six months, a senior civil servant in the 
68 
 
Immigration Office in Jakarta refused to renew my visa until I changed the topic and 
location of my research! After a long discussion I told him that I would adopt his 
suggestion of limiting my research on national identity to a study of MONAS, the 
national monument, and Taman Mini Indonesia Raya, the national theme park. Very 
real bureaucratic constraints such as this impacted the methods I selected and also 
raise ethical issues that will be examined in section 3.4. 
Similarly, the inefficiency and disorganization that I experienced at various 
state institutions during several preliminary visits influenced my methodological 
approach. While I had originally held high hopes for obtaining information about the 
development of Indonesian identity at the National Archives, I discovered that the 
post-Independence collection was woefully out of date and incomplete. The catalogue 
had last been updated in the 1980s, meaning that while the collection had grown over 
the past two decades, none of the items collected since then were catalogued nor 
could they be viewed. Members of staff were frequently unable to find listed 
documents, and for reasons I could not discern, I was only able to view several items 
per day during the five hours in which the archives were open. I was unable to view 
any video material I requested because it was in the process of being converted from 
film strips to video and because there was no viewing room for visitors to use. 
 A third challenge to conducting research in an Indonesian context relates to 
the pervasive machismo of a small but active portion of men. While most Indonesian 
men are polite and respectful of women, sexual harassment can be a daily reality that 
is often not confined simply to inappropriate comments. As a single female 
researching in Indonesia, facing constant problems with men was a concern that 
played a role in shaping what I felt I would be able to accomplish in my fieldwork. 
For example, after my interview with a high-ranking middle-aged diplomat at the 
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Indonesian Embassy to obtain a letter of recommendation needed to apply for a 
research visa, the diplomat proceeded to call and text message me for the following 
few weeks. During a preliminary visit to Tanjung Pinang, I stopped in at the police 
headquarters for the province to ask some questions. I was immediately surrounded 
by young police officers, a few of whom took my bag from me, removed my camera 
from my bag and went on to snap photos of each other in inappropriate poses around 
me. The police officers then went on to drill me about my marital status, why I did not 
have children, and what kind of birth control I used. When I visited one provincial 
government office in the hopes of asking employees some questions and observing 
some of the office’s national rituals, the boss introduced me to the entire office staff 
as his girlfriend and continued to interact in inappropriate ways with me over the 
course of my visit. Due to many unproductive and off-putting interactions such as 
these, I realized that this situation had to be accommodated by my fieldwork methods. 
 
3.2.2 Pulau Penyengat: Research in a small Malay village  
In the context of a village, the bureaucracy and interactions with men as 
sketched out above were not a concern. I found that, in contrast to the experiences 
mentioned above, my interactions with men in Pulau Penyengat were more positive 
and constructive. However, conducting research in Pulau Penyengat brought different 
opportunities and constraints, an understanding of which was necessary to help select 
appropriate methods. Some of the opportunities and constraints were generally typical 
of research in a village context, while others were specific to Pulau Penyengat. 
First, because Pulau Penyengat is a small island (under 2 km long, under 1 km 
wide) with a small population (2000), it has an intimate feel to it that carries certain 
advantages for a foreign researcher such as myself. Due to its small size, strangers are 
noted and often questioned as to their purpose on the island. Because it is an island, 
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there is a very different dynamic than in larger towns or even villages of a similar size 
located on the nearby islands of Bintan or Batam which are connected by roads and 
are therefore accessible to all sorts of passersby. Pulau Penyengat is only accessible 
by small wooden motorboats from Tanjung Pinang that operate between about 6 a.m. 
until 11 p.m. As a ‘white’ female outsider who is able to speak Malay, I found locals 
to be friendly, welcoming and approachable and I was able to quickly meet a wide 
spectrum of people, get involved in many aspects of community life and cultivate 
friendships. However, the small size also meant that there was no anonymity or 
privacy and the ubiquitous village gossip meant that I had to take extra care to respect 
village sensibilities in my behaviour, dress and social etiquette. For example, while in 
Jakarta I was able to meet with male interviewees without any eyebrows being raised. 
On Pulau Penyengat, I needed to be careful who I was seen with and where so as not 
to raise suspicions that I was having illicit relations with any of my male interviewees. 
Second, although Pulau Penyengat has a relaxed feel and slow pace of life, as I 
discovered after several visits, the island is deeply divided and there is much gossip 
and politicking among residents. Divisions ran along class lines, between descendents 
of the sultan (rajas) and non-rajas, between hamlets, and among competing rajas. The 
direct descendants of the Sultan of Riau have long been divided as to how the island 
should be run and there have been numerous power struggles in recent years as local 
rajas vie for control over the physical and symbolic legacy of the sultanate. Since the 
formation of the Propinsi Kepulauan Riau (Kepri), or ‘Riau Islands Province’, 
funding has been made available for Pulau Penyengat to develop a tourism industry, a 
double-edged sword that has further divided the island. Communities nearest to the 
developments are perceived to benefit from funding, whereas communities located 
farther from projects feel left out.  
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As I began to understand Pulau Penyengat’s social divisions, I realized the 
danger of being perceived as being allied with one particular group, thus making it 
difficult to interact with those in other groups. For example, I found myself being 
taken under the wing of several powerful people from the raja families. I soon learned 
from various villagers that previous researchers had stayed with one particular raja 
family, their home functioning as an unofficial guesthouse for visiting researchers, 
complete with a set price for room and board that is known informally among 
academics on several continents. While this may not have affected the research of 
other scholars focusing on Malay culture and history, it was problematic given my 
topic to be perceived as allied with the local elite. Since hotels and guesthouses are 
banned on Pulau Penyengat, I looked beyond the rajas for accommodation options. 
My decision to stay in the homes of various villagers who invited me is covered in 
more detail in the research ethics section (3.5).  
Third, living and conducting research in an Indonesian village is not for 
everyone. In a village there is the need to give more of oneself than in a city as it is 
impossible to maintain much distance with the researched without being considered 
sombong [arrogant] or tertutup [emotionally inaccessible]. In Pulau Penyengat (and in 
Indonesia more broadly), residents have very little personal time or space, the need 
for which is considered akin to a personality defect. In each home I stayed in, I shared 
a bedroom and often a bed with a daughter or two. The necessity of staying in 
villagers’ homes provided a valuable opportunity to experience daily life and 
understand their values. Different fieldwork contexts and methods benefit from 
different types of personalities (Moser 2008), and the lack of privacy and the intensely 
social environment of Pulau Penyengat required a more extroverted personality. 
Although I met several researchers who felt frustrated and trapped by the lack of 
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privacy and constant scrutiny on Pulau Penyengat, I was fortunately able to greatly 
enjoy the intimate domestic conditions and formed many close friendships. My 
enjoyment was clear to many on Pulau Penyengat and ultimately helped open doors in 
my fieldwork.  
Fourth, when I first started visiting Pulau Penyengat, the controversy about the 
‘anti-Muslim’ cartoons published in a Danish newspaper was a favourite conversation 
topic on the island, particularly with the men who meet regularly for tea in the square 
next to the mosque. There was a general feeling of outrage and a sense that Islam was 
under attack by the non-Muslim world. The degree to which people felt a part of a 
‘global Islam’ was something I had never experienced to such an extent during many 
previous trips to Indonesia. I found many residents of Pulau Penyengat were closely 
following the news, listening to the radio, reading several local newspapers and were 
sensitive to the ‘clash of civilizations’ that was being trumped up in the local press. I 
was asked many questions about why the cartoons were published and what I thought 
of them and my take on events. Given this situation, I felt that as a non-Muslim 
foreigner it was important for me to be particularly sensitive to local sentiment and to 
make an effort to build up a trusting rapport with villagers.   
 
3.3 Precedents: Methodology for performance and performativity 
Adopting performance and performativity as a conceptual framework to 
understand the embodied aspects of national identity poses two main methodological 
challenges. First is the difficulty in capturing or representing dynamic processes. 
Several geographers have argued that cultural geographers, particularly those 
concerned with performance and performativity, have failed to develop methods that 
recognize this shift in focus towards movement. Latham (2003) has criticized the 
limited methods used by geographers in empirical research, arguing that the cultural 
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turn has created a ‘strange gap between theory and empirical practice’. To Thrift 
(2000b; 2000a), the cultural turn in geography is marked by its methodological 
timidity and a lack of sensate life that research captures. Both Latham and Thrift view 
the recent interest in using the metaphor of performance as an opportunity to go 
beyond the politics of representation. More radical methodological approaches, they 
argue, can help make a more empirically engaging human geography. Cloke et al 
(2004: 189) similarly suggest that a researcher can push the boundaries of research 
design through ‘new media technologies which can help shift attention beyond words 
... to consider the experiential side of its methods in a more holistic manner’.  
The second challenge is that performance is conceptualized in a dichotomous 
way with Goffman on the one hand conceptualizing a masterful, strategic subject and 
Butler on the other hand conceptualizing the subject as a site for subconscious, 
unintentional performances of dominant discourses (see Chapter Two). While the 
work of Goffman, Butler and Thrift provides theoretical discussion of performance, 
their work offers few clues as to how researchers might empirically study 
performance and performativity. Since Butler’s work does not conceptualize agency 
or a conscious subject, her theoretical perspective would not lend itself to methods 
which yield reflective comments such as interviews. In contrast, Goffman’s 
theorization of a conscious and strategic subject lends itself to a range of qualitative 
methods. Thrift (2000c: 577) suggests that performance ‘provides a new set of 
qualitative methods which can be used to expand human geographers’ currently very 
limited (and often elitist) repertoire of ethnography, focus groups, in-depth interviews 
and the like’. Butler, Goffman, and Thrift do not offer sustained reflection on specific 
methodologies for understanding the performance of identities, particularly historical 
performances of identities.  
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Several geographers in recent years have conducted empirical studies adopting 
the concepts of performance and performativity in various contexts. In examining 
how space is performatively encountered in the context of caravanning, Crouch 
(2003) engages in participant observation to temporarily become a part of the 
caravanning community. He uses detailed field notes to capture the activity and 
movement, noting the sensorial experiences of caravanning, the other caravanners, 
and the mundane, everyday gestures. Through interviews, he has caravanners reflect 
upon what they do and then speak of their experiences. Similarly, in his investigation 
of clubbing, Malbon (1999) engages in participant observation to deeply engage with 
performative aspects of identity and conducts interviews in an attempt to understand 
how clubbers themselves interpret their performances. Both of these studies attempt to 
describe the range of movements involved in certain contextualized performances. 
Understanding how people actually perform and then contrasting it to how they 
understand and interpret their performance can elicit an understanding about how 
conscious or subconscious different aspects of these performances are. 
Geographical studies that have examined embodiment, experience, and 
performance (Rowles 1978; Crang 1994; Malbon 1999) use participant observation to 
understand how people perform various identities and for what reasons. Scholars in 
geography examining performance and performativity have not explicitly discussed 
methodological issues, although it is clear that they have used several methods. In his 
study on workplace performances in the service industry Crang (1994) works as a 
waiter, studying the role of performance based on his own experience and observing 
and talking to co-workers at the restaurant. While these studies focus on 





After selecting Pulau Penyengat as my field site, the first strategy in my 
fieldwork was to spend time in the village getting to know the island, gaining 
familiarity with its politics and social structure, introducing myself to people, 
socializing and gaining an understanding of the habits, values and views of the 
residents, particularly with regard to the nation.  
As Lyn Parker (2003: 10) observes in the context of conducting fieldwork in a 
Balinese village,  
everything is potential ‘data’. Every image, from the Independence Day 
parade to the poster of Sukarno on the lounge-room wall, every action, from 
the submissive snooping of a subservient peasant to the saluting of the flag by 
uniformed schoolchildren, is a little clue.  
 
As Parker (2003) points out, the sources of data are infinite and one requires a balance 
between staying focused on addressing research objectives and staying open to 
creative possibilities. I spent several periods of between one and four weeks in 
Jakarta, Tanjung Pinang and Pulau Penyengat at the early stages of the thesis in order 
to allow the places and their own dynamics to help form my research questions. The 
themes this thesis was structured around (work, education, and play) emerged from 
spending time on Pulau Penyengat and observing how state strategies affected 
residents’ lives in an embodied way. These themes helped to then focus the 
information I needed to address my research objectives, and several qualitative 
methods emerged as being suitable for my project and for the cultural context of 
Pulau Penyengat. Table 1 lays out my research objectives, the informational 









Table 1 - Objectives, informational requirements and methods 
Objectives Informational requirements  Methods  
-To understand the role of 
performance in the 
formation, dissemination, 
and enforcement of official 
national identity in 
postcolonial Indonesia.  
-To expose the strategies 
employed by the state to 
encourage citizens to 
perform various identities 
within the context of power 
relationships embedded in 
national landscapes. 
 
-state programs of nation-building – 
both at the national level and village 
level 
-information about how performances 
of national identity are embodied 
- inventory of state-created national 
spaces in Pulau Penyengat 
-how nation-building strategies were 












-video and photos 
-informal discussion 
-To examine the ways in 
which performances of 
national identity have and 
have not changed over the 
course of the Old and New 
Orders and into the present.  
 
-historical information about state 
national ideology and nation-building 
strategies 
-historical information about how 




-scholarly writing on 
nation-building in 




with those who 
remember changes 
-informal discussion 
-Explore how national 
identities are understood, 
accepted, resisted and 
reinterpreted by the 
citizenry in complex and 
often conflicting ways on a 
range of scales and 
locations.  
-opinions of people about national 
programs 
-observations of people in their daily 
lives 
-an understanding of the relationship 
between government programs and 









3.4.1 Primary and secondary sources 
I had initially assumed that the National Archives, located in Jakarta, would 
assist greatly in providing historical material that would help me to understand the 
national strategies of constructing national identity, how nationalization was 
implemented in the Riau islands, and how strategies have changed over time. The 
historical dimension to my thesis required that I access material from the Dutch and 
Japanese occupations and the Old and New Orders, including information about 
colonial policies and philosophy and how they reached into the everyday lives of 
Indonesians. After spending time examining the collection in the National Archives, I 
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realized it would be of little use. The collection was disorganized and had very little 
post-Independence material. Although the collection of films at the National Archives 
looked promising, I was unable to view most or make copies of any for technical and 
bureaucratic reasons. Like the majority of English-language scholarly writing on 
Indonesian nationalism, the material in the National Archives and in the National 
Library focused primarily on emerging pre-Independence nationalism during the 
Dutch occupation and on the Indonesian Revolution. Similarly, the tiny archives on 
Pulau Penyengat maintained by one of the families descended from the sultan of Riau 
focuses almost exclusively on the history of Pulau Penyengat royalty. Personal 
archives such as family photo albums were of some use, but tended to record 
significant events such as weddings, parties, births and so on rather than the everyday 
aspects of life that are the concern of this thesis.  
The National Library was more useful than the Archives and had a broader 
collection of post-Independence material, including many government publications 
filled with data on administrative matters and raw statistics. However, such 
publications offer no information on how policies were implemented, to what extent 
they changed the populace, how the policies mobilized people, and what physical 
form they took. Few government documents relating to nation-building from the post-
Independence period have been sent to the National Archives or the National Library 
as it is primarily material relating to the struggle for Independence that is valued. 
Government offices have their own collections of documents dating as far back as 
there is storage space for. When visiting a government office in Jakarta I once 
witnessed a bonfire of files in the parking lot – the standard way to clear space in the 
offices for other uses. This material was not offered to the Archives, nor was there 
any sense that possibly important historical information was being destroyed. This 
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illustrates the problem of the unevenness of and inaccessibility to the materials in 
Indonesia relating to national culture.  
 As I have pointed out in Chapter Two, the scholarly literature on Pulau 
Penyengat and on Indonesian nationalism (with a few examples) tends to examine 
neither the embodied aspects of nation-building nor how the state’s strategies of 
nation-building affected everyday life in the village. With the lack of primary and 
secondary sources, I realized that local government officials and ordinary people 
would be the most valuable source of information about nation-building in Pulau 
Penyengat and the embodied aspects of national identity. 
3.4.2 Participant observation 
Participant observation is one of the key ways in which ethnographers attempt 
to understand the world views and the everyday lived experiences of people (Crang 
and Cook 2007). Wogan (2004) describes participant observation as ‘deep hanging 
out’, a phrase that aptly conveys the spirit of my fieldwork in Indonesia. Participant 
observation was broadly used to understand how people on Pulau Penyengat live, 
their values, and how their time was structured. As Pulau Penyengat is such a small 
and welcoming community, I was able to quickly immerse myself in the everyday 
activities of the village. I was invited to share everyday life experiences, including 
cooking, fishing, socializing, leisure activities and so on with villagers, which allowed 
ways of life, values, social structure, to gradually become apparent. Preliminary visits 
to my field site were made in 2004 and fieldwork was conducted from 2005-2007. I 
spent 39 weeks in the field, comprising a total of 273 days, each visit lasting from 3 
days to several weeks (see Table 2). Rather than staying in my fieldsite for one long 
stretch, I chose to make numerous visits of varying lengths. As a married woman, 
many islanders considered it strange and mildly scandalous that my husband did not 
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accompany me on my research. Many islanders would have been suspicious if, living 
in Singapore, I had not travelled back and forth frequently and had I not brought my 
husband to the island. The many visits also allowed me to take much-needed breaks 
from the lack of privacy and intensely social environment of Pulau Penyengat and 
prevented me from getting pulled into island politics. While some scholars have 
rightfully pointed out the benefits of being an ‘insider’ with the community one is 
researching (hooks 1990; Tembo 2003), I found that as a non-local (non-Malay, non-
Indonesian) I was at an advantage to notice the many everyday, naturalized aspects 
that go un-noticed by locals and are difficult for many locals to formally describe 
(Garfinkel and Sacks 1986). Table 3 outlines the contexts I sought out for participant 
observation on Pulau Penyengat as they relate to the conceptual themes in my thesis. 
 






















































Table 3 - Sites for participant observation 
Themes Sites of participant observation 
Chapter Five: Working for the Nation • Informal sector (food stalls, gathering 
points for rickshaw drivers) 
• Fishing boats, gathering points for 
prawn collectors 
• Elementary school, Kelurahan 
Office, clinic 
Chapter Six: Educating the Nation • Classroom, school courtyard 
• School events (e.g. parades) 
Chapter Seven: The Nation at Play • Volleyball courts, main square 
(performance stage and takro court), 
performances off the island 
 
As Cloke et al (2004: 177) point out, participant observation uniquely involves 
‘studying both what people say they do and why, and what they are seen to do and say 
to others about this’. Through participant observation, in addition to both informal 
discussions and semi-structured interviews, I was able to observe gaps between what 
people say they do and what they actually do and how they understand and interpret 
their actions. This combination of methods can help to reveal the degree to which 
people are conscious they are performing.  
I recorded the participant observation aspects of my fieldwork in several ways. 
First, as a key aspect of participant observation I kept detailed field diaries (Sanjek 
1990). In my notes, I made general observations and described the setting, what the 
participants were doing, forms of behaviour, and how participants interact with each 
other. Wayne Fife (2005) recommends recording sensations to remind the researcher 
later about uncomfortable constraints, key to the experience of performing particular 
versions of national identity. After participating in an activity, I wrote down general 
impressions, including sensorial observations. This helped me to understand and 
explain the day-to-day ways in which national identity is performed, helped to reveal 
repetitive patterns of behaviour, and to later analyze certain scripted performances 
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that involved, for example, confining and disciplining the body rather than allowing 
individual body movements. 
Second, I took many photos of the built landscape of the island, particularly of 
state-created national infrastructure, and of people engaged in everyday activities. 
Taking photos was not as intrusive as I had expected as digital cameras and mobile 
phones with cameras were common in the village and I found myself to be the subject 
of many more photos than I took on the island.  
Third, as mentioned earlier, in order to capture the dynamism of the 
performances about which I was writing, I took video footage while conducting 
fieldwork. When filming, at times I sensed the ‘observer effect’, a principle that refers 
to changes that the act of observation brings about on that which is being observed. 
However, this was dependent on the context. While it did not have an effect on sport 
or dance performances, it did have effect on national rituals. In general, however, my 
cheap mini video camera did not draw attention and I feel that, far more than my 
having a video camera, it was my presence that brought about an ‘observer effect.’ 
When engaging in participant observation, I was aware at times that participants 
changed their behaviour at times due to my presence. In some cases, I was told that 
some people did not normally bother to participate in some activities (such as teachers 
in Senam Pagi Indonesia) but were doing so because they felt they needed to put their 
best foot forward for a visitor. I could sometimes sense a general tension as some 
groups seemed to be trying a little harder in the presence of an outsider. This usually 
took the form of taking greater care during formal national rituals such as Upacara 
Bendera and Senam Pagi Indonesia to demonstrate their discipline and patriotism to a 
foreigner. In my presence, these formal rituals also may have gone on longer than 
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usual with more prolonged and pedantic speeches from the principal or senior 
government official. 
 Participant observation is not without some problems. Because it requires 
getting close to the people one is researching, certain challenges emerge. At times I 
found myself beginning to be pulled into village drama and pushed to choose sides 
through my accommodation choices and who I was perceived to spend time with. To 
avoid appearing partisan and to gain more experiences with a spectrum of villagers, I 
made an effort to spend time with a range of villagers. After spending three weeks at 
the home of a raja family, I decided to accept the offer to stay at various homes of 
non-raja families. While there were some disadvantages to moving around, it helped 
me to avoid being seen as controlled by the raja family and allowed me to live at close 
quarters with a wider spectrum of Pulau Penyengat society.     
3.4.3 Selecting interviewees 
In order to understand the official views on nation-building it was important to 
speak with state employees at the national, provincial and village levels, including 
those who work on a voluntary, part-time basis as representatives of the state. I 
approached officials directly or was introduced through existing connections and was 
usually able to have a discussion on the spot. I also sought the views of a variety of 
citizens who did not work for the state in order to understand how citizens interpreted 
state strategies of nation-building. I selected a range of people of different ages and 
socio-economic classes and a balance between genders. Many of the residents I met 
on Pulau Penyengat initially approached me out of curiosity or for a variety of other 
reasons. While it was not difficult to meet many people, it was easy to fall into 
meeting the same types of people, such as when being sheltered by the rajas. My 
obvious foreignness likely attracted many people who were curious, who wanted to 
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practice English or were local Casanovas. Before people knew who I was, far more 
males approached me than females. To avoid having contact only with the types of 
people who would approach me, I intentionally sought out those who did not 
approach me. Some of these people were naturally shy or did not speak English and 
assumed I did not speak Malay. Others held social positions in the village that were 
low and others would intervene or prevent me from talking to them. Strategies for 
meeting people included networking with existing contacts, participating in 
community activities, hanging out in public gathering places, and approaching people 
and introducing myself. 
While the day-to-day interactions I had were not an even representation of the 
village, I tried to select a variety of people from Pulau Penyengat society to interview 
(Table 4).  
 
Table 4 – Selection of interviewees 
 Total number % 
Male 33 51 
Female 32 49 
Children and youths 27 42 
Working age people 34 52 
Elderly 4 6 
State workers 14 22 
Non-state workers 20 31 
Jakarta residents 5 8 
Tanjung Pinang residents 4 6 
Pulau Penyengat residents 56 86 
 
3.4.4 Interviews 
Through interviews and many informal discussions of varying lengths I 
attempted to gain an understanding of how state strategies of nation-building affected 
the daily lives of a range of residents of Pulau Penyengat and their interpretations and 
perceptions of their participation (or lack of participation). I sought to understand how 
experiences of nation-building have changed over time as different state strategies 
have been introduced on Pulau Penyengat. 
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Informal discussions were a key part of the research. Through informal chats, I 
was able to get a sense of the community, their values, who the most and least 
powerful people in the village were, the power dynamics and what the issues were 
that villagers felt were important. These many informal discussions helped me to 
focus my interviews and asked more targeted questions.  
I began interviews with warm-up questions about their background, general 
memories, and getting to know them, following local etiquette. I then advanced on to 
open-ended questions, allowing the interviewee to ‘talk about the subject in terms of 
their own frames of reference’ (May 1993: 112). Interviews lasted from between 20 
minutes to over two hours. My interview questions are arranged in sections 
(Appendix A). Not all questions were asked in one interview but were covered often 
over the course of several meetings in which I steered the interviewee through several 
topics. Some of the longer semi-structured interviews were recorded with permission, 
although some interviewees did not wish to be recorded. Most interviewees did not 
want me to write their names down for fear that others would find out what they said 
and the information would somehow be used against them.  
Shurmer-Smith (2004) points out that it is beneficial to hold interviews in 
places where interviewees feel comfortable. In my experience interviewing people on 
Pulau Penyengat, I found that the less formal the situation, the more comfortable 
people were and the more they opened up and shared their views. For this reason, I 
tried to conduct semi-structured interviews over tea in a café, on a walk about the 
island, while preparing food, while watching a sporting event or dance performance, 
or looking through family photo albums. The interviews I conducted in more formal 
places such as government offices or sitting down in a living room with a family 
tended to be overburdened with the various power relationships of the workplace or 
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the home, resulting in answers that tended to be more supportive of the status quo and 
less critical and honest.  
The interviewees I selected represent a cross-section of Pulau Penyengat 
residents (see Table 4). I selected ten villagers who worked in some capacity for the 
state, as office workers in the kantor kelurahan on the island, civil servants who 
worked in Tanjung Pinang, teachers, as a medical worker in the island’s clinic, and 
volunteers for state-run programs. I selected ten villagers who worked but were not 
employed by the state. This group included people involved in fishing, snack sellers, 
store owners, rickshaw drivers, hotel workers, and a tailor. I also sought to capture a 
selection of views from the youth, at whom many programs of nationalization are 
targeted. I selected sixteen children from age six to thirteen and eleven from age 
fourteen to nineteen, the age at which students normally graduate from high school. 
I experienced several minor challenges in conducting interviews. First, while 
none of the people I interviewed refused to answer my questions or discuss topics 
related to my research, it was clear that there were many topics many people found far 
more interesting. They expressed this by changing the topic, criticizing my research 
topic, implying it was boring and that there were far more interesting aspects of 
Malay and Indonesian culture to examine. I was frequently given suggestions for 
alternate research topics, all of which fit into national ‘Taman Mini’ conceptual 
hierarchies of culture, also the categories which have attracted among the most 
scholarly attention from foreign researchers: Balinese dance, Javanese gamelan and 
Malay cultural traditions were all suggestions I received and were obvious sources of 
pride for many residents of Pulau Penyengat. These suggestions reflect the dominant 
artistic tastes valued and promoted by the state and are rooted in research traditions 
86 
 
dating back to Dutch colonial times. As I discuss in the following section, I found 
group discussions helped to enliven the topics. 
3.4.5 Focus groups 
After some time in the field I found that group discussions had a different 
dynamic from individual discussion that allowed people to explore and discuss 
different opinions, feed off one another’s energy, stay energized with the topic, and 
jog memories. In group discussion, one comment can trigger a chain of responses 
(Cameron 2005) and has the potential to generate far more information than other 
research methods (Berg 1989; Stewart and Shamdasani 1990). As Lunt and 
Livingstone (1996) point out, groups enthusiastically discuss a topic in which there is 
little interest on an individual level. Group discussions are useful in hearing a range of 
often constrasting views on specific topics (Crang and Cook 2007).  
As Robyn Longhurst (2003) points out, it is useful at the start of a focus group 
discussion to engage participants in some kind of activity. I found it helpful to show 
photos or video footage I took of Senam Pagi Indonesia, dance, sports and other state 
performances so participants could reflect upon what they see and have a chance to 
discuss it with the group. Participants had not seen photos of some of these everyday 
performances and seeing photos helped people to consider them in a new way. 
Geraldine Pratt (2000: 272; see also Clifford 1986) points out that focus group 
discussions are ‘public performance[s] that are both enabled and constrained by social 
conventions’. In the context of Pulau Penyengat, I felt that the composition of the 
focus groups was crucial to their success as many people tended to treat fellow 
villagers according to social convention that was incompatible with the open, 
uninhibited discussion required in a focus group. As pointed out by many scholars 
(Stewart and Shamdasani 1990; Knodel 1993; Valentine 1999; Fern 2001), if a group 
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is highly diverse, there is the danger that those of a higher status (often men) will 
dominate those of a lower status by interrupting and assuming the role of expert. I 
found that class tensions on Pulau Penyengat could prevent productive discussion. 
One illustration of such tensions is when the wedding of a young man on the island 
was announced. The people around me responded to the news with excitement and 
happiness. One woman in her 50s from the lowest socio-economic class and who was 
friendly with the groom also showed her happiness, only to have several upper-class 
women accuse her of being happy not at the marriage but at the prospect of getting a 
free meal at the wedding. Predictably, this comment made the woman withdraw. With 
this in mind, I made the decision to minimize the variability within each focus group. 
I also found it beneficial to select ‘natural’ groups, groups who already knew each 
other and would normally spend time together in a group (Holbrook 1996).  
Holding discussions with ‘natural’ groups are not without problems. Although 
ideally focus groups should be ‘spaces of resistance’ where participants can openly 
critique or challenge the ideas of those in authority (Hyams 2004: 106), individuals 
can fall into patterns of behaviour in which everyday power relations within the group 
may be maintained during the discussion and some may not feel comfortable 
expressing differing opinions (Kong 1998). Within a group there may be ‘friendship 
pairs’ who focus on each other and interact with in-jokes rather than with the whole 
group (Crang and Cook 2007). These problems may be reduced if the researcher 
screens potential participants (Burgess, Limb, and Harrison 1988; Krueger 1994), 
however this is not possible to do when dealing with already-existing groups (Crang 
and Cook 2007). While I found that there was at times some deference to the eldest in 
the group, the key difficulty for me in conducting focus groups was keeping the group 
focused and understanding their intimate language, inside jokes and assumed 
88 
 
knowledge. The groups who were close friends tended to get carried away with their 
own enjoyment of each others’ company and be somewhat difficult to keep focused 
on the questions as the discussions would veer off into favourite topics and routines of 
teasing and joking. 
I spoke with five segments of society (children, youths, men, women and civil 
servants) who normally spent time together by choice, with the exception of civil 
servants who worked together. The members of the groups knew each other well and 
some were related in some way (cousins or part of the same branch of a family tree), 
were neighbours, or were long-time friends. I found each group in various ways. I was 
approached by many children on Pulau Penyengat and spent some time with several 
groups of them as they acted as my tour guides to the island, showing me their 
favourite spots and teaching me new Malay vocabulary. I met the youths and the men 
in the square next to the mosque. The men drank tea and played dominos regularly 
and the youths gathered in the square to socialize and to watch various activities in the 
square such as dance practice or takro [indigenous sport in which a rattan ball is kept 
in the air using only the feet]. The discussions I had with civil servants became group 
discussions when the entire office joined in discussion. After interacting with each 
group several times, I found that they were lively and were respectful of one another 
and, with the exception of the civil servants, routinely gathered to socialize.  
Goss and Leinbach (1996: 119) note that while the literature on focus groups 
suggests that the role of the researcher should be confined to that of observer, while 
conducting research in Indonesia they found that it was more effective and more 
enjoyable for the participants if the researcher was engaged directly in the discussion 
and become ‘part of the evolving social drama.’ Similarly, I participated in the 
discussion at times, particularly if people wanted to know about practices in my own 
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country. Discussing national rituals (or lack thereof) in my own country also helped 
interviewees to be aware that the practices that they experience as a normal part of 
their daily lives are unique to Indonesia. 
Where to meet is important for focus groups as participants must feel 
comfortable (Denzin 1970). Since I used ‘natural’ groups in spontaneous discussions, 
we spent time where the group was already gathered, as can be seen in Table 5. The 
location of the focus groups depended on the habits of that particular group and on 
what was socially appropriate. With groups of women, we would sit in someone’s 
living room or on their patio where children could be watched and where they 
normally gathered socially. With groups of men, we would sit at a table of one of the 

















Table 5 - Focus groups 
Focus 
groups 

















a cafe next to the square 

























Front porch of the home I was 
staying in. The children often 
gathered around to see if I 
wanted to play so I frequently 

























D. Youths  17-02-06  17 F Lela high school student In the main square, on the 
steps of the stage. In the 
evening the youths were 
hanging out socializing and 
watching activities in the 
main square. 
19 F Ninik high school student 
/ dancer 
21 M Santi college student 
21 M Uji college student 
22 M Zul dancer 












26 F Zuwirna teacher in training  
 
In the living room of a 













50s F Bu Erlina Housewife / 
cigarette seller 


















Coffee shop worker 
Housewife 
In the living room of one of 
the women.   
G. Men  18-03-06 40s M Pak Deni Sailor / shipping clerk  
Around a table of a cafe in the 
main square. This group (with 
some variation) enjoys tea 
and long discussions about 
politics, geography, current 
events and gossip together on 
many evenings. 
30s M Sayed Unemployed  
42 M Pak Fazrul Anti-narcotics worker 
40s M Said Fisher / sailor / 
handyman 
50s M Roni Coffee shop worker 
60s M Pak Ahmad Retired / tourism 
H. Men  19-08-06 30s M Akhmad Factory worker 
  50s M Pak 
Sudirman 
Principal / coffee shop 
owner 
  60s M Subur Retired / handyman 
  40s M Ansur Pompong driver 
I. Civil 
servants 
15-02-06  50s M Pak 
Sudirman 
Elementary school 
principal / coffee  
shop owner  
Elementary school 
teacher 
I caught this group one 
afternoon at a tea stall and 
initiated a group discussion. 40s F Haja Taty 
30s M Hendri Civil servant in 
Kelurahan office 
40s M Malik Tourism promoter / 




One of the challenges in arranging group discussions was actually getting a 
group together and safeguarding against non-attendance (Bedford and Burgess 2003). 
I realized early on that making appointments was not the most effective way to meet 
people because their lives were often unpredictable. For example, I had planned to 
meet with four youths once for tea next to the mosque but none showed up as the tides 
were perfect to catch prawns, a key way for many islanders to supplement their 
income. Also, as people became familiar with my presence, they assumed they could 
meet with me later while they did various chores or watched a TV show they liked. 
Alternatively, sometimes if I planned to hold a discussion later with several people, a 
dozen curious friends and neighbours and their children might show up and the 
planned discussion would not be possible. For these reasons, all of my discussion 
groups were spontaneously planned and participants were gathered through a tactic 
that I call ‘guerilla recruiting’. If I happened to be in a group that was already 
gathered to socialize, I asked whether they could answer some questions before 
bringing out photos or my laptop to show video footage. While guerrilla recruiting 
and spontaneous discussion groups would not be suitable in many fieldwork contexts, 
in the context of Pulau Penyengat this was a way to ensure participation and prevent 
‘participation anxiety’, or the feeling of not knowing what to do, how to perform, and 
the tendency to get intimidated by the formality of an interview. Spontaneous focus 
groups also meant that I could simply piggyback on an existing social group that had 
already developed a good rapport and enjoyed each other’s company while avoiding 
class tensions.  
Another challenge noted by Bedford and Burgess (2003) was the consensual 
nature of many groups. This was true in the case of Pulau Penyengat, with participants 
often agreeing with each other as a way of being pleasant according to social 
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convention. Furthermore, interviewees frequently told me what they thought I wanted 
to hear. It was important for me to keep the groups to a minimum in order to 
understand what people were saying as it was challenging to understand the informal 
Malay slang used (I speak more formal Indonesian) and the in-jokes (Krueger 1994). 
Over five people made it difficult for me to handle in Malay and recording was also 
difficult to hear people talking over one another. 
One unavoidable challenge was the noise level, particularly in the square next 
to the mosque, where it was difficult to record the discussion. Not only is there a 
regular call to prayer, but all activity within the mosque is broadcast over huge 
speakers turned up to the maximum volume. Long prayer sessions can be heard at all 
hours. Many mosques in Indonesia regularly solicit donations, recruiting the most 
loquacious male villager to act as the master of ceremonies, greeting everyone who 
comes in the mosque, providing updates as to how much money has been collected, 
and filling in the empty time with chatter about the weather, planned projects and so 
on.  
Because this mosque is an important part of Malay history and identity, it 
attracts Malays from Singapore, Malaysia, Sumatra and the Riau Islands, has a large 
staff, generates a large income, and has a busy program of activities. This translates 
into near constant noise. For the purposes of my fieldwork, this translated into a 
methodological challenge. As the main square is a key site for social activities, 
particularly in the evenings when people are not working, it is the most suitable venue 
in which to meet people. Furthermore it was the most appropriate venue in which to 




A final challenge was meeting old folks who were lucid enough to remember 
the Dutch, or at least Japanese colonial period on Pulau Penyengat. A person who 
would remember the Dutch occupation as a child would have had to have been born 
in around the mid-1930s or earlier and would be at least in their mid-70s today. To 
experience Dutch rule as an adult, a person would have had to have been born in the 
early 1920s and would be into their mid-late 80s now. Similarly, a person who would 
remember the Japanese occupation as a young adult would have had to have been 
born in the mid-1920s and would be in their early 80s now. I was surprised to find 
only a few people whose memories stretched back to pre-Independence times and was 
unable to find enough elderly people to form a discussion group. This is unfortunate 
as a group dynamic would have been valuable in sparking memories and discussing 
long-term change that is key to this research. Discussions with the elderly were 
confined to four lucid old-timers who were children during the Japanese occupation.  
3.5 Ethics  
In any research there will be sensitive aspects and in this section I discuss 
several key ethical issues related to my research12. As a ‘First World’, ‘white’ 
researcher going to the formerly colonized ‘Third World’, there are potential power 
dynamics that I had to be aware of and actively attempt to dissipate. Several scholars 
have argued for research to be ‘decolonised’ in order to ‘break down the cross-
cultural discourses, asymmetrical power relationships, representations, and political, 
economic, and social structures through which colonialism and neo-colonialism are 
constructed and maintained’ (Howitt and Stevens 2005: 32). Skelton (2001: 90) 
suggests that researchers recognize and take responsibility ‘for differential power 
relations that may exist between the researcher and those participating in the research’ 
                                                          
12 By the time the Institutional Review Board (IRB) was established in the Geography Department, I 
had completed the bulk of my fieldwork.  
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and choose methods that empower the researched and attempt to transform unequal 
power relations. Others recommend ‘culturally safe’ research practices which 
acknowledge how collective histories of power relations may affect individual 
research encounters (Dyck and Kearns 1995; Kearns and Dyck 2005). In the context 
of researching in Indonesia, I sought to dissipate power through several strategies. 
Howitt and Stevens (2005) suggest that researchers have an ethical 
responsibility to learn about the research protocols in the place of research and respect 
them. To be from the ‘First World’ and act as though the rules do not apply while in 
the ‘Third World’ perpetuates a colonial dynamic. One of the ways to avoid ‘deep 
colonizing’ is to follow the rules set by the host country (even if we do not agree with 
them or find them inconvenient) and to seek formal and/or informal authorization in 
the place of research (Howitt and Stevens 2005). While it is ethically and practically 
straightforward to follow the rules of a small community and seek informal 
authorization from leaders in the village, it is less clear how to proceed when seeking 
authorization from the Indonesian state. Most researchers I have spoken with 
informally have not researched in Indonesia with a research visa due to the time, cost 
and effort it takes and the few benefits it yields, depending on the research projects. 
Unless researchers need formal access to human subjects for medical/biological 
purposes or to protected places such as national parks, most researchers use a tourist 
visa or a social visit pass to conduct research.  
In an attempt to be ethical in my fieldwork, I went through the excruciating 
process of obtaining an official research visa. This involved a complicated schedule of 
visiting several times various offices around Jakarta with extremely short opening 
hours. I was recommended to photocopy my passport, visa, research proposal, letter 
from my university, letter from my sponsor in Indonesia and several other documents 
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ten times each, along with a dozen passport sized photos. These had to be taken to 
various offices for processing. My topic was initially approved by the Indonesian 
Embassy in Singapore, my sponsor in Riau and LIPI, the national research 
organization that sponsors foreign researchers, and the National Immigration Office. 
In order to renew my one-year visa I needed to go back to all of the offices in Jakarta. 
After six months in Indonesia with my research visa, the National Immigration Office 
denied my research proposal and made me change the topic of my thesis. The entire 
process of securing a research visa cost almost S$1000, 20 percent of my fieldwork 
budget and many weeks of driving around Jakarta and waiting in offices. In short, 
although the process was inefficient, tedious and at times corrupt, I felt bound (at least 
initially) to follow the rules the government had set for foreign researchers. 
In Pulau Penyengat, there was the ethical issue of being just another (white) 
researcher using the village to build my career. Many of the villagers I spoke with 
mentioned previous researchers who had come to Pulau Penyengat13 and while I 
sensed that villagers felt proud that their village was interesting and important enough 
to attract scholars, they expressed frustration that they were being used by foreign 
researchers with no benefit to themselves. Once required information was extracted, 
the researchers disappeared and the islanders did not see any of the research products 
and none were translated into Malay. Several of the villagers devised a scheme to 
enlist all visiting researchers to spend time teaching English to villagers as a way of 
giving back to the village. I felt obliged to provide occasional lessons to those who 
were interested and donated some English learning materials.   
Shurmer-Smith (2004: 156) points out that power relationships are ‘not fixed 
or unidirectional, but shift and change according to how the researcher and researched 
                                                          
13 As Pulau Penyengat was a centre of Malay culture and power as the home of the Riau Sultanate, many 
researchers over the decades have come to Pulau Penyengat to research aspects of Malay history and culture. 
96 
 
are interacting with one another’. I found that while I was a ‘First World’ researcher 
in the ‘Third World’ and was powerfully positioned, I found that at times I had little 
power, as mentioned above in the context of government offices or in particular male 
company. More significantly, I was in the unique position of living near to my field 
site and could make frequent visits over a period of several years (see Table 2). 
Moreover, my positionality as a ‘white’ ‘First World’ researcher living and studying 
in Singapore complicated stereotypes of the rich white foreigner, particularly as a 
number of friends and acquaintances from Jakarta, Tanjung Pinang and Pulau 
Penyengat visited me in Singapore, several even staying at my apartment. This 
disrupted traditional researcher-researched power relations and complicated our roles 
in many ways. Those who came to my apartment were able to confirm all that I had 
told them about my life in Singapore and to deconstruct some of their myths about 
white people, educated people, etc. The fact that I live in a studio apartment far 
smaller than most of the homes on Pulau Penyengat and have no car or even a 
motorcycle helped to place me more accurately in the wealth hierarchy on the island. 
In other words, after seeing my living situation, I was no longer automatically seen as 
being rich and powerful by Pulau Penyengat standards or Singapore standards. 
Living so close to my field site and maintaining relationships with people 
there brought about a particular ethical issue. As I became closer with members of the 
community, it became an ethical necessity to share more personal aspects of my life. I 
felt uncomfortable and unethical being welcomed into the community, learning from 
them, and forming friendships without reciprocating in ways that I was clearly able to. 
It was important for me to bring my husband to the island to assure his existence to 
the villagers and to prove that I was spending time there with his blessing. I also 
brought several friends to the island over the years, who also established some 
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personal connections with several villagers. Had I had not become increasingly 
involved on a personal level, I might have been viewed with distrust and suspicion. 
Opening aspects of my life to villagers served to humanize me and also showed 
villagers that my relationships with them are valuable enough to be included in my 
life. Again, I sensed this was necessary in the progression of my friendships and in the 
context of researching in a small community near to my home. 
3.6 Summary 
In this chapter I described the methodological approach I took in my research.  
I highlighted some of the main opportunities and constraints of conducting research as 
a foreign female researcher in Indonesia in general and in Pulau Penyengat in 
particular. I then examined existing literature on performance and performativity with 
regards to methodological approaches. I discussed how opportunities and constraints 
of the research context as well as previous studies affected the methods I selected 
before providing an overview of and justification for each. Finally, I discussed the 
ethical considerations of my research and how I handled them. Having detailed the 
methodological approach of this research, the next chapter will provide an overview 
of how national identity and ideology developed prior to Independence, followed by 
four empirical chapters examining four realms of villagers’ lives which are affected 




















Indonesian national identity has evolved over an extended period of time 
starting long before Independence was proclaimed in 1945. Due to its colonial history, 
Indonesian national identity cannot be understood without examining the imperial 
powers which have controlled the territory. This chapter begins with an introduction 
to the Dutch and Japanese rule over Indonesia, briefly introducing how the 
groundwork for Indonesian identity was established in large part as a reaction to or in 
imitation of these powers. This section also examines how the post-Independent 
Javanese elite can be considered as another imperial power to take control of the 
archipelago. This chapter demonstrates that many of the key features of Indonesian 
national identity including geographical boundaries, national philosophy, language, 
and conceptualizations of race have been influenced by various colonial powers.  
4.2 Colonial occupations 
4.2.1 The Dutch Period 
In order to understand the development of Indonesian national identity, it is 
helpful to have an understanding of the Dutch occupation of the region. The Dutch 
entered Indonesia initially as a trading partner and their level of control over the 
archipelago was extremely uneven over time and space. However, through politicians’ 
speeches, school text books and national songs, the Indonesian state perpetuates the 
idea that Dutch colonial rule lasted for 350 years.  
Maluku, known as the ‘Spice Islands’, was the original focus of the Dutch, 
who sought control over the spice trade in the 17th century. Economic activities 
moved to Java in the mid-18th century when attention shifted from spice to the 
99 
 
cultivation of coffee, tea, sugar, indigo and tobacco (Tarling 2001). Due to a 
concentration of economic interests, Java became the most intensely governed area of 
the Indies and where the highest number of Indonesians came into contact with the 
Dutch state and its citizens. The nationalist movement was strongest in Java where the 
Dutch faced great opposition to their oppressive and exploitative policies. For this 
reason, nationalists who emerged as leaders in Independence were primarily Javanese 
and tended to have had much experience interacting with the Dutch through education 
and employment.  
The Dutch colony has a highly centralized bureaucracy based in Batavia, now 
Jakarta. All decisions were made there and goods were primarily shipped through 
Batavia’s port. Administrative decisions made in Batavia were carried out by Dutch 
officials posted across the archipelago, and indigenous peoples increasingly began 
seeking their livelihoods within the new political framework, working as contract 
labourers in the plantations of East Sumatra or as minor government officials. This 
administrative unity grew particularly important with the massive growth of 
government which took place from the 19th century, as is explored in Chapter 5. As 
the colonial endeavour became more and more complex, technical expertise and 
administrative efficiency became increasingly indispensible and a vast governmental 
apparatus began to take shape:  
Departments of irrigation and transport, of trade and industry, of education 
and religion, began to grow and to intervene in the fabric of life in the colony, 
forming the feeling amongst non-Europeans in the colony that control of the 
governor-general’s palace in Batavia was the key to mastery of their affairs’ 
(Cribb and Brown 1995: 7).  
 
This centralized bureaucracy with representatives stationed across the archipelago, 
changed how people in the Indies perceived the world around them and helped to 
foster a sense of ‘imagined community’. It also reinforced the local sense that all 
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decisions were made in Jakarta, a symbolic role that was perpetuated in the 
archipelago after Independence when Jakarta was made the capital of the new nation.  
The Dutch were divided as to how to manage the population of their colony. 
In the second half of the 19th century, there were increasing calls from concerned 
people back in the Netherlands for humane policies in the Indies that would end the 
cultivation system14 and would allow people of the Indies to be educated, while others 
felt justified in exploiting what they considered to be inferior humans (Taylor 2003). 
Although the rate of educated indigenous people in the Dutch East Indies was far 
lower at every level of schooling than that of other colonies in Southeast Asia, a small 
number of bright and promising young men from the Indies were able to travel to the 
Netherlands to receive a Dutch education. Scholars have credited these early foreign 
students with bringing the notion of independence from the Dutch in the form of 
modern statehood back to the Indies (Kahin 1952; Legge 1964).   
The Dutch presence was uneven across the archipelago and local experience 
of the Dutch varied. While Dutch cruelty in the Indies is well-documented (Sukarno 
and Adams 1965; Pluvier 1972; Oostindie and Paasman 1998; Multatuli [1963]), there 
were also intermarriages and friendships between Europeans and Indonesians 
(Mangkupradja, Evans, and McVey 1968). The cruel and humiliating aspects of the 
Dutch Occupation have been emphasized for the political purpose of rallying citizens 
around the concept of Indonesian unity (Reid 1979). 
4.2.2 The Japanese Period 
There is relatively little information about the period of the Japanese 
Occupation of Southeast Asia because the Japanese military destroyed most of their 
war-related documents after the war (Akashi and Yoshimura 2008). While Japan’s 
                                                          
14 Primarily implemented in Java, the Cultivation System made it mandatory for 20% of all agricultural production 
to be devoted to export cash crops.  While the Dutch earned huge profits from this system, it resulted in 
widespread famine and poverty in the late 19th century (Fasseur 1991). 
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occupation of Indonesia is notorious in national history, it is less well-known that 
Japan was also an influence on people of the Indies even prior to World War II. In the 
early 20th century, Japan was seen as modern, cosmopolitan, technologically advanced 
and a model of a successful and powerful Asian nation (Kahin 1952). The Japanese 
defeat of Russia in 1905 had encouraged many Asians to question European 
superiority and emboldened many to imagine the possibilities of overthrowing their 
own colonial administration. To people of the Indies, Japan represented an Asian path 
towards modernity and a strong Asian alternative to the Dutch. As Sjahrir15 (1952: 
125-6; see also Kahin 1952) wrote,  
Dutch repression had the effect of turning the eyes of Westernized Indonesians 
away from the West and towards Japan. That country’s offer of autonomy in 
Korea in the mid-thirties naturally made a very favourable impression. 
Consequently, many middle-class and white-collar Indonesians looked to 
Japan for the education of their children, as well as for their cultural interests; 
it became the fashion to visit Japan on holiday.  
 
In the final years before WWII, Sjahrir observed that Japan had increased 
considerably in popularity, and that a large portion of the Islamic population of the 
country was pro-Japanese: 
…in the most remote kampongs [villages / neighbourhoods] people were 
firmly convinced of the superior power of the Japanese compared with the 
Dutch. Even the nationalists were inclined in that direction (Sjahrir 1952: 
185).  
 
Sympathy for Japan was a means of expressing antipathy towards the Dutch; at the 
same time, as Sjahrir pointed out, the subconscious causes lay in Asian feelings of 
inferiority, which ‘found their outlet in the glorification of the Japanese rather than in 
the more dangerous alternative of open hatred of the Dutch’ (Sjahrir 1952: 195). 
                                                          
15 Sutan Sjahrir was a key nationalist in the decades before Independence and the first Prime Minister of Indonesia. 
Sjahrir studied law in the Netherlands before returning to Indonesia to help establish the Indonesian National Party 




The Japanese were initially greeted as Asian liberators from European rule. As 
Kahin (1952: 102) has written, the ‘popular feeling that they came as liberators was 
reinforced by their immediately allowing the display of the red and white Indonesian 
national flag and the singing of Indonesia Raja, the national anthem, both of which 
had been forbidden by the Dutch.’ Displays of Indonesian nationalism permitted by 
the Japanese however, greatly varied depending on the location in the archipelago 
(Goto 2003). In contrast to Kahin’s observations, residents of Pulau Penyengat saw 
the Indonesian flag fly for the first time only after the Japanese defeat.  
While the Japanese arrived in Southeast Asia ostensibly to liberate Asians 
from European oppression, the underlying objective of their expansion was to secure 
sources of raw materials and food to fuel the Japanese expansion and war effort. 
Japanese economic policy stated that member states would sell their raw materials to 
Japan and purchase Japanese manufactured goods, the same economic relationship as 
Indonesians experienced under the Dutch (Goto 2003). Their occupation of Indonesia 
lasted just 3.5 years (1942-45) but is remembered in Pulau Penyengat as being more 
cruel than the Dutch occupation. 
Although Japan had been planning to expand into Southeast Asia for over ten 
years, their plans to administer its new territories were underdeveloped (Owen 2005: 
303). Their leadership can be characterized as being concerned ‘more with 
mobilisation and control than with state-building’ (Tarling 2001: 288). As a result, 
experiences under the Dutch and Japanese left the new rulers of Indonesia more 
prepared for designing intricate structures for controlling its citizenry than for 
handling problems and managing resources.  
 The Japanese recognized the potency of the Indonesian nationalist movement 
and sought to harness it for their own ends, realizing that if nationalists’ goals were 
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not appreciated, there was a risk of a paralyzing level of anti-Japanese sentiment 
developing. The Japanese soon identified themselves with the nationalist cause in 
order to convince the population that policies that worked to Japan’s advantage did 
not clash with Indonesian ambitions. The Japanese Military Government began to 
sponsor and organize nationalists into a movement that would bring them together 
into one organization, making it easier to expose them to Japanese propaganda and 
influence16 (Khoo 1977: 29). Most of the successful national leaders after 
independence were favoured by the Japanese military and placed in positions of 
leadership over Japanese-created mass organizations (Owen 2005). Sukarno and Hatta 
were selected to lead Java Hokokai, the Java branches of the Japanese organization 
that civilians over fourteen were required to join, which organized mass support of the 
emperor and his war and for Japanese policies (Owen 2005: 305). The Republican 
government retained the personnel and apparatus of Java Hokokai after the war. Both 
Sukarno and Hatta made trips to Japan during this time and had much exposure to the 
Japanese military and bureaucratic cultures. Significantly, unlike the Dutch, the 
Japanese allowed nationalists to talk of an independent Indonesia, if not realize it. 
Under the Japanese, the small minority of Indonesians who had received an 
education under the Dutch saw their socioeconomic status rise tremendously (Kahin 
1952). A great vacuum in upper administrative and technical positions was left by the 
Dutch who had fled or were imprisoned, along with a substantial portion of the 
Eurasian community and many Christian Indonesians who the Japanese suspected as 
being Dutch sympathizers. Under Japanese rule, a relatively homogenous group of 
Dutch-educated indigenous men were propelled into positions of leadership and 
                                                          
16 This organization was established in March 1943 and was called Pusat Tenaga Rakjat, or PUTERA. The 
Japanese placed Sukarno as the Chairman and Mohammad Hatta as the Vice-Chairman. 
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nearly all such personnel were promoted at least one or as high as three levels within 
the hierarchy in which they were employed (Kahin 1952).  
The assistance the Japanese gave to Sukarno and other Republicans over 
competing nationalists was instrumental in the direction the independent nation went. 
As Owen writes of the Republicans, they  
operated in a thought-world created by the Japanese, did not propose 
democratic institutions and rejected a bill of rights advocated by Maria Ulfah 
Santoso, a Holland-trained lawyer. They persevered in the view that an 
independent country should regroup the territories of the former Dutch colony. 
None championed ethnic and regional interests. (Owen 2005: 307)  
 
As Tokyo’s military planners anticipated defeat, they promised independence for 
Indonesia in March 1945. They established a committee by hand-picking all sixty-
four members to represent the major ethnic groups as well as Chinese, significantly 
excluding the Dutch. The Japanese selected delegates primarily from Java who had 
had connections to the Japanese during occupation. Sukarno and his group dominated 
the committee and were able to impose their view that ‘Indonesia’ should be united as 
a republic rather than as a monarchy, theocracy or federation (Owen 2005). This 
committee of Japanese-selected delegates also adopted Pancasila, the Five principles 
developed by Sukarno and others in June 1945 as the national philosophy. 
While the spirit of local government began to emerge during the Dutch 
colonial period, the Japanese occupation radically expanded local government 
structure, extending the bureaucracy down to the level of the hamlet and sub-hamlet 








Figure 4.1 - Indonesia's bureaucratic structure 
 
 
Clusters of about a dozen homes formed household associations, or what they called 
tonarigumi (Prasetyo 2005). This administrative unit, renamed after Independence as 
rukun tetangga or RT, has remained until today, while it has since disappeared in 
Japan (Norldholt 1997). In this way, ‘every household, neighbourhood association, 
hamlet and village, all of which had previously fallen outside the formal 
administrative structure, were incorporated into the all-encompassing single 
administrative pyramid dominated by the Japanese army’ (Prasetyo 2005: 110). The 
This image shows Indonesia’s 
bureaucratic structure. The 
Kebupaten, or regency level, is 
equivalent to the Kota, or city, 
level and exists as a level of 
government in rural areas. In recent 
years, the Desa level has been 
replaced with Kelurahan. For Pulau 
Penyengat, this has meant going 
from having an elected village 
chief from the island to having a 
Lurah from outside the island, 
nominated at the Kota level.    
106 
 
effect was a greatly expanded and highly centralized bureaucracy based on a military 
structure, both of which have lasted until today. 
4.2.3 The colonial Javanese? 
As examined in Chapter Two (section 2.4) many groups in Indonesia do not 
feel emancipated by Indonesian Independence. Scholars have observed that 
Independence from the Dutch and Japanese has lead to a Javanese colonial state, with 
a relatively unchanged bureaucracy and economy now in the hands of a small 
Javanese elite (van der Kroef 1957; Lagerberg 1980; Taylor 2003; Brown 2004; Reid 
2004b, 2005). The Javanese have been criticized as a culturally dominant force that 
has imposed its values and norms onto the rest of the Indonesian population (Taylor 
2003). As mentioned, parallels have been drawn between the leadership styles of the 
first two presidents and that of a Javanese sultan. For example, Crouch (1978) 
suggests that the Guided Democracy Period of the Old Order is a manifestation of 
‘traditional’ politics, with Sukarno playing the role of sultan.  
 
4.3 Geographical boundaries 
The geographical area of the Dutch colony foreshadowed the boundaries of 
the new Indonesian state rather that adopting an ethno-cultural unit (Reid 2004a). 
While the boundaries of Indonesia were initially ‘arbitrary and fortuitous, marking the 
spatial limits of particular military conquests’, they gradually became normalized as 
administrative units (Anderson 1994: 198). Unlike the British territories in the 
Caribbean which were ruled as a multitude of separate administrations responsible to 
various mother countries, the Dutch chose to rule their Southeast Asia possessions as 
a whole and, ‘for all its legal complexity, the Netherlands Indies evolved as a single 
state apparatus’ (Cribb and Brown 1995: 7). In contrast, with no common 
administrative apparatus and no common language, the colonies in the Caribbean 
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developed into separate countries. Furthermore, the provinces of Indonesia (the 
number has changed but is currently at 33) are derived from a spatial scale codified by 
the Dutch in the Decentralization Law of 1922 (Benda 1966). 
Not only physical boundaries were created by the Dutch but ways of 
imagining the territory changed due to European influence (Owen 2005). While Java 
has been known by that name since ancient times, early European traders at the port 
of Samudera-Pasai named the entire island Sumatra, and visitors to the sultanate of 
Brunei called the whole island Borneo (Taylor 2003).  
While uniting many cultural and linguistic groups, some cultural groups’ 
traditional territories were split up by the Dutch East Indies. The most significant 
example is the western archipelago of Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, the Kalimantan 
coasts, and the Riau Islands, which functioned as one world to its inhabitants (Taylor 
2003). At a meeting in Europe, the Dutch and British divided the Malay world, a split 
that would be maintained after Independence. Sukarno’s attempts to merge the British 
territory of Malaya (now Malaysia) with Indonesia were unsuccessful and the current 
borders closely reproduce those of the Dutch East Indies (McIntyre 1973). 
After taking control of much of Southeast Asia, the Japanese re-drew the 
Dutch colonial boundaries, creating three new states out of the single Dutch colony: 
the new state of ‘Syonan’ joined Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, the Riau Islands and 
Singapore as its capital; Java was administered as a single state with its capital in 
Jakarta; and ‘The Great East’ included Borneo, Sulawesi and the eastern archipelago 
with its capital in Makassar (Tarling 2001).  
When the Dutch returned to Indonesia after the war with the intention of 
regaining their colony and realized they would not be able to claim it, they lobbied to 
prevent the archipelago from uniting as one country. Against the wishes of Sukarno 
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and his Republican supporters who sought to unite the archipelago as a republic, the 
Dutch strongly supported the creation of separate states and a smaller Republic that 
would be brought together in a federation to form the United States of Indonesia. The 
Republic was originally to consist of Java alone but the Dutch eventually decided to 
include the islands of Madura and Sumatra. The Government of the Republic was to 
exercise control over its own territory (Java, Madura and Sumatra) while Sulawesi, 
Bali, Kalimantan and the eastern archipelago would remain under Dutch control. In 
dividing up the archipelago, the Dutch sought to maintain a large degree of influence 
over foreign relations, defence, finance, and economics, in order to protect their 
massive economic interests17 (Khoo 1977; Taylor 2003). The crucial role the Indies 
played in the Dutch economy guided the decision to push for the creation of the 
United States of Indonesia as a united and independent Indonesia would threaten 
Dutch economic interests.  
In the first months of independence, Republicans merged the three states 
created by the Japanese and dissolved the federal states called for by the Dutch, thus 
restoring the boundaries to those of the Dutch East Indies. Sukarno often made a 
historical justification for the boundaries of Indonesia, claiming in many speeches that 
the boundaries of Indonesia were not a colonial creation but were in fact the 
boundaries of the grand historical kingdoms of Srivijaya and Majapahit18, a claim that 
has become part of the creation myth of Indonesia and is perpetuated in Indonesian 
school books. 
                                                          
17 Before World War II, the Dutch East Indies supplied sizeable percentages of many of the world’s commodities: 
quinine (90%), pepper (86%), rubber (37%), coconut palm products (28%), tea (19%) and tin (17%) (Khoo 1977: 
36). Furthermore, at its peak, one out of seven Dutch people derived income directly or indirectly from the Indies 
(Khoo 1977).   
18 Srivijaya’s (7th-12th century) sphere of influence included Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula up to southern 
Thailand, parts of Borneo and a part of western Java. The core realm of the Majapahit kingdom (1293-about 1500) 
was in central and eastern Java. Its vassal states included Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula, parts of Borneo and the 
eastern archipelago. While neither kingdoms’ spheres of influence match the current borders of Indonesia, many 
Indonesian nationalists invoke both as predecessors of the modern nation-state, provoking accusations of Javanese 
imperialism in many parts of the country (Tarling 2001).  
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4.4 National philosophy  
The struggle to link religiously and culturally diverse people in the 
archipelago resulted in the crafting of a unique national philosophy that sought to be 
inclusive and secular. In this section I will provide a brief overview of Indonesia’s 
key national philosophies as expressed in the Constitution of 1945, the state motto of 
‘Unity in Diversity’, and the concept of Pancasila and how they emerged. 
One of the main threats to Republican nationalism came from Muslim groups 
who insisted on the creation of an Islamic state. However, the Republican 
government, largely due to their secular Dutch education, wished to minimize the 
influence of Islam in the archipelago (Legge 1964). The parliamentary group that 
ratified the Constitution in 1945 decided the word ‘Allah’ (God in Islam) should be 
replaced with the more general ‘Tuhan’ (God), a term which was more acceptable to 
Hindus. The Constitution of 1945 was written during the Japanese Occupation largely 
with the ideas of Dr. Supomo, an expert in adat [customary] law (Suryakusuma, 
1996). Supomo sought to blend traditional indigenous and modern theories of state 
with a modern structure and an indigenous essence informed by local social 
structures, culture and mysticism. It dissatisfied many who sought the adoption of 
Muslim law and argued that the constitution should explicitly include the words 
‘Muslims should follow Islamic law’ (Effendy 2003; Friend 2003). Rather than 
allowing the practice of shariah law, the constitution retained family courts created by 
the Dutch that dealt with marriage, inheritance and divorce. 
In response to the diversity of cultures and religions, the Republican 
government built inclusiveness into the official motto and doctrine of the country. The 
national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika, or ‘Unity in Diversity’, emphasized diversity 
(Cribb and Brown 1995) and Pancasila, derived from Sanskrit (‘panca’ meaning five, 
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and ‘sila’ meaning principle), was crafted as the national doctrine 19. The principles of 
Pancasila, invented by Sukarno in 1945, are broadly treated as the basis for 
Indonesian politics, nationalism and statecraft (McCawley 1982; Budiman 1990). As 
the official philosophical foundation of Indonesia, Pancasila was intended as a way to 
unite the new nation and ensure political stability of Indonesia (Suryakusuma 1996). 
Pancasila is credited with helping to smooth over differences between groups who had 
competing visions for the archipelago, regardless of their ethnicity or political beliefs.  
The five principles of Pancasila are as follows:  
1. Belief in one and only God (Ketuhanan yang Maha Esa) – this point makes it 
mandatory for citizens to practise any religion, so long as it is monotheistic. 
This point was written to guarantee the concept of God for Muslims, 
Christians, Buddhists, and Hindus by law in order to stress religious tolerance 
and preclude a Muslim state. While Hinduism teaches many forms of God, 
these forms represent aspects of a single, underlying power or Supreme Deity. 
This is a common interpretation of Hinduism in Indonesia and is the way that 
the Indonesian state has justified its inclusion in the first tenet of Pancasila. 
While Hindus are generally satisfied with this tenet, this has caused conflict 
with animists, who have been forced to convert (at least on paper) to Islam, 
Christianity, Buddhism or Hinduism. 
2. Just and Civilized Humanity (Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab) – This 
requires humans to be treated with dignity and not tolerate oppression by their 
own people or by any other nation. 
3. The Unity of Indonesia (Persatuan Indonesia) - pointing to the geographical 
entity of the islands that comprised Indonesia and emphasizing the identity of 
the people within it and their brotherhood. The principle embodies the concept 
of nationalism and the need to foster national unity.  
4. Democracy guided by inner wisdom in the unanimity arising out of 
deliberations amongst representatives, or Representative Government 
(Kerakyatan yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam 
Permusyawaratan/Perwakilan) – this refers to the good of having a 
government based on the participation of the people through elected 
representatives 
                                                          
19 An earlier incarnation of Pancasila, Pantja Dharma [The Five Duties], was a rather vague declaration of 
nationalist aspirations and devotion to the Japanese cause drawn up at the Chuo Sangi-in’s sixth plenary session 
(November 12-18, 1944). Never very popular, the Pantja Dharma was explicitly disavowed by Sukarno in favour 




5. Social justice for all Indonesians (Keadilan Sosial bagi Seluruh Rakyat 
Indonesia) – This principle calls for the equitable spread of social welfare and 
justice to the entire population. 
 
 
Aside from Muslims who are unsatisfied with Pancasila’s lack of explicit 
support for Islam, others have critiqued Pancasila’s lack of dynamism. Michael Morfit 
critiques Pancasila as being an ‘extraordinarily static ideology’, lacking in any 
element of social or historical change: 
There is no account of the past as the triumph of reason over superstition, as in 
the Enlightenment and in the political thinking of men such as Montesquieu at 
that time. There is no rejection of the past as a record of oppression and 
exploitation, as in Marx. Instead, the past is invoked only in the most general 
form and never with a sense of change or development. ... [it] can easily 
accommodate hierarchy as equality, and private ownership of the means of 
production as collective ownership. Abrupt revolutionary upheaval, 
incremental change, or no change at all are all consistent with the five 
principles. (Morfit 1981: 842-3) 
 
Suryakusuma critiques the application of Pancasila: 
As the president and the army are identified with Pancasila, any criticism of 
them can be interpreted as criticism of Pancasila and the state and is therefore 
considered subversive. (Suryakusuma 1996: 94)  
 
Pancasila was invested with an almost sacred status by the ideologues in the New 
Order20 (Bourchier and Hadiz 2003). In the late 1970s, it was made compulsory for all 
political parties and social and religious organizations to acknowledge Pancasila as 
their azaz , or sole foundation, and a national indoctrination program was launched to 
inculcate Pancasila values in all citizens. The azaz  policy became a law in 1985, 
something Suharto felt was one of the great achievements of his presidency. With 
political forces united under Pancasila, Suharto believed that Indonesia’s ideological 
and religious conflict would come to an end.  
                                                          
20 For an excellent critical overview of Pancasila and how it was interpreted by the Old and New 
Orders, see Michael Morfit’s (1981) paper ‘Pancasila: The Indonesian state ideology according to the 
New Order government’, Asian Survey 21 (8): 838-851. 
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4.5 Language  
While Indonesian nationalism is influenced by European nationalist thinking, 
it differs from European nationalist movements which rely on linkages of common 
language, territory, traditions, and history (Legge 1964). In Indonesia’s case, the 
common language of Malay was selected by various groups in the archipelago for 
various purposes. In the late colonial era, the Dutch selected Malay as the lingua 
franca for its neutrality and familiarity as a trade language to many people across the 
archipelago, which was spoken as a mother tongue by people in part of Sumatra and 
the Riau Islands21.  
Malay became a central feature of Indonesian nationalism in the 1920s and a 
symbol of national unity. Its name was changed to Bahasa Indonesia [language of 
Indonesia], it was declared the national language at the 1928 Indonesian Youth 
Congress by nationalists in Java, forming a key part of the national ideology. The 
Japanese further supported the use of Malay as the single operative language in the 
archipelago, placing even more emphasis on the development of a standardized Malay 
than the Dutch had in the preceding decade. The Japanese administration had initially 
sought to transform Indonesians into loyal subjects of Japan (Goto 2003). They 
sought to achieve this through a policy of ‘Nipponization’ which attempted to redirect 
Indonesian loyalties towards Japan and to make them as culturally Japanese as 
possible. As one strategy of ‘Nipponization’, the Japanese hoped that the population 
would eventually all speak Japanese. This proved difficult to implement. The 
                                                          
21 The first monolingual Malay dictionary was compiled by Raja Ali Haji, a Malay scholar on Pulau 
Penyengat, out of a concern for the degeneration of Malay language and culture. In his essay ‘On sex, 
drugs and good manners: Raja Ali Haji as Lexographer’ Jan van der Putten provides a fascinating 
history and analysis of Raja Ali Haji’s dictionary (Putten 2002). Barbara Watson and Virginia 
Matheson examine Raja Ali Haji’s other writing in their essay ‘Islamic thought and Malay tradition: 
The writings of Raja Ali Haji of Riau’ (Andaya and Matheson 1980). For his contribution to Malay 
(and by extension, the national language of Bahasa Indonesia) Raja Ali Haji was declared a national 
hero. He is commemorated in the Riau Province section of Taman Mini in a giant concrete book upon 
which is written his famous poem, ‘Gurindam Duabelas’. 
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Japanese rulers eventually encouraged the use of Bahasa Indonesia as a lingua franca 
to be used as the official language in government offices and schools with Japanese 
being used for important words, such as ‘national’ rituals and songs, and, as 
mentioned earlier, many place names. Many place names were changed from their 
Dutch names, such as Batavia, to their indigenous names, such as Jakarta. 
‘Nipponized’ names were confined to the names of government ministries and 
programs, and some place names, including in the Riau Islands22. Nationalist figures 
such as Sukarno and Hatta who were given a voice and official position by the 
Japanese during the occupation used Bahasa Indonesia on their radio addresses to the 
people and then in their declaration of Independence on August 17, 1945. 
4.6 Race and culture 
The racial categories and hierarchies introduced during the Dutch colonial 
occupation were a significant part of the colonial strategy of domination and social 
control and were maintained after Independence (Boellstorff 2002). Benedict 
Anderson (1990) points out how races were reified through colonial census 
categories, an approach that saw races as distinct, while homogenizing the differences 
within racial categories. As the primary census classification, race was imagined by 
colonial census-makers to be an unambiguous category to which each person had but 
one clear place. Not only did colonial census-makers believe that all humans could fit 
into and be represented by the census but they had no tolerance for ‘multiple, 
politically “transvestite,” blurred, or changing identifications’ (Anderson 1983: 166). 
Significantly, while the racial categories used in the census were colonially-derived 
and imposed, rather than categories the indigenous population used for themselves 
                                                          
22 The island of Bintan in the Riau Islands, for example, was ‘Nipponized’ as ‘Bintanto’ and the small settlement 




and others, the colonized were forced to identify themselves as one of the races 
offered in the census.  
The post-Independence government has inherited the colonial obsession with 
classification, which has come to form an integral part of Indonesian national identity. 
Despite perpetuating these colonial racial categories, Sukarno often tried to downplay 
race in his constructions of nation, particularly when trying to convince citizens of his 
transmigrasi policies. In such cases, Sukarno would claim Indonesians were all 
immigrants at one time and were genetically related, thereby suggesting that race was 
a superficial category. Other times he would celebrate the racial differences as a 
fundamental part of the nation, the ‘Unity in Diversity’ that is the national motto. 
However, it was Suharto that most capitalized on racial distinctions. His racial 
philosophies and strategies are made particularly clear in the Indonesia-themed park, 
Taman Mini Indonesia Raya. In the 1970s, Taman Mini was built to celebrate the 
races that constituted the nation, presenting simplified amalgamations of each racial 
category in the form of a house, a heterosexual couple in adat [traditional] costume, a 
dance and other ‘benign’ cultural forms. In drawing together locality and ethnicity, 
several anthropologists have commented upon the ways in which Taman Mini reveals 
conceptions of culture, race and power (Pemberton 1994; Rutherford 1996; Spyer 
1996).  As Boellstorff (2002: 32) argues, these forms adopt colonial metaphors for 
ethnicity and culture while ‘literally containerizing and depoliticizing culture’. Spyer 
(1996: 26) argues that in Taman Mini, ethnicity and locality are drawn together in a 
way that is incomprehensible without the ‘framework generated by the unifying 
agency of the state’. Within this framework, Indonesia is comprised of 
‘ethnolocalities’, categories in which place and ethnicity are collapsed:  
‘Javanese’ (with ‘Javanese’ language, custom, and cosmology) live in ‘Java’, 
the  ‘Balinese’ (with ‘Balinese’ language, custom, and cosmology) live in 
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‘Bali’, the ‘Torajans’ (with ‘Torajan’ language, custom, and cosmology) live 
in ‘Torajaland’, and so on. (Boellstorff, 2002: 32) 
 
Under the New Order, these ‘ethnolocalities’ became the only way in which citizens 
could express difference and to be ‘Javanese’, ‘Balinese’, ‘Bugis’ and so on are 
cultural authenticators of the state (Boellstorff 2002). In this way, the state struggle 
for legitimacy works through the paradox that ethnolocality and adat are 
‘ontologically prior to the nation, yet dependent on the nation for coherence’ 
(Boellstorff 2002: 32). Figure 4.2 shows two posters found in classrooms on Pulau 
Penyengat which summarize Indonesian diversity. As will be examined in subsequent 
chapters, the state has developed various, often conflicting, strategies over time that 
have served to homogenize members of racial communities, perpetuate racial 
boundaries developed in colonial times, and even exaggerate these distinctions.  








Indonesia’s national philosophy and process of nation-building cannot be 
understood independently of its colonial history. National identity has developed in 
large part both through direct borrowing from Dutch and Japanese ideology and 
methods of governing and in reaction to their presence. Dutch and Japanese 
influences on Indonesia were particularly strong and lasting because the Republican 
nationalist leaders who eventually gained power after independence were nearly all 
Dutch-educated and cooperated to varying extents with the Japanese. Had the 
Republicans not won control of the archipelago, the region would likely be radically 
different in terms of geographical boundaries, language, and national philosophy. 
 Chapters Five to Seven turn to the empirical example of Pulau Penyengat to 
investigate how villagers were encouraged to alter their behaviour in line with nation-
building strategies, specifically in the realms of work, education, and recreation. In 
each chapter I briefly discuss pre-colonial influences on the nation to provide a 













Chapter 5 – The Nation at Work 
 
5.1 Introduction 
It is early on a Monday morning and the sun is low. Men and women stand in 
orderly rows in a yard outside their office building facing a gleaming white 
flagpole. They stand out from passersby as they wear closed shoes, military-
style uniforms decorated with epaulettes, crests and badges that indicate 
differences in rank. Several people who wear more elaborate uniforms, 
including white gloves, stand facing the ‘troops’. The leader of the group 
stands on an elevated platform and speaks through a microphone conducting 
a solemn ritual while the employees stand silently at attention. An Indonesian 
flag is marched out, ritualistically unfolded, and hoisted slowly up the flagpole 
while the entire office staff sings a national song in unison. For the duration of 
the ritual, the office yard is temporarily transformed into a space of order, 
solemnity, hierarchy and a space of national significance. Meanwhile, outside 
of the yard daily routines continue as usual: traffic passes by noisily, food 
sellers push their carts by, and mosque activities can be heard. (Field notes, 
13 February, 2006) 
 
The above scenario is an ordinary sight in cities and villages across Indonesia 
and highlights several points about work and national identity. First, the active 
performance of national identity is a key component of the workplace. Second, it 
illustrates vast differences in citizens’ obligations to perform national identity in the 
workplace. Third, a social hierarchy based on work is created that recalls colonial 
experiences of exclusion and division according to one’s occupation. Finally, these 
rituals are performative in that they require not a single act but the repetition of 
scripted actions, the meanings of which are recognizable to participants and the 
audience (Nash 2000). Over time and through repetition, performances of national 
identity by different actors in various contexts are normalized. Such rituals emphasize 
the embodied nature of work and illustrate that employees can be understood not 
simply as ‘software’ but as ‘hardware’ as they can be corporeally moulded to embody 
the nation (Witz, Warhurst, & Nickson 2003). 
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While there are countless work situations in Indonesia, in this chapter I focus 
on three categories of work23 found in Pulau Penyengat that help provide insights into 
how, and to what extent, national identity is performed in various workplaces. The 
first group of workers are employed by the state as office workers in the Kelurahan 
office [Village District], the PKK office [Pembinaan Kesejateraan Keluarga, or the 
Committee for the Promotion of Family Prosperity], health care workers in the village 
clinic and as school teachers in the village schools. As one of the key places in which 
national ideology is instructed and performed, the workplace is an ideological zone in 
which the state attempts to shape the employees’ values and behaviour. In 
independent Indonesia, civil servants are placed in the unique role of embodying the 
nation to the populace and normalizing state rituals and values through the repetition 
of a recognizably ‘Indonesian’ set of actions.  
The second group of workers consists broadly of those who work in the 
informal sector on Pulau Penyengat. They are not employed by the state or a 
company, and include rickshaw drivers, food sellers, coolies, those involved in 
maritime activities (fishing, catching prawns, boat building, etc.) and shop owners. 
While these people have less exposure to the state and are less directly managed by 
the state than civil servants, they have been affected to varying degrees by changing 
state policies that have altered when they work, what they do or how they dress in 
particular contexts.  
The third group of workers overlaps with the second group and consists of 
‘volunteers’ who are mobilized by the state to work on various public works projects 
such as constructing roads, buildings or other community projects. While volunteering 
                                                          
23 I define work based on how it is understood on Pulau Penyengat: an activity from which one derives income and 
labour that is mandatory but unpaid. While some people on Pulau Penyengat earn money as dancers or musicians, 
their paid performances are infrequent and do not earn enough to constitute a full income. The dancers tend to 
have other jobs or study and view their dancing as a hobby. For this reason, I explore dance on Pulau Penyengat as 
a leisure activity in Chapter Seven, ‘The Nation at Play’.  
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labour in the form of neighbourly assistance is an embedded ideology in Pulau 
Penyengat society, I focus solely on ‘volunteer’ work projects initiated by the state. 
An analysis of these three groups of workers illustrates how and to what extent the 
arm of the state reaches people on Pulau Penyengat through work activities. This 
analysis does not seek to represent a full spectrum of the types of work in Indonesia as 
a whole and does not investigate how national identity is performed in other socially 
and economically important forms of work such as industrial labour, agricultural 
labour, corporate business, and so on, none of which exists on Pulau Penyengat. 
Furthermore, although there are people from Pulau Penyengat who work in factories 
in Batam, resorts in the province or in Bali or on ships in the region, I have chosen to 
limit my focus to occupations of people residing on the island itself.  
This chapter begins with a review of literature that examines the connections 
between work and identity. Through an investigation of the three types of work 
mentioned above, this chapter illustrates how workplace performances have and have 
not changed over the decades since Independence by looking specifically at 
workplace uniforms, workplace national rituals, and workplace organizational 
hierarchies. I examine for whom these standardized national work performances are 
mandatory and for whom they are not. This chapter also examines how employees 
ignore, reject or assign alternate meanings to mandatory performances of national 
identity and how some non-state workers have enthusiastically imitated versions of 
state spaces and performance for a range of purposes.  
  
5.2 Work and identity  
Work is an important context in which various identities including gender, 
class, race and national identities are formed, maintained and challenged. However, as 
has been observed by Andrew Sayer (1994), studies of work tend to be focused on 
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‘hard core’ economic and political discussions of capital and class, with little attention 
paid to cultural policies. This focus on the economic and political side of work is 
particularly evident in the literature on Southeast Asia. Joel Kahn (1998:1) is right to 
remind us that ‘contrary to the impression generated by the majority of observers of 
contemporary Southeast Asia – of a region whose peoples are dedicated entirely to the 
single goal of economic development – matters cultural are never very far down 
anyone’s agenda’. While not to deny the important economic aspects of work, a 
cultural and geographical analysis can provide insights into how national ideology 
affects workers in an embodied way.  
A small number of geographers have written about work from a cultural, 
rather than an economic or political perspective to examine the performance of 
identities in the workplace. The most significant and thorough contribution to date is a 
special issue of the journal Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 
published in 1994 that examines the issue of workplace performances of various 
identities. In this issue, Linda McDowell and Gill Court (1994) examine workplace 
performances of gender in the context of British merchant banks, drawing on Butler’s 
theorization of performance and performativity to link gender identity and economic 
process. They examine how professional women are embodied and / or represented as 
‘woman’ in the workplace in ways that constitute an integral part of selling financial 
advice, making money and attaining power. For these women, work is a performance 
in which individual criteria of appearance, personality, and deliberate self-
presentation are key aspects of career success. As discussed in Chapter Two, while 
citing Butler in their theorization of performance, Lise Nelson (1999: 344) argues that 
their analysis more accurately employs an understanding of performance that is closer 
to Goffman’s (1959) as they read intentionality and conscious action into subjects 
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who strategically construct or fabricate their workplace identities and perform them 
through daily practice.   
In the same issue of Society and Space, Phil Crang (1994) writes about the 
workplace geographies of display in a restaurant in southeast England.  Through an 
examination of the performative geographies of display in waiting work, Crang argues 
that such workplace geographies as surveillance, display and location help to 
constitute the character of employment. Crang’s formulation adopts Goffman’s (1959) 
approach, which assumes a knowing subject who is conscious of performing a role 
and strategically performs for personal gain. Similarly, Witz, Warburst and Nickson 
(2003) highlight the importance of corporeal dimensions of the emotional labourer in 
the service industry and argue that there are new modes of embodiment that are 
produced and valorized in workplace performances.  They argue that employees in the 
service sector are ‘increasingly regarded by employers as an integral – literally 
animate – component’ of workplace performances (Witz, Warburst and Nickson 
2003: 34). While acknowledging the knowing and strategic subject theorized by 
Goffman, they also turn to the work of Hochschild (1983: 7) who explains emotional 
labour as being not only ‘the management of feeling to create a publicly observable 
facial and bodily display’ as Goffman proposes but insists on a greater depth of 
feeling in the performers. He suggests that beyond the bodily display, workplace 
performances function to imply a depth and authenticity of feeling possessed by the 
inner-self. 
Although little has been written on the interrelatedness of work and national-
identity, work is frequently utilized by states and individuals for nation-building 
purposes. There are numerous examples of nationalist leaders or states using certain 
types of work in an attempt to change people’s behaviour, to mobilize support, and to 
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reach political goals. A potent example of national identity being explicitly linked to 
work can be seen in late colonial India. In the decades before Indian independence, 
Mahatma Gandhi encouraged the populace to engage in particular types of work to 
push his nationalist agenda (Chakrabarty 2006). Significantly, for Gandhi the actual 
doing of this work was a symbolic performance as well as a strategy to bring benefits 
that would change conditions for the populace and ultimately bring independence. 
Gandhi’s nationalist vision constructed a hierarchy of work with village activities at 
the top. The work activity Gandhi felt best represented his nationalist vision was in 
charkha (spinning wheel) and khadi (home-spun cotton textile). Aside from freeing 
India from its dependence on British textiles, the process of creating khadi was a 
political statement that allied one to Gandhi’s nationalist vision (Parekh 1997). 
Gandhi encouraged everyone to spin as a display of sacrifice and commitment to his 
brand of nationalism:  
Every Congressman has to become a master spinner and master weaver. … He 
has to spin for the sake of the country. … Every Congress office should 
become a model laboratory and spinning and weaving institute for the 
organization of villages. (Harijan, 30 December, 1939, CWMG, Vol. 71, pp. 
55-6, cited in Chakrabarty 2006: 144)  
 
In this way, engaging in the work of spinning thread also served to break down social 
hierarchy.  
The relationship between work and national identity is highly dependent upon 
time and place. For example, during WWII women in the United States and Britain 
were called upon to serve their nation by working in munitions factories to support the 
war effort. While engaging in this type of ‘men’s’ work was seen as the ultimate 
(female) expression of national identity and patriotism in wartime, it was seen as quite 
the opposite after the war when the employment of servicemen in civilian jobs was 
123 
 
the national priority and women holding onto to ‘men’s jobs’ were seen as unpatriotic 
(Milkman 1987; Wise 1994).    
Work is relevant to this thesis in its inherent everydayness, or what Michael 
Billig (1995: 6) calls ‘banal nationalism’ to describe the collections of ideological 
habits which ‘reproduce established nations as nations’. Billig argues that nationalism 
does not strike only on extraordinary occasions such as during wars. While 
nationalism can become particularly inflamed in wartime to create a temporary 
feverish outbreak, such crises depend on existing ideological foundations that are 
maintained in less spectacular ways. Between crises, nation-states continue to exist 
and ‘are reproduced as nations and their citizenry as nationals’ on a daily basis (Billig, 
1995: 6). Billig makes the important point that while banal nationalism occurs every 
day, it is not innocent as it reproduces institutions and values in a way that disguises 
their constructedness and resists critique. 
 Very little scholarship has examined how work in its various forms is related 
to nation-building or to issues of identity and work in pre- or post-independent 
Indonesia. Work in an Indonesian context has generally been examined in terms of 
subjugation, victimization, exploitation and oppression. Even in colonial times, work 
became a site of contestation over human rights and sparked heated debate in the 
Indies and the Netherlands over Dutch policies. The miseries and indignities of work 
under the Cultivation System are documented as early as in Max Havelaar, the 
famous politically-charged novel by E. D. Dekker published in 1860 that challenged 
Dutch policy towards workers in the Indies. Vedi Hadiz (1997) examines the 
emergence of the Indonesian industrial working class in his book Workers and the 
State in New Order Indonesia. Taking a comparative approach, Hadiz examines 
labour movements and industrialization in various national contexts, arguing that the 
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later a country undergoes industrialization, the greater the obstacles facing the 
emerging industrial working class in organizing labour movements. In the case of 
Indonesia, Hadiz contends that the mobility of capital, a powerful state, strict labour 
controls, and the political exclusion of large segments of society all serve to constrain 
labour movements and weaken workers’ bargaining power, making industrial workers 
increasingly vulnerable to exploitation (Hadiz 1993, 1994). Many scholars have also 
examined the civil service in Indonesia as an organization rife with corruption and 
inefficiency  (Besley and McLaren 1993; Buchori 1994; Quah 2003). Others have 
examined the general trend towards bureaucratization in Indonesia and the rapid 
increase of government workers at various times in Indonesia’s history and the 
rationalization of the workforce (Evers 1987). However, despite the elaborate set of 
rituals and hierarchies in the workplace there has been little analysis of them or of the 
embodied nature of work.  
 One significant way in which scholars have begun to see work as embodied 
has been through analyses of workplace uniforms. Uniforms function as a ‘symbolic 
declaration that an individual will adhere to group norms and standardized roles and 
has mastered the relevant group skills’ (Joseph 1986: 66-67). As a result, the uniform 
overtly marks identities and ‘suppresses individual idiosyncrasies of behaviour, 
appearance, and sometimes physical attributes’ creating a visual homogeneity and 
stripping citizens of their individuality (Joseph, 1986: 68). The ‘devices used by 
ordinary citizens to express their attitudes are denied to the uniform wearer – political 
buttons, religious insignia, and symbols of individual esthetic or ludic preferences’ 
(Joseph 1986: 67). 
The wearing of uniforms creates the appearance of order and discipline within 
the populace as well as a recognition of and implicit compliance with the state’s 
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agenda. They are a ‘group emblem’ for those outside the organization ‘who use them 
as a means of convenient classification, as a way of knowing who does what, of what 
role a person performs’ (McVeigh 2000: 80). The uniform is not only ‘an emblem but 
also a reminder of the behaviour appropriate toward this emblem; it becomes a third 
factor in the interaction between wearer and other’ (Joseph 1986: 66). Working 
through the bodies of its citizens, the Indonesian state expresses its strength to its 
populace in the sheer numbers of uniforms, giving the appearance of massive support 
for the state and the nation it envisions. Because uniforms are externally recognizable 
markers which are easily identified from a distance, they facilitate a sense of 
Foucauldian surveillance of wearers. The examples of Gandhi, American and British 
women during WWII, and uniforms are relevant to the ideas developed in this chapter 
in how work is intertwined with national identity. Each example discussed above 
illustrates how work can be analysed, not as simply a disembodied economic activity, 
but as a realm in which national identity is reproduced and challenged through 
performance.  
5.3 State workers 
 State workers constitute the adults who are most targeted by the Indonesian 
state to perform in particular ways that embody national ideals. Their weekly work 
schedules are filled with mandatory participation in rituals and activities, each of 
which require a complicated set of uniforms. In the following sub-sections, I first 
provide a brief historical overview of the development of state jobs in Indonesia, 
contrasting pre-Independence experiences of state employment opportunities with the 
post-Independence period. I then examine how civil servants perform national identity 
in the workplace through uniforms, workplace ceremonies (Upacara Bendera and 
Senam Pagi Indonesia), and everyday office culture. 
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5.3.1 Pre-Independence work 
While the Dutch empire relied upon mass labour of the colonized, the range of 
work options available was extremely narrow, limited primarily to agricultural and 
domestic labour. However, in response to the economic troubles brought on by the 
Depression of 1930, the Dutch somewhat reduced the number of European officials 
on the payroll in the Indies to cut costs and replaced them with poorly paid locals 
(Hadisumarto 1974). However, unlike in British India where a large part of the 
bureaucracy was made up of Indians (Tarling 2001), comparatively few 
administrative or professional positions were held by Indonesians. While a quarter of 
a million indigenous people were working in the civil service by 1928, they were 
placed in largely low levels of the colonial bureaucracy (Cribb and Brown 1995). 
Those that were able to rise in the Dutch bureaucracy were resentful of the higher 
salaries their European counterparts earned as well as the social hierarchy that barred 
natives from fashionable clubs and swimming pools (Cribb and Brown 1995).  
During the Japanese occupation, Indonesians working in the bureaucracy were 
seen as an opportunity for the Japanese to win allies who would potentially support 
Japanese policy. As mentioned in Chapter Four, the fine-grained administrative 
structure created many positions for Indonesians to join the bureaucracy. Furthermore, 
with the absence of the Dutch, a great number of Indonesians were installed in senior 
positions of responsibility in the administration for the first time (Khoo 1977; Cribb 
and Brown 1995). After expelling or imprisoning the Dutch, the Japanese filled some 
of the administrative positions themselves, promoted Indonesians who were already 
working in Dutch offices, and hired many Indonesians. This widespread 
administrative experience helped to assure nationalists that they could manage the 
administration of an independent Indonesia (Kahin 1952).  
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The Japanese had attempted to inculcate the local people working in the 
administration with their ideology through the introduction of various workplace 
ceremonies and rituals (Raben 1999). For employees in Japanese-run offices, the 
work day was highly regimented. Roll call was taken three times per day. Displays of 
Japanese identity and of loyalty to the emperor were frequent and mandatory. Junior 
employees were made to bow deeply to their Japanese superiors in an overt display of 
Japanese culture that served to maintain a rigid workplace hierarchy with the Japanese 
positioned at the top. Employees were made to sing nationalistic songs in Japanese 
that celebrated the divinity of the emperor and paid tribute to Japanese superiority. 
Formal flag ceremonies were held in the workplace using the Japanese flag and, later 
in the occupation, the Indonesian flag in some places as a way to placate the 
increasing strength of the nationalists. The Japanese also introduced regular group 
callisthenics to the workplace, an activity that left a lasting impression on nationalists 
and was carried out long after Independence as a way to unify employees, teach them 
to follow instructions and instil in them a sense of common purpose (Raben 1999). 
These workplace activities were peppered with phrases in Japanese that Indonesian 
employees were expected to learn. Indonesians working in the bureaucracy under the 
Japanese were particularly targeted for activities of indoctrination, a group that 
continued to be the primary target of nationalization strategies after Independence.  
5.3.2 Post-Independence work 
Following the Japanese, the Sukarno administration saw the civil service as a 
key site in the production of national identity and continued many of the workplace 
rituals established under Japanese rule. Civil servants served as the primary actors in 
national rituals and were the workers which had the most direct contact with the 
official version of national culture constructed by the state. Civil servants were meant 
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to embody national ideals such as discipline, order, and progress as well as the sacred 
aura of the revolution and government institutions were perceived by the state as 
beacons of modernity, order and dignity in the chaos of daily life in Indonesia. This 
sacred aura around the state has meant that many Indonesians held the civil service in 
high esteem to the extent that, upon receiving their civil servant number, the unique 
number issued to each government employee upon being hired, it has been 
documented that many break down in tears (Siegel 1997).  
After Suharto took over the presidency, the government bureaucracy was 
greatly expanded. Evers (1987) points out the ‘runaway bureaucratization’, or rapid 
increase in the number of government civil servants in Southeast Asia, particularly in 
Indonesia, that has escaped the notice of scholars. In the 1970s, the number of 
government employees in Indonesia grew by more than 1.5 million, or almost 400 
percent24. By 1980, there were around 13.9 civil servants for every thousand people, 
up from 1.8 per thousand in 1930 and 3.7 in 1950 (Evers 1987: 672).  
 The sharp increase in bureaucratization had two significant effects. First, the 
Suharto regime used the civil service as an instrument of social and political control 
that brought regular citizens into closer contact with the state. It ‘inculcated an 
institutional culture of compliance in the bureaucracy whereby loyalty was rewarded 
with security of tenure, pension rights and access to development funds’ (Rohdewohld 
2003: 264). Second, the increased bureaucratization led to a sharpening of work-based 
social hierarchies. In contrast to Gandhi’s or Sukarno’s attempts to create an 
egalitarian system in which all individuals were respected equally, policies of the 
New Order demanded respect from those in lower ranks. The increasingly hierarchical 
and patrimonial working culture that emerged in the New Order is well illustrated in 
                                                          
24 This figure includes only the administration proper. As Evers (1987: 666) explains, ‘if we add all those whose 




Independence Day celebrations (Brietzke 2002). During the Old Order, Independence 
Day was celebrated as a lively event with mass participation with political elements 
(Hatley 1982). All walks of life would gather in their villages and listen to speeches 
by local officials, various political parties and village heads, and villagers would 
socialize, gamble, play games and eat in a relaxed carnival-like atmosphere. In 
contrast, Independence Day during the New Order saw the expansion of the formal, 
ceremonial activities to which only civil servants and those who belonged to state 
organizations were invited, and their presence was mandatory. In the Riau Islands, 
rather than many small celebrations in each town and village, the ceremony shifted to 
Tanjung Pinang. Older residents of Pulau Penyengat recalled staying on the island for 
all of the festivities in the past (Field notes, 17 August, 2006). As officials from the 
village were sent to Tanjung Pinang to join mass civil servant ceremonies, the village 
and its residents were marginalized from the events. 
5.3.3 Uniforms 
For Indonesians, uniforms are a daily sight. They are highly visible markers of 
national identity and instantly communicate the wearer’s job and rank. Civil servants’ 
uniforms are a powerful symbol of the Indonesian state. The study of state uniforms 
reveals the state’s micromanaging style and reflects changing official notions of 
national identity. It also aids in understanding how state and non-state workers feel 
about particular uniforms and why.  
While Gandhi’s nationalist movement supported a policy of national dress as a 
counter-identity to British rule which found its expression in the khadi (Nordholt 
1997b), no similarly symbolic dress emerged in colonial Indonesia. In contrast to 
India, indigenous dress in the Indies represented non-progress and nationalists 
overwhelmingly favoured Western suits (Nordholt 1997). Notably, the Republicans 
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did not reject Dutch clothes and many aspects of Dutch work culture and structure. 
Siegel (1997) argues that clothes were fetishized in the Indies as they were taken to 
represent one’s politics to a high degree. The strong commitment to wearing 
uniforms, despite the lack of cohesiveness across nationalist and revolutionary 
organizations and cloth shortages, indicates the important link many Indonesians 
perceived between dress and national identity in the struggle for Independence, a link 
that has continued into the present.  
During the Japanese occupation, Indonesian society witnessed an 
unprecedented uniform fever in which new ideals were formulated through dress 
codes (Frederick 1997). McVeigh (2000) has noted that Japan must be one of the 
most uniformed societies in the world, a feature which was replicated in occupied 
Indonesia where, paralleling the military, the Japanese introduced different uniforms 
to visually mark the body to denote occupation and rank. The military regime sought 
to mobilize mass support and thought this could be achieved in part through uniforms. 
Following Japanese styles, Republican army officers stopped wearing neckties, using 
the open collar instead (Danandjaja 1997). During this time, the peci, the black velvet 
cap worn by working class Muslim men, became the widespread symbol of national 
unity. When Sukarno proclaimed Independence, he appeared in a white suit, no tie 






                                                          




Figure 5.1 – Sukarno proclaims Independence, August 17, 1945; Sukarno in a self-styled military 
uniform; Sarong, traditionally worn by many South and Southeast Asians (from left: a, b, c) 
 
[source of 5.1a: Sukarno and Adams (1965); source of 5.1b Pender (1974)] 
After Independence, Sukarno’s administration continued the Japanese culture 
of uniforms in the government workplace. State uniforms under the Old Order had a 
revolution-ready, military flavour. As commander-in-chief, Sukarno’s self-styled 
uniform was elaborately militaristic, verging on the theatrical. Much to the military’s 
anger, Sukarno, who had not served in the military, donned ‘phantasy uniforms with 
five stars on his shoulders and loaded with medals’ (Sundhaussen 1982: 556; cited in 
Friend 2003: 69) (Figure 5.1b). Sukarno publicly rejected the sarong, the cloth wrap 
traditionally worn by many South and Southeast Asians, for daily wear as he felt it 
was the clothing of servants (Figure 5.1c). Suits under the Dutch afforded ‘the native’ 
more rights and could command obedience from the Indonesian people (Sukarno and 
Adams 1965), a stance that Sukarno continued during his presidency.  
During Suharto’s presidency there was an increase in the bureaucratization 
and rationalization of the workplace. Government uniforms became more regimented, 
the weekly schedule of wearing uniforms became more complex and the number of 
uniforms greatly increased (Danandjaja 1997). It has been suggested that the 
proliferation of uniforms in Indonesia is linked to the fact that one of Suharto’s 
cronies owned a uniform factory and Suharto directly profited from increasing the 
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number of uniforms (Nordholt 1997). Civil servants, which include government 
employees at all levels including Kelurahan, Kecamatan, Walikota, Bupati, 
provincial, and national, as well as bank employees, teachers, and state university 
faculty wore uniforms that made visible their rank and branch (Owen 2005) and were 
given a detailed schedule of clothing they must wear on particular days. The standard 
uniform consisted of what was commonly known as a ‘safari suit’, a matching tan 
shirt and pants set for men and skirt for women (Figure 5.2b). All uniforms introduced 
were (and continue to be) paid for by the employees themselves. 
‘Native’ clothing found a place in Suharto’s national strategy and the national 
formal dress for civil servants became a Javanese-style batik shirt. The formal 
national uniform during the New Order consisted of the Korpri batik (Korps Pegawai 
Republik Indonesia, the ‘Indonesian Civil Service Corps’), which was a long-sleeved 
shirt made with a blue batik beringin [banyan] tree pattern (Figure 5.2a). It was 
mandatory to wear the Korpri batik on the 17th of every month to mark the 
anniversary of Indonesian Independence, for special national ceremonies, and in such 
events as the visit of a dignitary. While in keeping with the uniformization of the Old 
Order, these uniforms marked a shift from the military style supported by Sukarno to 
include a reference to ‘traditional’ culture. This shirt became a notorious symbol of 
the Suharto regime and after he was forced to step down in 1998, many civil servants 
gave their Korpri batik to the poor. 
The Korpri batik was a source of discontent among civil servants from Pulau 
Penyengat who felt it did not represent their sense of the nation. Some felt it was 
overtly Javanese rather than ‘Indonesian’.  
The national clothes are Javanese because we have Javanese presidents. If we 
had a president from Riau maybe civil servants would wear songket and baju 





We need a national uniform, some clothes that all Indonesians can wear. ... we 
need to show unity... Batik has already become Indonesian, not just Javanese. 
... but the Korpri batik is not a symbol of Indonesia, but a sign of the Suharto 
era. (Pak Sudirman, 10 May, 2006) 
 
In addition to the safari suit and Korpri batik, Senam Pagi Indonesia [the 
weekly state callisthenics, literally Indonesia’s Morning Exercise] uniforms were 
introduced during the New Order. Where civil servants once wore their work clothes 
for morning exercises, in the New Order state track suits were introduced (but paid for 
by the employees themselves) (Figure 5.2d). Similar to the safari suit, these uniforms 
immediately identified a state worker, although they were not as widely imitated as 
the safari suit was by people working in the private sector.  
Figure 5.2 - Old Korpri batik, safari suit, new Korpri batik, civil servant track suit (from left: a, 
b, c, d) 
 
  
As mentioned, the daily office uniform during the New Order was the safari 
suit decorated with a Korpri pin in the shape of the Garuda Pancasila, the national 
crest of the garuda, or mythical eagle of Hindu origins (Figure 5.2b). When university 
lecturers were unhappy with the government, they would ‘show their resentment by 
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not wearing the safari shirt when it is required’ (Danandjaja 1997: 257). To others, 
however, the safari suit brought social prestige and was adopted by some men 
working in the private sector, particularly when meeting with government officials. 
Danandjaja (1997: 258) wryly observes that wearing the safari suit with Korpri pin 
frequently had the power to ‘ward off evil “spirits” in the form of certain individuals 
… like policemen, soldiers, and customs officers, who are inclined to practise 
extortion. … Thus the safari suit and the Korpri button have the mystical power to 
ward off these evil powers.’ The strategic use of the safari suit by both civil servants 
and non-civil servants reveals a conscious subject who is aware of the power the 
uniform commands. Clearly, the safari suit does more than simply identify people 
working for the state – the uniform symbolizes the power and reach of the state. 
Furthermore, it perpetuates the social hierarchy that positions uniformed civil servants 
above other citizens.   
Sepatu kantor [closed office shoes] have been an important component of civil 
servants’ office attire since Independence. While most Indonesians wear sandals 
(Figure 5.1c), civil servants are often the only employees (at least in villages and 
smaller towns) who wear closed shoes every day. This aspect of civil servants’ 
uniforms has had an impact on the physical landscape of Pulau Penyengat. The main 
square on the island was covered with grass until 2006. As Pulau Penyengat has taken 
on greater significance for Kepri, the square has been used by the provincial 
government to host visiting dignitaries and civil servants. While watching a dance 
performance on the stage in the square after a rain storm, provincial officials noticed 
that the ground had become muddy and the visitors’ leather sepatu kantor were 
messy. Later that week, the provincial government arranged for bricks to be brought 
to the island and the grassy square was quickly paved over to avoid future visitors 
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muddying their shoes while watching a dance performance. While some Pulau 
Penyengat residents feel that this makes the square look tidier and more modern, most 
residents complain that the paving has made the square hotter, particularly since a 
large mango tree was cut down in the process of paving. This example illustrates how 
class differences are manifested in civil servants’ uniforms and how these differences 
have changed the physical landscape in Pulau Penyengat. 
To many non-Javanese across the archipelago, the Korpri batik was a symbol 
of Javanese imperialism disguised as national culture and imposed on them without 
their consent. Many civil servants have stories about intentionally forgetting to wear 
their Korpri batik on required days or being absent from ceremonies when the Korpri 
batik was required, demonstrating that the Korpri batik inspired small acts of 
resistance in many civil servants26. This small but symbolic act of defiance against the 
dominant power can be understood in terms of James Scott’s (1985) ‘everyday form 
of peasant resistance’ and as a ‘weapon of the weak’. The refusal to ‘perform’ reveals 
an awareness in civil servants’ understanding of national identity in the form of the 
Korpri batik as a sort of performance, rather than as a deeper, naturalized identity. 
This display of intentionality is in line with Goffman’s conceptualization of 
performance: they are thinking subjects who strategically perform an identity (or, in 
this case, refuse to perform an identity) in a particular context. At the same time as 
conscious and strategic forms of resistance, there is also a less conscious performative 
element at play. Through repetition, the wearing of uniforms has become normalized 
to the extent that while some uniforms may be resisted on occasion, the underlying 
tactic of wearing uniforms to represent the state is not challenged. 
                                                          
26 These stories are likely exaggerated in light of the fall of Suharto. 
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Suharto’s fall ushered in widespread decentralization and affected the state 
workplace in two key ways. First, where 90 percent of civil servants in 1999 were 
employees of the central government, this number fell to 25 percent after 
decentralization laws came into effect with the overwhelming majority employed at 
the Kabupaten/Kota (district) level (Rohdewohld 2003: 260). Second, there were 
attempts to integrate provincial culture into the workplace. Third, due to the political 
baggage of the Korpri batik, it was replaced soon after the fall of Suharto with a less 
overtly Javanese national batik of a different colour and pattern (Figure 5.2c).  
Civil servants on Pulau Penyengat give the new batik positive reviews: 
The new batik is very smart ... it is worn for the big national ceremonies and 
important dates: the 17th of every month. (Pak Sudirman, 10 May, 2006) 
 
This batik is more national and less Javanese. (Yudi, 25 April, 2008) 
Many civil servants in Pulau Penyengat said that they most enjoyed being able 
to wear baju Melayu [traditional Malay clothes] on certain occasions rather than 
batiks, as will be discussed below. 
In Kepri, the state has introduced strategies to enhance ‘Malayness’ in state 
workplaces around the province, including on Pulau Penyengat. Since the formation 
of Riau Islands Province, it is mandatory for civil servants – regardless of ethnicity or 
religion – to wear baju Melayu [traditional matching 2-piece Malay clothing] for men 
and baju kurung [tradition long skirt and tunic] for women to work each Saturday and 







Figure 5.3 - Government employees wearing baju Melayu and baju kurung at work (from left: a, 
b, c, d) 
 
 As can be seen in Figure 5.3, baju Melayu is interpreted differently among 
employees and there is not yet an official interpretation to which employees must 
conform. The women in Figure 5.3a are wearing traditional baju kurung sets, a more 
conservative interpretation. Likewise, the man in Figure 5.3c is wearing the traditional 
pyjama-style set, with a formal woven songket over top. The other men (Figures 5.3b 
and 5.3d) wear pyjama-style sets or just a baju Melayu top with office pants on the 
bottom. One woman explains her interpretation of what clothing was expected to be 
worn: 
Baju kurung is traditional Malay clothes for ladies. See - a long skirt, and a 
long top... matching cloth and tudung [head scarf].  
 
A younger employee had a more inclusive interpretation of baju Melayu: 
 
This is Malay style – long sleeves and long shirt... no t-shirt, no jeans no short 
skirt. ... and a tudung. ... That is not mandatory but it is more Malay to wear it. 
 
Civil servants felt that wearing Malay clothes one day a week at work was a 
positive move that showed the state had sensitivity to and respect for Malay culture. 
These Malay clothes are our culture. We represent the Malay people in Kepri 
… we should wear Malay clothes … it’s Dunia Melayu [the Malay world], 
right? (9 September, 2006)  
 
I think they are beautiful. ... Because it’s a new policy, we just wear our own 
baju kurung – there is no baju kurung uniform yet… maybe next year we will 
have a uniform, I don’t know. ... Maybe it will be khaki like our regular 




However, some comments expressed some reservations about wearing baju Melayu:  
I’m glad we only have to wear them on Saturdays … they are very hot … I 
always sweat a lot wearing Malay clothes. (9 September, 2006)  
 
On Saturdays I get dropped off at work by my husband. I cannot ride a 
motorcycle well wearing baju kurung. (9 September, 2006) 
 
The last comment reveals that gender is a dimension in the ‘ethnic’ uniform 
policy. In contrast to regular state uniforms in which little gender distinction is made, 
wearing baju kurung recalls traditional gender roles and somewhat constricts 
movement in women, making some everyday activities, such as commuting to work 
on their motorcycles, problematic. Some scholars have pointed out that tradition and 
nostalgia are more frequently embodied representationally in women, while the 
progressive, modern aspects of the nation are mapped on to the male body 
(McClintock 1993; Radcliffe 1996; Sunindyo 1998). However, in the case of the 
ethnicization of office uniforms, it is both men and women who embody tradition. 
The key issue then is that in wearing baju kurung, a set of physical and psychological 
restrictions are imposed on women in the workplace that restrict behaviour and serve 
to gender the workplace performance one day per week. For example, while many 
women regularly wear knee-length skirts, if one is wearing baju kurung, it is expected 
that one does not pull up one’s skirt to knee-length to ride a motorcycle. A more 
demure behaviour is expected of those who wear the baju kurung which contrasts 
with the uniforms worn on other days and with the modern work environment the 
state has attempted to create.      
While the fine clothes that employees wear to work on Saturdays are also what 
they would wear to the mosque or to a Malay wedding, there appears to be no sense of 
conflict or impropriety in wearing these clothes to the office and I was asked 
numerous times if I would like to photograph employees in their baju Melayu. While 
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wearing baju Melayu is intended as an expression of Malay identity, it is still taken as 
seriously as the safari suit in government offices and is imposed on all employees. 
One employee failed to wear baju Melayu to work while I was visiting the office and 
was sent home to change. Employees belonging to other ethnic or cultural groups are 
also made to wear baju Melayu, including Chinese. On the day of my visit, the most 
senior civil servant (pictured to the far left of Figure 5.3d) did not wear baju Melayu 
that day because he had forgotten and had worn his regular uniform. Others in the 
office did not comment about his dress and when asked, they simply said that ‘he is 
the boss’, implying that those who make the rules themselves do not have to follow 
them. The double standards suggest a naturalized bureaucratic hierarchy that produces 
unevenness in performances of national identity across workers. There are exceptions 
to this bureaucratic hierarchy, however, as it was pointed out to me that one woman 
forgot to wear Malay clothes last Saturday. Since she lives far away and commutes a 
great distance, it was not expected that she go home to change.   
 Civil servants are pleased with the move towards ethnicization as expressed in 
uniforms. At least in terms of the Malay uniforms, there is the perception that 
decentralization is positive and provides greater cultural autonomy although the 
state’s Taman Mini-ized understanding of cultural diversity is unchanged. In fact, the 
new Malay uniform ultimately serves to reify the state’s national ideology by making 
national ‘ethnic’ cultures (albeit in ways that reduce the cultures to a pastiche) 
tangible and more visible. While civil servants are familiar with the Taman Mini 
concept of cultural diversity, they are now expected to bring this concept to life 
through dress, thus perpetuating Taman Mini-style cultural diversity.  
The introduction of Malay uniforms was intended to be a liberating move 
away from centralization, yet in practice it is as homogenizing and top-down as pre-
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Kepri office uniform rules. While there is some degree of flexibility in the style of 
clothes worn, it is clear that civil servants are not involved in making decisions about 
their uniforms and can only respond to decrees formulated in Jakarta. On one level, 
employees are aware of their freedom to choose what Malay clothes to wear on 
Saturdays. At the same time, there in an unconscious performative element to this act 
that reinforces and perpetuates the state’s hegemony. Through repetition, the wearing 
of Malay clothes has come to represent not only civil servants’ own local cultural 
identity, but also an aspect of national culture in the form of the political entity of 
Riau Islands Province. 
 
5.3.4 Upacara Bendera 
I now turn to one of the key performances of the Indonesian state workplace, 
Upacara Bendera, or Flag Ceremony. It is an elaborate and formal ceremony lasting 
about 30-45 minutes in which the Indonesian flag is ceremoniously raised. The 
ceremony follows strict protocol that was drafted upon Independence and has been 
performed weekly by civil servants since the Japanese occupation. It is a common 
sight to see the flag ceremony across Indonesia on Monday mornings in front of 
government offices and state-run banks.  
The current flag ceremony is nearly identical to the one introduced by the 
Japanese, with all Japanese national symbolism replaced with Indonesian national 
symbolism. In order to build solidarity and maintain ideological hegemony in the 
workplace, the Japanese introduced many features of the workday, many of which 
were perpetuated after Independence. Each day, employees would gather in the public 
front yard of the office to stand as a group. Employees would stand in rows and 
receive orders from their superior in a military-style interaction. In 1944 the Japanese 
permitted the Indonesian flag, the Merah Putih [the Red and White] to be flown 
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alongside the Japanese flag in some parts of the archipelago (Goto 2003). While after 
Independence, some songs sung in Japanese during the occupation were replaced with 
Indonesian songs, some of the songs simply had their lyrics changed from the 
Japanese to Indonesian with the tune remaining the same. In the case of the flag 
ceremony, the patriotic tone of the performance, its choreography and the location 
remained the same – the only change is the state. 
There is a stark difference between how state workers who commute to 
Tanjung Pinang and state workers who work on Pulau Penyengat perform national 
identity. Those who commute to Tanjung Pinang hurry to be at work on time for the 
start of Upacara Bendera a half hour before state office hours begin, while civil 
servants at the Kelurahan office on Pulau Penyengat arrive as much as 30 minutes 
after state office hours begin. Employees on Pulau Penyengat felt that since they were 
not forced to conduct Upacara Bendera and no one positioned higher in the 
bureaucratic hierarchy was watching them, they did not need to bother with it. 
Employees in the Kelurahan office in Pulau Penyengat explain: 
It is mandatory, but more for the bigger offices. We are just a small office with 
few employees and this is just kampung [village]… who will see us? (9 
February, 2006) 
 
No, not mandatory for us! Only the big offices in the capitals cities ... maybe 
big towns too. We don’t have enough people. (9 February, 2006) 
 
Their comments imply an awareness of being watched by superiors as well as an 
awareness of display, suggesting that the audience, in this case Pulau Penyengat 
society, was perceived as being too small and too insignificant to warrant putting on a 
show. When I asked employees of the state working on Pulau Penyengat whether they 
ever considered having a joint flag ceremony in which all civil servants would come 
together to conduct national ceremonies, they offered similar responses: 
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No, there are just too few of us! When I worked in the mayor’s office in 
Tanjung Pinang we had so many duties that were mandatory... the atmosphere 
was more formal ... we would all stand outside for the flag ceremonies in our 
formal office clothes – quite a sight! Here we are more relaxed and Pak Lurah 
[head of the kelurahan] is rarely here. He is not from Pulau Penyengat and 
does not come to the office everyday. We join the ceremonies in Tanjung 
Pinang only on national days ... 17th of the month, Independence Day, 
National Hero Day, etc. (10 September, 2006) 
 
We don’t have to ... it’s not mandatory ... we’re lucky! (11 September, 2006) 
We don’t have to, so why bother? Our office joins the large ceremonies in 
Tanjung Pinang on important dates. ... I don’t always join ... there are so many 
people that they won’t notice if I’m not there! ... If we were told to have a Flag 
Ceremony we would ... we all know how to do it! (10 September, 2006) 
 
The exceptions on Pulau Penyengat were the teachers (this is discussed in Chapter 
Six) and the nurse at the clinic, the only full-time health care professional on the 
island. The nurse raised a flag on the flagpole in her yard each Monday morning in a 
mini ceremony on her own.  
I raise the flag each Monday morning because that is a rule for government 
offices... this clinic is run by the state. ... There is no ceremony – it is just me! 
Sometimes I sing a little bit of Indonesia Raya (national anthem)... I take the 
flag down every Friday... because you cannot leave the flag there all weekend 
– it is not polite, not proper. (Ani, 14 February, 2006) 
 
The nurse seems to derive some personal satisfaction from the routine of raising the 
flag. More importantly, however, she feels that the flag is a necessary aspect of 
appearing professional for the villagers, and putting up a flag each Monday clearly 
marks her clinic as a state building.  
The variation in commitment to performing Upacara Bendera among state 
workers on Pulau Penyengat demonstrates differences in how national identity is 
imagined. While civil servants in the Kelurahan office generally see this ceremony as 
being performed by lots of people, for lots of people in a large ceremony, the nurse 
sees value in the symbolism of raising the flag, even if she is the only employee. The 
school teachers are the most diligent civil servants on the island with regards to 
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carrying out Upacara Bendera. The large number of students means that the teachers 
have many performers as well as a captive audience, key components of the 
ceremony. This variation suggests that performance is only considered performance 
when there is an audience.  
 
5.3.5 Senam Pagi Indonesia 
The other main performance of identity in the government workplace is Senam 
Pagi Indonesia that, like Upacara Bendera, was introduced during the Japanese 
occupation. Morning callisthenics called taiso were introduced into the workplace by 
the Japanese with the intention of inculcating a feeling of solidarity, discipline and 
strength among government employees working for the Japanese (Owen 2005). After 
Independence, they were adopted wholesale by Republican leaders. Figure 5.4 depicts 
Japanese soldiers in a prisoner-of-war camp in the Indies immediately after their 
defeat. They are engaged in taiso, group callisthenics, which they continued to 
conduct each morning, even after their imprisonment. Their dedication to taiso 
indicates the importance of group exercises to the Japanese and how the activity 












Figure 5.4 - Japanese doing group callisthenics 
 
 *image taken from Raben (1999) 
 
According to fitness experts at Senayan, the National Sports complex in 
Jakarta, Senam Pagi Indonesia has been carried out across Indonesia since 
Independence with few changes (Field notes, 5 May 2007). The underlying 
philosophy of Senam Pagi Indonesia views the body as a metonym of the nation, or as 
one fitness instructor aptly stated it ‘makes the body strong so the nation will be 
strong’ (Agus, 5 May 2007). The connection is overt and is further explicated by 
Agus (5 May, 2007) thus: 
Look at these athletes – their bodies are strong, they are fit. If everyone in 
Indonesia was like this, we would have a very powerful nation, right? If 
everyone’s body was weak and tired, our nation would also become weak and 
tired....  
 
However, Agus felt that while Senam Pagi Indonesia introduced a basic level of 
fitness, he was frustrated that it was not cutting edge fitness as it did not raise the 
heartbeat significantly.  
The purpose is to unite people, not fitness. Once per week is not enough 
exercise. And it is not ‘intensive’ enough. Jogging is better. Or weight 
training. (Agus, 5 May, 2007) 
 
In order to standardize Senam Pagi Indonesia across the country, training 
workshops are held several times per year. Several teachers from Pulau Penyengat 
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volunteered to attend the most recent training held in Tanjung Pinang where they 
were taught a new routine and that they needed to infuse their Senam Pagi with the 
necessary ‘spirit’ by acting enthusiastic. The training instructs not only on the 
physical aspect but on the emotional aspect, which is key in performing Senam Pagi.  
Since decentralization, Senam Pagi Indonesia requirements have relaxed in 
many workplaces and there is significant variation in how it is carried out at the 
national, provincial and village levels in Pulau Penyengat. Like Upacara Bendera, on 
Pulau Penyengat, civil servants in the Kelurahan office consider Senam Pagi 
Indonesia as optional. With so few people in the Kelurahan Office, there is no 
employee who has received official training in leading the Senam Pagi Indonesia. 
This indicates that the state has uneven expectations of state offices and is more 
permissive with smaller, more peripheral offices in terms of enforcing some 
performances of national identity. 
Several residents have independently conducted their own Senam Pagi with a 
portable stereo playing official Senam Pagi CDs in the square. Participants enjoy the 
act of coming together regularly and feel more motivated to exercise in a group. 
While people can watch government VCDs on television or listen to CDs at home, 
meeting as a group generates more energy and sense of purpose (Field notes, 14 
February, 2006). In these independently-organized Senam Pagi sessions, participants 
on Pulau Penyengat adopt the theme of national pride to motivate participants and to 
create a feeling of solidarity and sense of purpose. This linking of exercise and the 
nation indicates that to many residents on Pulau Penyengat, the format of Senam Pagi 
Indonesia has been so normalized that when they wish to start an exercise group, they 
do so in the same format as Senam Pagi Indonesia. It is popular for many adults to 
recreate Senam Pagi Indonesia on Sunday mornings, even wearing patriotic red and 
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white exercise clothes (see Figure 5.5). The types of people who join in these 
activities are people who both wish to stay in shape and tend not to have other 
opportunities to express nationalism. One participant comments on the activity and 
the uniforms: 
We like to wake up early for Senam so we feel fresh and fit. We wear these 
uniforms to increase our spirit and look more official. (Wasriah, 16 August, 
2006) 
 
Several women from the Kelurahan Office participated in these initiatives but the 
men did not. Senam Pagi Indonesia is increasingly perceived as aerobics, which have 
grown in popularity in Indonesia in recent years with women and is seen as a 
woman’s exercise. While some men in the village still participate in independently-
organized Senam Pagi, its domination by women reveals that it is considered a more 
‘feminine’ activity. 
Figure 5.5 - Voluntary Senam Pagi Indonesia 
 
For villagers who work as civil servants in Tanjung Pinang, Senam Pagi is still 
mandatory, although some offices have shifted it to Saturday mornings and has been 
replaced in many offices by mixed volleyball, which lacks the militaristic undertones 
of callisthenics and which people find more enjoyable and social. While it is 
significant that many bosses reject Senam Pagi, an activity they have grown up with, 
in favour of volleyball, they do not reject the basic notion that employees must come 
147 
 
together for a group exercise activity on a weekly basis. The expansion of national 
workplace exercise demonstrates how the expression of national identity is less 
regimented than in the past, yet is still a key way in which national identity is 
performed. 
5.3.6 Office performances 
Beyond the more official workplace performances of national identity, it is 
also instructive to examine how state employees perform throughout a workday. 
Despite decentralization and the formation of Riau Islands Province, there is still 
much daily emphasis on the nation in the context of work. The civil servants from 
Pulau Penyengat are all able to describe the daily, weekly, monthly and yearly 
programs of national rituals and the accompanying uniforms in great detail and 
accuracy. Employees were keenly aware of what was expected of them in national 
rituals in detail, including the schedule of daily office rituals such as gathering in the 
yard before work, when and where roll call was conducted, the intricacies of Upacara 
Bendera and Senam Pagi Indonesia, the ethnic uniform day, the rituals that occur on 
the 17th of each month to mark the monthly anniversary of Independence (17 August), 
and the various national holidays such as National Heroes Day, and of course, 
Independence Day.  In fact, some civil servants were better able to describe the 
national rituals that were (or should be) part of their job than they were able to 
provide a description of their work duties and responsibilities. 
As civil servants are the workers most targeted to participate in performances 
of national identity, examining a typical day is instructive in understanding how the 
state communicates national ideology. In what follows, I provide samples from the 
day of a civil servant from Pulau Penyengat that illustrates the ways in which civil 
servants are mobilized to perform and how they respond to them. 
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Employees arrive at the office and put their bags down at their desks. They 
wait until 8:30 then walk out to the yard outside the office facing the road. 
Everyone is chatting and joking as they form lines. They stand loosely in lines 
waiting for the boss to arrive. He arrives about 10 minutes later with an 
assistant. The boss stands on a box so he is higher than the employees. His 
assistant holds a microphone up to his mouth and he makes a show of barking 
out names27. Employees answer with little enthusiasm.  









8:45 a.m. – After attendance is taken, employees return to the office to relax. 
The mood is light and some of the men smoke cigarettes. A junior employee is 
sent to bring tea and snacks for everyone. One woman has a pile of papers on 
her desk and begins to process new identity cards. There is one computer in 
the office and the youngest employee is using it to play a computer game. 
Other employees have moved their chairs around one person’s desk and are 
laughing loudly, telling jokes and smoking.  
 
9: 30 a.m. – Two women are sleeping with their head on their desks. The 
computer is still being used for computer games. A cluster of men are sitting 
around smoking and chatting at one person’s desk.  
 
10:30 a.m. – Only half of the employees have anything at all on their desk. 
One person works on a typewriter. 
 
At 12:00, all employees leave the office for lunch, some taking a motorcycle 
home, others walking to a nearby cafe.  
 
1:00 p.m. – After lunch, employees gather in the yard again for attendance 
taking. It is very hot now and employees are sweating. The boss is late so 
everyone stands and waits. Once again employees line up and there is a 
formal show of lining up and calling out employees’ names.  
 
Another employee shows up who had not come in the morning. He had been 
watching a football game that was broadcast early in the morning and was 
excused from work to sleep in. 
 
                                                          
27 As with many of the national rituals I observed, I believe the rigor with which this task was 
performed was largely for my benefit judging by the theatrical flourish in which the role call was 
conducted, in contrast to the blasé response of the employees, most of whom did not appear to attempt 




Several of the employees nap at their desks. Several people come into the 
office asking about their identity cards. They are offered chairs and a round of 
tea is brought out. 
 
By around two, everyone’s desk is clean. The floor is swept by a cleaner and 
tea cups are taken away. There is nothing to do. Employees sit and chat until 
it is time to go home. 
 
3:00 p.m. – The workday is over and all employees immediately go home. 
 
 
For many of the employees, the workplace ceremonies and rituals such as roll call and 
Upacara Bendera, in addition to office work, are a key part of their jobs. A primary 
aspect of being a civil servant is maintaining continuity in carrying out national ritual 
duties and looking and behaving like a civil servant.  
For civil servants, we must know about Indonesia. The main cultures, the 
history of the struggle for Independence... national rituals. We must look smart 
and clean – no ear piercings, no long hair! [for men] ... We are told from the 
top how we should look and behave. (Hendri, 18 March, 2006) 
  
This comment was corroborated by others with whom I spoke and reveals the 
importance placed on the aspect of work that involves performance. Such workplace 
ceremonies maintain a high level of importance through their iteration and citation of 
prior performances, a concept found in Butler’s work on performativity.  
The audience is a key part of these national rituals. The flag ceremony, Senam 
Pagi Indonesia, the taking of attendance, and the uniforms are all intended for public 
display and consumption. Civil servants are the actors who produce the performance, 
but they are also simultaneously audience as they are intended to consume the event 
and internalize its meaning. As the yard in which these performances are staged is 
always along a public thoroughfare, the general public is also intended as part of the 
audience. This same emphasis on the empty yard with a flagpole is extended to the 
homes of civil servants. It is common to see a flagpole prominently displayed on the 
street side of a yard in middle class homes as a public display of patriotism. In fact, 
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one civil servant told me, only partly joking, ‘The flagpole is absolutely necessary for 
each house … if we build a new house, we will erect the flagpole first and then build 
the house!’ (Field notes, 4 November, 2004) This comment reinforces how the public, 
performative side of national rituals are prioritized by civil servants even in their 
private lives. 
Workplace performances on Pulau Penyengat are not as stringently carried out 
as in bigger offices in larger towns. The distance from anyone who would check up on 
them and the small numbers of employees has left villagers with the sense that they 
are only marginally under state surveillance. For national performances to have an 
effect, large groups of people are needed to form part of a spectacle, and audiences 
are needed. The small numbers available at Pulau Penyengat have thus been used as 
justification for not performing the national rituals as required by Jakarta. 
 A few of the people I spoke with felt that it was a problem that civil servants 
on Pulau Penyengat did not perform in the way that civil servants did in other, larger 
offices. They felt this was representative of several problems inherent in civil servants 
and Indonesians in general: the lack of discipline and the habit of never doing 
anything unless someone is watching over and threatening punishment. The principal 
of one of the schools felt that more discipline, more rules, more structure, starting 
with teachers, would benefit the village as more would get done, and the moral 
character of the workers would be higher. 
The various acts of national identity in the workplace can be construed as 
performative as they engage citizens in active performances but also contribute to and 
maintain the state’s version of national identity. The meaning of the performances 
relies on the citation of prior rituals that are now widely recognized as stylized 
versions of great moments in the history of the nation: proclamation, the mutual help 
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and cooperation that lead to Independence, the noble abandoning of individual 
identity for the sake of the nation, the raising of the Indonesian flag for the first time 
after Independence. Like the performances of other identities, workplace 
performances of national identity refer to ‘prior acts and require repetition in order to 
endure’ (Butler 1997: 20). For example, through the choreography of the flag 
ceremony, the state seeks to temporarily recreate the gravity and emotional intensity 
of the moment Independence was proclaimed. Particular lines are written into the flag 
ceremony and delivered by participants that were uttered – or imagined to be uttered – 
by Sukarno when he announced Indonesian Independence. The wearing of matching 
uniforms references the Indonesian revolution and perpetuates the notion of coming 
together in a disciplined way for a common cause. This image of revolutionary 
discipline and unity is further conveyed through the militaristic style of the uniforms 
and tone of the ceremonies. To Indonesians, such elements of the flag ceremony are 
clear references to the national struggle and it is through repeated participation in or 
exposure to ceremonies that the rituals are familiar.  
The workplace rituals in Indonesia constitute a ritual display of national unity. 
As Billig (1995) points out, the common occurrence of such choreographed displays 
does not necessarily mean that a sense of national pride bubbles within each civil 
servant every day, however, it does mean that the nation is celebrated on a routine 
basis and has an impact on the populace. In his book The Political Lives of Children, 
the psychotherapist Robert Coles argues that the significance of the ceremony is not 
diminished if it is treated not as an intense experience but as routine. Similarly, 
Benedict Anderson (1983) suggests that a feeling of national community is produced 
by the knowledge that across the country people are performing even mundane daily 
rituals such as reading the same newspaper. I suggest that this sense of national 
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community is felt keenly through work, both by workers themselves as they perform 
national rituals as well as by the ‘audience’ or the public. Significantly, the national 
workplace performances discussed are all presented in public with the intention of 
being observed. While they have become so ordinary and perfunctory, they play an 
important role in maintaining citizens’ understanding of the nation and their 
relationship to it.  
5.4 Non-state workers 
While non-state workers on Pulau Penyengat are not required to perform 
national ceremonies or wear national uniforms in their workplaces, they are familiar 
with the ‘choreography’ of state performances and refer to them strategically in what 
Butler calls ‘citational practices’. As will be examined in this section, non-state 
workers strategically replicate aspects of state workers’ behaviour and appearance in 
order to gain prestige and respect within the community. 
As previously discussed, the growing bureaucracy combined with the ever-
increasing rationalization of the workplace has resulted in more uniforms for state 
workers. This uniformization at the state level has seeped into society more broadly. 
Over the past several decades, the prestige associated with uniforms has become more 
readily accessible as factory-made clothing and printing costs have grown more 
affordable. As a consequence, non-state workers on Pulau Penyengat enthusiastically 
and strategically adopted uniforms and the mannerisms of civil servants in an effort to 
associate themselves with a more powerful entity. This strategy was taken by some 
Indonesians who imitated Dutch dress in colonial times, again when Japanese dress 
was adopted and during the Revolution when the indigenous military groups adopted 
versions of Western battle dress (Pemberton 1994: 58). Significantly, these people do 
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not reject the power of the state, but seek to harness state power and prestige for 
themselves at particular times. 
Here I turn to the example of a group of rickshaw drivers on Pulau Penyengat, 
the lowest socio-economic class on the island. During the recent Gerak Jalan28 
[marching competition] they have been diligent in assembling uniforms that, to them, 
represent positions of power and prestige. In 2006 they wore full military fatigues, 
including combat boots (see Figure 5.6), while in 2007 they wore (borrowed) civil 
servant track suits.  
 The rickshaw drivers spent weeks practicing for the competition. While there 
was no comic statement intended in their performance, they elicited laughter from the 
audience unaccustomed to seeing the rickshaw drivers looking so disciplined and 
respectable. While the marching competitions are part of the state’s nation-building 
agenda in villages across the archipelago, the rickshaw drivers use them as an 
opportunity to make a local point: to impress fellow islanders and hopefully 
(temporarily) bring them the respect and dignity that they believe comes with the 
uniform. This indicates a gap between the state’s intended meaning of the marching 








                                                          
28 Marching is held as a village competition. The object is to show national spirit, conform to a group, demonstrate 
stamina and discipline and follow a leader well (Pak Acay, 10 August, 2006). Teams are made up of six people 
plus a leader and are groups of friends, relatives or work colleagues. (see Chapter Seven) 
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Figure 5.6 - Marching competition - rickshaw drivers in military costumes 
 
For the rickshaw drivers, the marching competition is an opportunity to 
perform for the community. By citing the military through wearing army uniforms, 
they strategically decided to present themselves in a way that attempts to temporarily 
reverse their social status. Not all in the audience were convinced by this 
performance, however, as several people made comments aloud about the rickshaw 
drivers pretending to be something they are not.  
Others who have sought official-looking uniforms for strategic purposes are 
neighbourhood leaders and women’s groups. To volunteers in organizations such as 
PKK (Pembinaan Kesejateraan Keluarga, or Committee for the Promotion of Family 
Prosperity) and other women’s groups, having a uniform is believed to bring prestige. 
Likewise, neighbourhood representatives on Pulau Penyengat requested uniforms to 
wear to the occasional meeting held off the island: 
Sometimes we have meetings in Tanjung Pinang with other neighbourhood 
heads from other parts of the province. We need to look official, right? We 
don’t want to be dressed in any old way … how would that look? We need to 
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look professional … right now we do not have uniforms … we want them so 
we can represent Pulau Penyengat with pride. (Yusuf, 16 August, 2005) 
 
Several people expressed frustration with those who imitate state dress and 
behaviour. They felt that these people were ‘uneducated and easily influenced by 
government propaganda’ (Sayed, 11 August, 2006). In fact, some residents felt they 
were lucky not to have to endure the rituals that they found boring as students, when 
they regularly had to participate in national ceremonies. Others found such rituals and 
the accompanying dress codes a potent example of the oppressive and controlling 
approach of an arrogant state administered from Jakarta. One man on Pulau 
Penyengat, referred to popularly as Orang Bugil, or ‘Naked Man’, takes pride in never 
wearing a shirt and always wearing cut-off jeans, both highly unusual in the context 
of Pulau Penyengat where both men and women tend to cover their shoulders and 
legs, and the more religious cover their arms and head29. Naked Man makes specific 
reference to the lives of state workers when he elaborates upon his chosen dress: 
I don’t wear a shirt because this is the way God made me! This is a tropical 
region! ... I don’t work for the government, I’m not an office person, I’m not 
an important person or ‘VIP’ … no one can make me wear anything. It’s a free 
country … no one can judge me but God. (Naked Man, 14 February, 2006) 
 
Through his nakedness, Naked Man is displaying corporeal resistance to the dominant 
norm, a reaction both to the normalizing and rationalizing hand of the state and that of 
the powerful local mosque, both of which he feels increasingly enforce conservative 
rules about dress that serve their own agendas. Through his dress, he consciously 
rejects the dominant way of being an Indonesian, a man and a Malay. Similarly, 
several residents I spoke with including Pak Deni, a middle-aged former sailor, 
express frustration over the uniformization and its implicit symbolism of 
respectability and elitism:  
                                                          
29 People involved with the fishing industry wear less clothes while working and dress more 
conservatively when socializing in the village. 
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Everyone wants a uniform ... the rickshaw drivers, the pompong [small 
wooden boat for ferrying people short distances] drivers, housewives in 
women’s groups ... I used to wear a uniform on a ship ... we had to know what 
rank everyone was ... for safety. These uniforms are for show, meaningless. 
They just want to look official and powerful. (Pak Deni, 14 February, 2006)   
 
Some people, the poor, the uneducated, those who have hardly left Pulau 
Penyengat, … believe everything the government says. They admire and 
respect the civil servants and wish that they could be respected like that and 
have a salary with the assurance of a pension. … Those types of people really 
annoy me because they just follow whatever the most powerful person says, 
which is not always the best way. Our civil servants are not creative or smart 
or even honest … they got their job through KKN [collusion, corruption, 
nepotism] and do the minimum … why do people listen to them? (Sayed, 13 
February, 2006) 
 
In short, while many in Pulau Penyengat view having a job that requires a 
uniform as prestigious, this view does not go unchallenged. However, no one would 
dispute that engaging in state rituals and displaying national identity through state 
uniforms certainly yields benefits and various groups have sought to derive the same 
benefits through imitation of state adornment. This conscious and strategic 
performance of national identity recalls Goffman, yet the citation of prior practices is 
in line with Butler’s performativity.  
I now turn to a final example of how the uniformization of Indonesia has 
affected Riau islanders. In the context of broad national strategies of pembangunan 
[development], the creation of jobs and a modern, rationalized workforce are at the 
forefront and in the National Day parade, pembangunan plans are showcased through 
high school students. As there is no high school on Pulau Penyengat, students from 
the island go to school in Tanjung Pinang and participate with their school, along with 
other schools from around the province. The students are asked to dress up in a range 
of uniforms that the state suggests to each school district, with a focus on types of 
‘modern’ occupations that are linked closely with nation-building, modernity, and 
Indonesia’s national future (Pak Acay, 14 August, 2006). As a feature of 
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Independence Day parades beginning in the New Order, the costumed youth illustrate 
the importance placed on the development of particular types of jobs and emphasize 
how they are linked with national identity (Figures 5.7-5.9). The majority of the 
featured uniforms represent areas earmarked for development in the Riau Islands, 
such as resort tourism. Others represented professional careers such as accountancy, 
medicine, law and government.  
Figure 5.7 – Students parading 'Developing professions' in the National Day parade -  





















Figure 5.8 - Students parading 'Developing professions' in the National Day parade  – ‘Front 
office’, ‘Reservation section’, ‘Reception’ 
 
Figure 5.9 - Students parading 'Developing professions' in the National Day parade – 
'Housekeeping' 
 
As can be seen in the above photos, students are enlisted to publicly perform 
the state’s national ambition. Uniforms play a key role as being instantly 
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recognizable. To people watching the parade, it is obvious that these people do not 
actually work in resorts or as doctors, accountants, and so on: Riau is not yet 
‘developed’ and does not yet have training schools for most of these occupations. It is 
clear that this is a performance of a national ideal devised by the state. For the 
performers, there is the sense that these are simply costumes, not unlike the ethnic 
costumes other students in the parade are made to wear (14 August, 2006): 
No – I am not going to be a doctor! I cannot pay for university and I am not 
smart enough. (boy in the parade dressed as a doctor) 
 
I would like to work in a resort but I can only speak English a little. (girl 
dressed up in a ‘reception’ uniform) 
 
Among many participants and spectators, there was a general lack of confidence in 
the ‘developing professions’ component of the parade. The students were cynical 
about their future and aware that they were performing the state’s ambitions rather 
than a reality for their own future. Here we can see a disparity between the state’s 
version of nation-building and the students’ understanding of it. While they are asked 
to perform, they are not convinced of this aspect of the state’s vision.  
5.5 State ‘volunteers’ 
Volunteer labour constitutes an important aspect of nation-building strategies 
on Pulau Penyengat and in Indonesia in general and is profitably studied using 
concepts of performance and performativity. In this section, I first examine how 
volunteer labour takes its roots in strategies introduced by pre-colonial imperial 
forces. I then examine how the state mobilizes particular people to volunteer to work 
on various national gotong-royong [volunteer] projects in the context of Pulau 
Penyengat, before examining how some residents of Pulau Penyengat have adopted 
the state’s strategy of gotong-royong to advance their own agendas.  
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As mentioned earlier, the Japanese needed bureaucrats to administer Indonesia 
in order to extract resources for the war effort and to manage the population. They 
also needed a massive number of people to grow food and produce materials needed 
by the military, to carry out building projects, and to fight in the Imperial Army. 
Similar to heerendienst, the system of unpaid labour under the Dutch, the Japanese 
Military Government set up several organizations to enrol labour conscripts, called 
sukarela in Indonesian or romusha in Japanese, for projects to support the war effort. 
The total number of people conscripted as romusha is estimated to be in the millions 
(Friend 1997). Organizations set up included Hei Ho which was started in order to 
conscript labourers for the use of the Japanese government and Sukarela Tentera 
Pembela Tanah Air (PETA) to train a local army corps ‘for the defence of the 
Fatherland’. The Japanese moved about a quarter of a million Indonesians around 
their colonies to work on major projects that supported the Japanese war effort. 
During the war the Riau Islands were under the administration of Singapore and many 
Malays were taken to Singapore to join the Imperial Army (Andaya 1997).  
The use of conscript labour continued after Independence, although it was 
justified by the state as serving the contradictory purposes of being traditional and 
pre-colonial while contributing to development and modernization of the Indonesian 
nation. While it was referred to by the name gotong-royong, it was in fact more 
similar to the Japanese practice of romusha. Gotong-royong is originally a Javanese 
term (although the practice is found across the archipelago) that refers to the mutual 
assistance neighbours and communities offer when the need arises. Such a need could 
be at the household scale, for example if a family needs to borrow money for an 
emergency or needs additional labour to help build a new roof for their house. 
Gotong-royong can also be practiced at the community level, when village labour is 
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pooled to create a new rumah adat [traditional community hall] or other labour-
intensive project. After Independence, instead of giving free labour to the Japanese 
state through romusha, (male) citizens were to give free labour to the Indonesian state 
through gotong-royong. Sukarno elevated gotong-royong to state policy, even going 
so far as to call Indonesia a ‘gotong-royong state’ (Friend 2003). Gotong-royong was 
framed as being a man’s obligation as a member of the nation and as a way to actively 
show patriotism and support national causes. On a national level, conscript labour was 
used to construct mega-projects such as the National Stadium at Senayan, Jakarta, for 
which thousands of Indonesians were mobilized by the state around the clock to work 
without pay to construct the sports complex in time for the 1962 Asian Games.  
The use of gotong-royong for nation-building was felt down to the village 
level including Pulau Penyengat, where various national projects were built through 
state-organized village labour, such as schools and administration buildings as well as 
mandatory neighbourhood or hamlet gateways, constructed to commemorate 
Independence. State gotong-royong projects intensified during the New Order and on 
Pulau Penyengat there are still regular, if smaller-scale projects created with gotong-
royong labour. While there is still an active sense of neighbourly mutual assistance on 
Pulau Penyengat, in this section I refer to volunteers who lend their labour to state 
projects. One resident of Pulau Penyengat expressed a commonly-held view in his 
comment about gotong-royong: 
Gotong-royong is our culture, our tradition. If a neighbour needs help with 
something, we help out. For free – they do not have to pay anything... because 
if then I need help my neighbours will help me for free. (Pak Fazrul, 7 
October, 2007) 
 
The act of gotong-royong references a recognizable communal tradition and 
can be understood as a citational practice referring back to an aspect of community 
life that is considered wholesome, positive, and community-oriented. While others 
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have examined the symbolism of built gotong-royong projects (Sekimoto 1997), I 
argue that the key role of these projects is the process of gathering volunteers and the 
actual public performance of gotong-royong. While performing scripted roles that 
demonstrate solidarity and uniformity, the workers are simultaneously both actors 
who produce the performance and as well as an audience intended to consume and 
internalize its meaning. 
While adopted by the state for nation-building purposes, the practice is more 
about spending the time publicly demonstrating cooperation than accomplishing a 
task. This is evidenced by the fact that many gotong-royong projects are never 
completed. A certain amount of time and / or materials are allocated to the project and 
when this runs out, the project is abandoned. The project itself is of little importance; 
it is the doing of the project, the display of cooperation and spirit that are key, as will 
be demonstrated in what follows.  
Pulau Penyengat has had several gotong-royong projects in recent years, each 
determined by the kelurahan in the case of larger projects and by the RT 
[neighbourhood] or RW [hamlet] for smaller neighbourhood projects. For the larger 
projects, the provincial government in Tanjung Pinang asks each kelurahan what their 
program of gotong-royong is for the year. The kelurahan then submits several ideas 
they have come up with along with a budget. Past ideas have included a playground, a 
paved path around the island, and various village ‘beautification’ projects.   
 During the Old Order, gotong-royong labour was used to construct and 
maintain the first state buildings on the island, including a new school, the PKK 
building, and the clinic. Seniors on Pulau Penyengat explain the general feeling of 
helping to construct these state buildings: 
We were very spirited after Independence to build new facilities... We needed 
a new school and a clinic but there was no money to build them... We worked 
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together ... the spirit of gotong-royong... the government provided the 
materials. (Pak Hari, 7 May, 2006) 
 
There was a sense of community spirit and national unity that Independence brought 
and the state was able to channel this into volunteer projects. At the state level in 
Jakarta at this time, Sukarno was able to inspire tens of thousands of people to help 
construct the national stadium largely with free labour. 
 The state practice of gotong-royong was continued in the New Order, during 
which time it was frequently employed by the state in Pulau Penyengat to mobilize 
groups of men to contribute labour to state projects, such as constructing and 
maintaining state buildings in the village and creating a number of decorative projects 
such as village gates and planters. In his essay ‘Uniforms and concrete walls’, Teruo 
Sekimoto writes about how youth in a Javanese village where he conducted fieldwork 
in the mid-1970s would be mobilized to spend time on projects with little practical 
utility such as decorative gates and concrete walls until ‘the village looked neat and 
clean with national symbols everywhere’ (Sekimoto 1997: 316). In fact, the state held 
competitions between villages in which they would be evaluated on their 
‘beautification achievements’ that would ‘drive the villagers into more advanced 
degrees of collective work in succeeding years’ (Sekimoto 1997: 316). This practice 
continues in Pulau Penyengat and remnants of similar activities can be found scattered 
around Pulau Penyengat. One carried out in the early 1990s involved cutting the brush 
back from a path through an unbuilt part of the island and using segments of huge 
concrete piping as planters. The labour-intensive work of cutting back the brush, 
moving and arranging the concrete planters, filling them with soil, painting them 
alternating white and light blue, and then planting bougainvillea was carried out 
entirely by volunteers. After completion, there was occasional maintenance in 
subsequent gotong-royong activities in which the planters were repainted. At present, 
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most of the plants are now dead, the paint has flaked away and the brush is not kept 
trimmed.  
In 2007, more concrete planters were created next to a path in another part of 
the island (Figure 5.10). Unlike the previous planter project, this one was more 
modest in scale, requiring fewer volunteers and materials. The physical structures of 
the planters were formed from concrete-covered brick but were left unpainted. The 
similarity between this project and the one created about two decades ago 
demonstrates how the village beautification strategies that spark wide participation 
and inter-village competition have not changed on Pulau Penyengat since the height 
of the Old Order. However, the down-sized scale of the recent project suggests that 
such projects are not as prioritized as they used to be in terms of funding and labour.  
Figure 5.10  - Gotong-royong project - path-side planters 
 
 
Residents of Pulau Penyengat are also mobilized for various kampung 
[village] improvement projects around Independence Day, including the 
beautification of neighbourhood gates. These gates are found throughout Indonesia 
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and mark the entrance to a particular neighbourhood (see Figures 5.11 and 5.12). 
Designs for the gates depend on the budget, drawn from neighbourhood donations, 
and volunteers are free to design the gate in whichever way they choose as long as 
there is some element commemorating the anniversary of Indonesian Independence. 
Design guidelines are passed along to the representatives of the RT and RW who 
communicate them to the volunteers. In what follows, I provide a brief ethnography 
of a gotong-royong gate beautification project.  
The volunteers sit around discussing what needs to be done on the 
gate. All of the volunteers are men, all under 40 except the neighbourhood 
leader who is guiding the activity. The leader suggests writing ‘17-08-45’ (the 
date of Independence) on the front of the gate in order to show patriotism. A 
younger volunteer counters that this will not fit on the front of the gate 
because of decorative ridges in the concrete and suggests they write it on the 
smoother inside wall of the gate. Others agree with the suggestion and 
someone volunteers to paint it, confident of his skill in painting numbers. He 
sets out to sketch the numbers in pencil. 
 People passing by ask what they are going to do with the gate and 
several people stop by to chat and watch.  
 The leader says that there is enough paint to touch up the existing 
concrete frieze, which should be prioritized over adding more decoration. He 
says he hopes to add something distinct and creative to the existing design. 
 One of the men’s wives brings some glasses of tea and small snacks for 
the men. Children are hanging around watching the group. 
 A neighbour passes by and comments that another gate in another 
neighbourhood he has seen has further decorated their gate with cut bamboo. 
The response to this comment is that the arch will be ‘good enough’ with what 
they have planned. (Field notes, 6 August, 2006)  
 
While the volunteers are carrying out the wishes of the state, the task is 
conducted as any project in the neighbourhood would, indicating a ‘fusion of state 
structure and neighbourly practice’ (Hatley 1982: 57-58). At the same time, there is 
the distinct awareness that this is a state activity that will be inspected. The leader 
wants to make the gates look fresh as they will be inspected by the Pak Lurah from 
the kelurahan office, however he rejects the elaborate design suggestions, claiming 
that they will take too much time and effort to execute. The subtext here is that he is 
trying to get through the inspection with the minimum amount of effort. The leader’s 
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comments also indicate that this is a performance for which there are multiple 
audiences. First, the group is aware that they are performing for the general public 
who can watch them work as they walk by. Second, the team performs for the 
neighbourhood who can watch to see how the team is working, the ability of the 
leader to guide the process, lead the team, and produce a gate to be proud of. Third, 
the team performs for the state, in the form of the Pak Lurah who will inspect the 
gate.      
The workers gathered for gotong-royong projects on Pulau Penyengat tend not 
to be employees of the state, but are either marginally employed or were working in 
the informal sector. ‘Volunteers’ are recruited for such projects by the state 
representatives at the RT and RW levels. As one Pak RT [neighbourhood leader] 
states,  
We announce that volunteers are needed for a project. Sometimes we need 
five or six people, sometimes ten or fifteen or more...it depends on the project. 
... There is no limit to the number of volunteers ... of course, more is better so 
the work is lighter and the group is more spirited. (Pulau Penyengat, 17 
August, 2006) 
 
Another Pak RT explains that he targets people who he knows have time on their 
hands or who are unemployed, particularly youths. As one middle-class man points 
out, 
If there is a gotong-royong project, we are asked to donate money. If we have 
no money, then we have to join the gotong-royong activity. (8 August, 2006) 
 
These comments demonstrate that on Pulau Penyengat, gotong-royong reflects class 
divisions in a way that contradicts the intended unifying and egalitarian spirit of the 
practice30. 
 
                                                          
30 Barbara Hatley (1982) makes a similar observation in the context of a central Javanese kampung in 
the 1970s in which wealthier kampung dwellers could made a monetary contribution instead of 
contributing physical help. 
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 Figure 5.11 - Gotong-royong - 'volunteers' repainting a neighbourhood gate  
 
Figure 5.12 - Gotong-royong 'volunteers'  
 
 
5.5.1 Strategic non-state volunteerism 
Some residents on Pulau Penyengat feel that the state has been increasingly 
intrusive since decentralization and the formation of Riau Islands Province, 
particularly due to recent plans to develop the island’s tourism potential. Resistance to 
168 
 
state control has manifested itself in activities of citizen groups who wish to have 
more control over island affairs. Adopting gotong-royong in the recuperated language 
of the state, one group decided to start a team that would engage in island 
improvement and clean-up projects in order to prove to other residents that they could 
manage the island themselves without the state and hopefully inspire their fellow 
villagers to join their cause. The gotong-royong group consisted of 8-10 young men 
who were marginally employed in seasonal work or odd-jobs and were led by Sayed, 
a local who had experience working in various Indonesian resorts. Every second 
morning Sayed would pack tea and snacks for the gotong-royong group and assemble 
them in the square next to the mosque and they would set off as a group. This group 
hoped that the island would obtain be able to obtain greater autonomy through 
displays of hard work that would prove they were willing to work towards common 
goals in ways the state would recognize and respect.  
Sayed’s gotong-royong initiative illustrates how some locals strategically 
employ state strategies in order to resist the hegemony of the state. Reinforcing what 
James Siegel (1997) has written about the power of recognition in the formation of 
identity, residents of Pulau Penyengat recognize the state’s power as legitimate and 
then attempt to imitate it to their advantage. Adopting civil service-like uniforms or 
mobilizing gotong-royong groups reaffirms hierarchies and the state’s authority while 
using them for local purposes unintended by the state. Furthermore, while Sayed and 
the others were strategic in selecting gotong-royong as a tactic that they thought might 
bring success, they were uncritical of the constructedness of the concept itself. This 
indicates the success the state has had in naturalizing its national ideology, as even 




In this chapter, I have demonstrated how work is used in nation-building and 
how the nation and workplace intersect on Pulau Penyengat. The empirical examples 
of state workers, non-state workers and state ‘volunteers’ illustrate the unevenness of 
the state’s nation-building strategies across the working population while at the same 
time, revealing how potent and familiar civil servants’ performances of national 
identity have become.  
The empirical examples demonstrate how the state has made civil servants 
highly visible and immediately recognizable through the different uniforms required 
on particular days. The uniforms give the appearance of widespread state support and 
homogeneity amongst civil servants and, since the meaning of the uniforms is widely 
known to the public, the uniforms are a way by which the state can broadcast its 
ideology to the population through the bodies of its employees. Through uniforms and 
choreographed workplace performances, civil servants are intended to embody 
national ideals such as discipline, order, progress and the sacred aura of the 
Revolution.  
The state is unable to control how non-state workers interpret and use national 
performances intended for civil servants. This is exemplified through the adoption of 
official-looking uniforms by non-state workers and the practice of the state’s version 
of gotong-royong by one group on Pulau Penyengat. To many non-state workers, state 
uniforms are a potent symbol of power. Non-state workers who adopted civil servant-
like uniforms did not dispute the hegemony of the state but rather wished to co-opt the 
authority of the state to gain personal prestige. This recognition of the state’s power 
ultimately served to reinforce it. In contrast, the gotong-royong group discussed 
earlier strategically adopted the state’s version of the practice in order to both resist 
the state’s hegemony and advance their personal agenda. Work is performed 
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simultaneously in conscious, strategic ways as conceptualized by Goffman and in 
subconscious, iterative practices that reinforce workplace norms as conceptualized by 
Butler.  
This chapter has demonstrated how the state has employed particular 
mechanisms of control through dress and workplace performances in an attempt to 
‘nationalize’ particular segments of the citizenry and maintain its authority. However, 
despite the regimentation of government workplace performances and the state’s 
attempts to maintain uniformity and control, there are several things that prevent 
homogenous workplace performances. 
First, as my analysis of these three groups of workers demonstrates, it is clear 
that performances of national identity are not applied evenly across the working 
population. In national ceremonies, civil servants are prioritized over non-state 
workers, who, over the decades, have been increasingly excluded from participating.  
Second, as this chapter indicates, there is room for interpretation of 
compulsory national performances among workers. Some state workers are convinced 
that they are not obliged to participate in national activities such as Upacara Bendera, 
Senam Pagi Indonesia, or ethnic costume day because of their age or seniority. The 
unevenness within the same workplace reinforces existing social hierarchies based on 
age and perpetuates the hierarchical relationship between senior and junior 
employees. 
Third, the state itself has uneven expectations as to how civil servants should 
perform in different offices. State rules regarding, for example, uniforms, are subject 
to the interpretation of multiple layers of bureaucracy, resulting in a high degree of 
variation in how, and to what extent, national ceremonies and rituals such as Upacara 
Bendera and Senam Pagi Indonesia are performed. Furthermore, as the empirical 
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material reveals, the state’s expectations as to how civil servants are to perform 
national identity are closely linked to the intended audience. As the Kelurahan on 
Pulau Penyengat is considered peripheral and the number of residents is small, there is 
no audience of any size to perform to and many performances of national identity that 























Chapter 6 – Educating the Nation 
 
   
6.1 Introduction 
It is early Friday morning and hundreds of elementary school students dressed 
in identical orange tracksuits pour into the school yard like an army of 
children. They bend over, in a local gesture of respect, and gently press their 
foreheads against the outstretched hands of any teachers they see in the yard. 
Students mill around chatting in clusters or playing until their teachers call 
them to form lines according to their grade. Teachers and older students 
patrol the lines, ensuring that each student is facing forward, that the lines are 
straight, and that each student is spaced an arm’s length away from the 
student in front and behind in the line. The grid of students is surrounded by 
older students and teachers placed at regular intervals.  
Once everyone is in position, a recording of upbeat music begins to 
emerge from speakers. In unison, the entire school begins the weekly 
callisthenic session. The students bend down, march in place, raise their arms 
at particular moments, clap their hands, and turn in different directions in 
unison to the beat of the woman’s voice on the recording counting from one to 
eight over and over again and played so loud that talking is impossible. The 
choreographed moves are complicated but require a minimal level of exertion 
or fitness. Students are paying close attention in order to keep up with the 
complicated moves. The session lasts for about half an hour, after which the 
students are given about forty minutes of ‘rest time’ before their classes. The 
students use this time to play soccer, badminton and various other games, and 
do not appear tired by the callisthenics. (Field notes, June 5, 2006) 
 
The above scenario illustrates how the state’s agenda of nation-building is 
carried out through the actions of school children. Active, bodily performances in the 
context of schools are a key way in which the state inculcates ideology in its citizens 
and is a key way in which people on Pulau Penyengat experience and understand the 
nation. The above scenario also illustrates how local cultural elements seep into 
national performances in the act of giving sayang31 when the children press their 
forehead to the hands of elders upon arriving at school. For many residents of Pulau 
Penyengat, the only time in their lives in which they are asked by the state to 
                                                          
31 The sayang greeting is commonly performed in Pulau Penyengat and the Malay world by children up to their 
mid-teens to their elders in various contexts. It is one of the first things parents teach their babies and is seen to 
display refined manners and good parenting. 
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participate in official national rituals is as a student. As the most visible and frequent 
performances of national identity on Pulau Penyengat, it is necessary to include 
school performances in a study of embodied national identity. Furthermore, since 
educational settings have been instrumental sites in which official versions of national 
identity are inculcated, they can provide an understanding of how official national 
identity is perpetuated and normalized through repetitive performance and also how it 
is challenged and reinterpreted by the participants. 
While there have been numerous studies examining the connections between 
power, nation-building and education, the literature tends to focus on curriculum and 
bureaucratic structures, rather than on students’ embodied experiences. As Jan 
Penrose (1993: 28) argues, ‘nations are not natural entities but social constructions’, 
which, as Lyn Parker (2003: 206) rightfully reminds us, need to be ‘created and 
continually recreated’. This perpetual maintenance requires the repetition of embodied 
activity, a conceptual approach that resonates with the dynamism inherent in the 
concepts of performance and performativity. Conceptualizing the continuous re-
creation of the nation-state in schools as performative is a helpful way to approach the 
issue of nation-building through education at the finest scale of political space 
(Hyndman & de Alwis 2005). As Benedict Anderson (1990: 111) wrote of Indonesia, 
‘the consistent leit-motiv of the New Order governance has been the strengthening of 
the state qua state’. One of the most effective tools that the Indonesian state used to 
strengthen itself was through the implementation of mass schooling (Parker 2002). 
In this chapter I review the literature that links education and nation-building, 
and work that has examined how school rituals and activities can be conceptualized as 
performance. I then discuss educational policy and investigate how education has 
been a site in which national identity is inculcated, to varying degrees of success, 
174 
 
through performance. In order to contextualize Indonesia’s history of education and to 
understand its continuities and innovations across changes in leadership, I provide an 
overview of pre- and post-Independence education strategies. Without delving into an 
analysis of educational curricula (see Poerbakawatja 1971; Mangunpranoto 1978; 
Siegel 1986; Parker 1992a; Buchori 1994; Leigh 1999; Buchori 2001; Bjork 2005; 
Laksmi 2006), I focus my investigation on the compulsory national ritual 
performances in an elementary school on Pulau Penyengat. The four areas in which I 
focus my study include the complex set of national school uniforms, Senam Pagi 
Indonesia [Indonesia’s Morning Exercise], Upacara Bendera [Flag Ceremony] and 
the national ethnic identities which are taught using performative strategies. These 
ceremonies overlap with those performed in state workplaces and serve to reinforce 
observations and analysis there. However, there are differences in how they are 
performed and experienced in the context of schools on Pulau Penyengat that make 
education a crucial realm in which to study performances of national identity. 
Throughout the discussion, I examine how state schools in Pulau Penyengat have 
relied upon the citizenry to perform in particular ways and how performativity can 
help to conceptualize the repetition and citational practices crucial in perpetuating the 
state’s version of national identity. 
6.2 Education and nation-building  
There is a rich literature examining how states create citizens through schools. 
As one of the most important social services states provide and the ‘principle 
ideological apparatus of the state’, leaders of states attribute great importance to 
education as part of the means of achieving social transformation (Carnoy et al. 
1990). Education is seen as ‘a route to all things’ (Carnoy et al. 1990: 175), the 
primary vehicle for learning skills, where ideas, values, and worldviews are developed 
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so that ‘from the process of schooling there emerges a new person—not simply 
someone with skills, but also someone with an understanding of his or her own role in 
the world and of what is important for that society’. 
There are a number of scholars who have examined connections between 
education and nation-building. For example, McVeigh (2000) has observed that the 
Japanese state has long regarded the school as a key site of socialization for imbuing 
the youth with the morals and ideology of the nation. Similarly, Marshall (1994) 
provides an in-depth analysis of the development of Japan’s education system in his 
book Learning to Be Modern. He examines the power struggles and ideological 
controversies about how to socialize and enculturate the youth as the ‘heart of the 
processes by which a society is continually recreated’ (Marshall 1994: 1) and argues 
that ‘society’s normative assumptions and hegemonic ideals are most clearly 
revealed’ through values found in both textbooks and classroom behaviour (1994: 2). 
In Lois Peak’s (1991) book Learning to Go to School in Japan, she observes the vast 
differences between children’s behaviour at home and at school, examining how 
school teaches a new set of behaviours. She focuses on the transition when a child 
learns ways of behaving in the school and examines the techniques of social training 
used to elicit ideal behaviour: obedient, cooperative, self-reliant, and group-oriented. 
This literature convincingly demonstrates the various ways in which schools attempt 
to shape the behaviour of students to conform to societal values. 
Despite the global increase in mass schooling, particularly in the second half 
of the 20th century, education in the service of the nation-state has been comparatively 
neglected by scholars of the nation-state. Parker (2003: 206) speculates that ‘perhaps 
the “fit” of schooling and the nation-state is so precise, so “natural”, that it remains 
invisible’. In response to this gap, Parker denaturalizes education by viewing it as ‘a 
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means of making and recreating the nation-state’ through her numerous studies of 
curricula and classroom behaviour in a village in Bali (1992b; 1992a; 2002; 2003). 
Mass education acts as a key ideological instrument for the state to legitimize and 
naturalize its power. One of the key functions of mass education is to bring a diverse 
population into direct contact with the state’s ideological apparatus (Carnoy et al. 
1990). Boli et al. (1985: 146) conceptualize mass education as ‘a means of resolving 
the strains of differentiation’ and as a ‘structure of universalistic integration’. In other 
words, as members of a modern society we are all entangled in various homogenizing 
structures that serve to conform individuals to a norm and to shape them into citizens. 
It is through mass education that members of the rational society and modern state are 
created: 
In the new view, the unformed, the parochial, or even the morally defective 
child could be molded in desired ways if its environmental experiences were 
controlled in a rational and purposive manner. Such deliberate socialization 
was necessary because all of the virtuous goals of society increasingly were 
seen as attainable only to the extent that individual members of society 
embodied the corresponding personal virtues. ... Education is engendered by 
the effort to create properly socialized members of the rational society who 
have the capacity and disposition to join in the struggle for progress as 
workers, innovators, consumers, organizers, and committed members of the 
political community. (Boli et al 1985: 157-58) 
 
As Ramirez and Rubinson argue (1979) the state promotes a system of mass 
education in order to transform all individuals into members of the national polity. 
Moreover, it supports a uniform system to build devotion to common goals, symbols, 
and assumptions about proper conduct in the social arena. Similarly, as Goffman 
(1961: 41) has theorized, schools can be understood as ‘total institutions’ in which 
authority ‘is directed to a multitude of items of conduct – dress, deportment, manners 
– that constantly occur and constantly come up for judgment’.  
Several scholars have made detailed studies of Indonesian textbooks and the 
national curriculum, how the content has changed over time, and to what extent 
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textbooks engender a sense of patriotism in students (Thomas, 1990; Parker, 1992a; 
Leigh, 1999). While content analyses of school curricula reveals much about the 
state’s values and strategies of indoctrination, they do not examine the embodied 
aspects of education in which students and teachers are expected to act out state 
rituals and to perform in particular ways. Like the workplace performances examined 
in Chapter Five, the variety of school-based national performances in the form of 
ceremonies, adornment, activities and songs is striking. They are commonplace 
throughout Indonesia, constitute an integral part of growing up in Indonesia and serve 
as a way of linking the citizenry. However, as with workplace performances, school 
performances of national identity have not been explicitly examined in the existing 
literature. In the context of a Balinese village, Parker (2003: 206) points out the 
‘tremendous coercive power’ schools have over child citizens, who enter school at the 
age of about six as ‘not-yet citizens and come out, three to twelve years later, as 
citizens.’ While she does not adopt the concept of performance in her writing, Parker 
alludes to how Indonesian state education seeks to transform students’ behaviour – 
inside and outside the classroom – to national ideals. 
One anecdote that illustrates how educational experience transforms children 
into citizens was related to me by an Indonesian who had done her graduate studies in 
the U.S. She and the two other Indonesian graduate students at the university were 
asked to perform something ‘Indonesian’ for a university cultural festival. As a Batak 
from north Sumatra, a Chinese-Indonesian from Jakarta and a Balinese, the students 
were stumped as to what they could perform together to represent Indonesia. Finally, 
they decided to perform the only thing they could think of that they were all familiar 
with: they sang a propaganda song about democracy that they had learned in school at 
the height of the Suharto regime. (Field notes, 30 November, 2004) 
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6.2.1 School ritual as performance 
In the 1990s, several sociologists of education including Peter McLaren, 
Richard Quantz, and Peter Magolda integrated the concepts of ritual and performance 
into analyses of education. These scholars critique the existing literature on ritual for 
its emphasis on the spectacular over the everyday, arguing that both the spectacular 
and everyday can productively be examined as types of rituals. It is helpful here to 
provide a brief background on how ritual has been examined in order to show its 
similarities to performance and how, at least to some scholars, these two concepts 
have merged.  
 A 1997 special issue of the journal Urban Review explores ways in which 
ritual can be used as a major organizing concept for analyzing educational practices. 
Richard Quantz and Peter Magolda think of ritual as an aspect of social action in 
which the most ordinary and mundane of activities have the potential to achieve the 
various effects attributed to ritual. They demonstrate this by presenting ordinary 
school activities that are mundane yet can be thought of as ritual moments, such as a 
school assembly and the everyday activities in a science class. In the same issue, 
McCadden demonstrates how the transition from ‘child’ to ‘student’ is ritualized in 
contemporary society through imposed expectations in school and at home. This 
transition parallels the process of transforming a student into a citizen through 
repeated actions. 
 Quantz (1999: 493) is critical of social anthropologists and educational 
ethnographers who, he argues, ‘appear to prefer to listen to what their informants say 
rather than to observe what they perform’ and that rather than drawing evidence from 
interviews with informants, they ought to engage the detailed visual and aural 
descriptions that one often finds in the classic ethnographies of tribal societies. 
Ronald Grimes critiques how educational ethnographies are written in a way that 
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assume[s] the primacy of auditory and visual sensorial and makes no 
systematic attempt to assess kinaesthetic, gestural, and postural dimensions of 
liturgy. It attends primarily to the exegetical meanings of symbols (that is, 
what people say about those symbols), and it ignores their operational and 
positional meanings. (Grimes 1990:195) 
 
In other words, Grimes argues that educational ethnographers prioritize what their 
subjects say over what they do. Similarly, Quantz agrees that scholars have  
favoured the static words of informants to close description of the processes of 
social performance, undoubtedly one of those reasons is that the wide 
literature on ritual has assumed that ritual is not a particularly important aspect 
of contemporary, complex societies. They assume that ritual performances are 
just not as important in modern, bureaucratic, secular schools as they once 
were in communal, sacred tribal societies. (Quantz 1999: 494)  
 
Conducting research in the context of contemporary North American schools, 
Magolda and Quantz (1997) interpret ritual as formalized, symbolic performance that 
cannot be separated from everyday life that includes staging and costumes. They 
make this point through examining several ordinary classroom activities (e.g. a school 
assembly, a high school chemistry class) that may appear mundane, but can be 
understood as ritual and argue that ritual can be thought of as ‘an aspect of action 
rather than as a type of action’ (Magolda and Quantz 1997: 221). Such an approach, 
whether conceptualized as ‘ritual’ or as ‘performance’ allows us to understand how 
powerful cultural messages can be found even in mundane everyday activities. 
6.3 Setting the stage for national schooling 
 This section offers a brief history of pre-Independence education under the 
Dutch and Japanese to demonstrate continuity with post-Independence education 
initiatives.  
6.3.1 Education under the Dutch 
The Dutch in Indonesia were interested primarily in trade and until the 19th 
century, the only schools that were set up in the region were run by Christian 
missionaries, which were exclusively for Europeans, the elite, or for Christian 
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converts. As early as 1775, British colonial policy in India emphasized the importance 
of educating the natives in order to further their economic goals. Through education, 
the colonial British sought to ‘harness the native mind to the new state apparatus as a 
cheap but indispensable carrier of its administrative burden’ (Guha 1997: 167). In 
contrast, the Dutch did not believe that educating its native population would benefit 
their economic goals and did not develop strategies for indigenous education until 
early in the 20th century.  
Spurred on by the advance of democracy in the homeland and a greater 
understanding of the oppressive work conditions natives were subjected to in the 
Dutch East Indies, the Ethical Policy was created in 1901 to address the Netherlands’ 
‘ethical obligations and moral responsibility’ and stressed that the government would 
do its best to provide facilities for native education (Lee 1995). The Dutch came to 
realize that without some Western-type education the Indonesian nobility and village 
heads, upon whom the system of forced cultivation relied, could not be effective. The 
Hague thereupon empowered the governor-general to allocate 25,000 guilders to set 
up schools to train Indonesians for the colonial administration. These prepared the 
children of priyayi [traditional aristocratic class of Java] to become administrators in 
the colonial service (Storry 1979). Even by 1860, ‘native schools did not yet exist in 
the residence of Batavia in 1860’ (De Haan, 260 - cited in Govaars 2005: 40). By 
1865, there was a paltry total of 3,017 pupils in 58 regency schools in Java, all boys. 
In 1893 indigenous education was reorganized into two streams. What the Dutch 
called ‘First-class’ schools were reserved for children of headmen and prominent 
persons and offered a five-year course. Children of common people were placed in 
what the Dutch referred to as ‘Second-class’ schools, offering just a three-year course. 
The people in villages were expected to find or construct their own schools, while the 
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colonial government would provide books, develop syllabi and train teachers. Despite 
the changes, students still consisted overwhelmingly of children of the local ruling 
elite and of European children (Storry 1979). Children of the indigenous elite were 
considered more inclined to study and would reach a level of literacy that would 
enable them to work as clerks, requiring only a minimum of Europeans to govern the 
immense colony (Tarling 2001). While the Dutch used Malay as the lingua franca to 
communicate with the colonized, they used regional languages as the medium of 
instruction in the schools. There were several contradictory reasons for this. First, 
there was a humanitarian perspective that felt that they should be allowed to learn in 
their own language. Second was the more sinister and pragmatic reason of having a 
population that was unable to communicate with one another (Kahin 1952).  
 Another reason the Dutch decided to fund native education was the growing 
Pan-Islamic movement32 in the early 20th century. They sought to counter the Islamic 
influence with a Western education and exposure to European culture and ideals, a 
move the Dutch hoped would attract native support away from the Islamic culture 
(Benda 1958). The few students educated in this system formed a new secular, Dutch-
educated Indonesian elite whose leadership and philosophy of nationalism was guided 
by Dutch ideas rather than political Islam. The Dutch school system encouraged 
indigenous students to behave in Western ways such as attending high school dances 
(Mrázek 2002). Some Western-educated indigenous men came to see their own 
society through Dutch eyes, as dirty and backward (Owen 2005). Also influenced by 
Dutch culture, many wished to date and choose their own wives rather than have their 
marriage arranged for them by their families.  
                                                          
32  The Pan-Islamic movement was an international movement led primarily by residents of colonized countries. 
Rejecting European authority, they sought a united Muslim world that followed Islamic Shari’a law (Laffan 2003). 
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By the time the Japanese invaded and ended the Dutch occupation, the number 
of Indonesians who had attended school was still extremely low despite the efforts of 
previous decades. The Dutch had created very little educational infrastructure during 
their occupation of Indonesia. Immediately after Independence was declared in 1945, 
there were just five senior high schools throughout Indonesia, all of which were in 
Java, one junior high school in each karesidenan (a now defunct administrative area, 
directly below the provincial administration and above the kabutaten, or district 
administration), and one elementary school in each kecamatan sub-district area 
(Buchori 2001). There were just five teacher training schools for elementary school 
teachers (all in Java) and one teacher training school in Jakarta.  
Many nationalists who eventually became leaders after Independence were 
among the few who were given a higher education by the Dutch. Partai Nasional 
Indonesia (PNI), the party that eventually became the government of Indonesia, had 
several highly educated founding members. Sukarno was a graduate of the Bandung 
School of Technology and Tjipto Mangunkusumo, the famed nationalist leader and 
national hero who was exiled and imprisoned for his resistance to Dutch colonial rule, 
was a physician who had attended the Javanese medical school. Other prominent and 
highly educated members of the PNI included Mohammed Hatta, the first vice 
president of Indonesia, who had studied economics in Rotterdam in the Netherlands 
and Sutan Sjahrir, the first prime minister of Indonesia, who had studied law in 
Leiden. 
6.3.2 Indigenous education initiatives during colonial times 
 Education was a source of anger and deep division in the Indies from the 
early 19th century as it occurred late in the Dutch Occupation and was treated in an 
inconsequential and neglectful manner by the Dutch (Govaars 2005). Despite the 
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severe shortcomings of the education system, improving it was not initially a priority 
for nationalists. In the early 20th century, nationalists focused their efforts on 
organizing social and economic projects to improve the lot of the poor. It was only in 
the 1920s that the various nationalist movements prioritized education as a way to 
obtain self-government, preserve traditional values, to ‘invent Indonesians’, and as a 
response to elitism and Eurocentrism in Dutch schools (Owen 2005: 301). 
Mangunpranoto (1976) argues that education was a crucial part of rejecting occupying 
forces and creating a population with an understanding of and loyalty to the concept 
of ‘Indonesia’.   
As it was difficult for most locals to gain access to Dutch schooling, private 
indigenous-run schools sprung up across the archipelago. One of the main indigenous 
school systems that emerged during Dutch colonial rule was pioneered by early 
nationalists. In the 1920s, a school system called Taman Siswa, or ‘Garden of 
Learning’, was created across the archipelago33, fulfilling a need for indigenous 
education (Tsuchiya 1987). Subjects from the Dutch curriculum were taught in the 
Javanese language and the history of Java rather than Dutch history was studied. The 
Taman Siswa schools also had students and staff wear Javanese clothing rather than 
the western clothes the Javanese were increasingly adopting. These schools 
emphasized and strengthened the awareness of a shared national culture and identity. 
Another indigenous educator in the early 20th century, Raden Adjeng Kartini, one of 
the earliest nationalist figures, ‘personified the new social consciousness by her 
efforts to make education available to girls and uplift the status of women’ (Khoo 
1977:15). Similarly, another nationalist figure, Dr. Mas Wahidin Sudiro Husudo, 
focused on producing education for locals, travelling around Java to campaign to set 
                                                          
33 Ki Hadjar Dewantara (1967: 165) states that by 1938 there were between 207 and 250 Taman Siswa schools, of 
which 4 were in Bali, 70 in East Java, 45 in Central Java, 32 in West Java, 49 in Sumatra, 2 in Borneo, 2 in 
Sulawesi, 1 in Ambon and 1 in Ternate.   
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up schools and to collect money for scholarship funds. Through his work as an 
educator, he influenced a group of young medical students who founded the 
organization Budi Utomo [Noble Endeavour] in 1908, which heralded the birth of the 
Indonesian nationalist movement and was dedicated to the promotion of education 
among Indonesians (Dewantara 1967). Religious associations such as Muhammadiya 
set up Islamic schools34 to provide a Muslim alternative to Dutch Christian education 
(Dewantara 1967), believing that their society’s decline was the result of straying 
from the correct practice of Islam (Peacock 1978).  
On Pulau Penyengat, Raja Ali Haji, a well-respected member of the 
indigenous ruling elite, who was a prolific scholar and poet, requested funds from the 
Dutch in the late 19th century to build a school on the island for the sons of the ruling 
elite (Putten 2006). However, Raja Ali Haji was unable to secure the necessary 
funding as he was feared by the Dutch as a fanatical Muslim who was suspected of 
having ambitions to expel the Dutch and take over Riau (Putten 2006). Instead, the 
government school of Tanjung Pinang was opened to ‘children of respectable natives 
and foreign Orientals of the same status’ (Memorie, 1870: 283, cited in Putten 2006: 
256). It was not until the Japanese occupation that a school would be built on Pulau 
Penyengat. 
6.3.3 Education under the Japanese 
Where the Dutch sought to control the native population by keeping them 
ignorant and uneducated, the Japanese sought to control Indonesians using education 
for the purposes of indoctrination. The Japanese introduced mass education open to 
all Indonesians, regardless of class and gender (Thomas 1966). The expansion of 
education was a key strategy to gain Indonesians’ sympathy and support for Japan’s 
                                                          
34 Muhammadiya started in 1912 and had 1,275 schools by 1942 (Peacock 1978). 
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political agenda. While the Japanese had briefly adopted a strategy of Nipponization 
in the initial months of occupation, they realized that simply substituting the Japanese 
language for Dutch was a practical impossibility (Kahin 1952). Furthermore, they had 
learned from mistakes in Manchuria and northern China in the 1930s that rapid 
Nipponization alienated the population. In Southeast Asia, the Japanese quickly 
shifted tack, recognizing that encouraging local values and nationalist goals (at least 
to some extent) would be a more effective strategy in controlling the populace 
(Thomas 1966). While the long-term objective was to gradually introduce Japanese 
language and values, the Malay language, or Bahasa Indonesia, became the official 
language for the administration and for education above the third grade (Alisjabana 
1949; Kahin 1952; Assegaf 2005). As the War Minister Hideki Tojo explained to 
Japanese civil authorities in 1942 before they were sent to administrative posts 
throughout Southeast Asia: 
The secret of governing occupied territories lies in successfully controlling the 
people both physically and psychologically. The objectives of the military 
government can be attained only through our winning the wholehearted 
support of the people of the occupied lands. ... 
 Therefore, we must respect the traditional customs and manners of the 
people in occupied territories. We Japanese are prone to ethnocentrism. ... One 
of our unfortunate traits that has not served us well has been the tendency to 
force others to abide by our particular customs. Many of our past failures in 
ruling other peoples have stemmed from attempts to impose our ways on 
them. (From a transcript of Tojo’s speech, October 1942, cited in Thomas 
1966: 631) 
 
While educational policies were to be implemented by civil administrators who were 
professional educators recruited by the Ministry of Education in Tokyo rather than by 
military men, there were no detailed instructions issued from Tokyo about how 
schools in occupied territories were to be set up and what they were to teach (Thomas 
1966). Each educator was to fashion their school as they saw fit in a way that carried 
out the general goals of the war (Thomas 1966).  
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Although the Japanese influence on schools in the Indonesian archipelago was 
not uniform, there were widespread commonalities. English and French, considered 
the languages of the enemy, were prohibited from being taught and were replaced 
with Japanese language instruction. The Japanese introduced ‘strenuous, time-
consuming physical activities’ and military training for secondary schools (Thomas 
1966: 632) and obligatory manual-labour projects to contribute both to the war effort 
and to community self-sufficiency. Dutch and European history was eliminated from 
curricula and substituted with studies of Asia, and Japan and Indonesia in particular. 
Finally, the Japanese eliminated the socially stratified school system created by the 
Dutch, which separated the children of elite Europeans, less influential Europeans, 
titled Indonesians, non-titled Indonesians, and villagers. Schools based on class and 
racial distinctions were replaced with a single type of school for everyone (Thomas 
1966).  
While Post-Independence education in Indonesia was strongly influenced by 
the Japanese occupation, little has been written on how Japanese schooling affected 
people’s everyday lives. Kahin (1952) notes that in attempting to control the 
population, the Japanese pushed into every village, however he does not elaborate on 
what programs were implemented at the village level, who these affected, and to what 
extent. On Pulau Penyengat, the Japanese had a strong presence and immediately 
established a school and took complete control of the curriculum. While no studies 
have been made of Indonesian students’ school experience during the Japanese 
occupation, from the accounts of seniors on Pulau Penyengat, performance was a key 
component of Japanese education. The Japanese mobilized students to behave a 
certain way to create uniformity, discipline and with the hopes of ultimately changing 
their ideology. McVeigh (2000) has discussed the importance of discipline and 
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uniformity in doing a choreographed set of actions in contemporary Japanese schools, 
describing the militaristic rigour expected during many activities such as exercise. 
Those I interviewed in Pulau Penyengat had similar stories about their education 
under the Japanese, illustrating a dramatic contrast with children’s experiences during 
the Dutch colonial period.  
 It is difficult to evaluate the extent to which the Japanese were successful in 
convincing Indonesian students of their ideology. Because Japan lost the war and has 
been greatly demonized in Indonesian history, Indonesians tend to dismiss any 
positive contributions the Japanese might have made. However, after interviewing 
several seniors, it is clear that at least on Pulau Penyengat, the Japanese were the first 
to introduce a modern education. While locals may not have been convinced by the 
superiority and mythology of the Emperor, children who attended the Japanese 
schools acknowledge that the schools brought discipline, a new range of nationalistic 
performances, and a military rigour to their lives that had a lasting impact on 
Indonesian national education after Independence. 
6.4 Dressing the student-citizen 
It is the start of Ramadan, the month in which many Muslims fast from sunrise 
to sunset. It is also a Friday, the most important day of the week for Muslims 
and the day in which the weekly Senam Pagi Indonesia is performed in 
schools across the country. Although there is still almost an hour until school 
begins, many students are arriving in the school yard. It is a busy month for 
Muslims. Most of the students have woken up before dawn to have breakfast 
and pray with their families and are bored waiting for school to begin. Some 
of the students arrive wearing a batik shirt, their most formal school uniform 
worn on national holidays. Others are wearing the regular formal uniform 
used for the Monday flag ceremonies. Some are wearing their school 
tracksuits, prepared for Senam Pagi Indonesia, the Friday morning 
callisthenics. Still others are dressed in their Saturday uniforms of traditional 
Malay wear, also a symbol of Muslim faith. 
 The students realize that they are all wearing different uniforms and 
ask teachers as they arrive what the proper uniform is for today. The teachers 
are unsure and wait until the principal arrives, who announces that during the 
month of Ramadan it is compulsory for all students to wear traditional Malay 
costumes. Many students go home to change. One boy wearing a tracksuit 
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lives too far away from the school and cannot go home. He sits on the ground 
in the corner of the yard humiliated and crying while he is teased by the other 
children for being bodoh [stupid, ignorant] for wearing the wrong uniform. 
(Field notes, 29 September, 2006)   
 
This scene illustrates the complicated set of uniforms that mark students as 
national subjects. It also reveals the many facets of national identity expressed 
through uniforms, as well as the arbitrary nature of and confusion surrounding the 
state rules dictating which uniforms are appropriate at what time. The Indonesian state 
has a significant impact on the appearance of a great number of its citizens, making 
them into ‘mobile participants in the modern nation-state’ (Nordholt 1997a: 14; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983; Wilson 1985). This section examines national uniforms 
and adornment policies as they are applied in schools on Pulau Penyengat, how they 
have changed since Independence and how they are experienced as a key component 
of the performance of Indonesian identity. This section also suggests that, despite the 
appearance of state hegemony with regards to student dress, the intended meaning and 
significance of the uniforms is altered through negotiation and reinterpretation.  
As discussed in Chapter Five, even before Independence, uniforms were 
assigned great importance in Indonesian society. During the Old Order, school 
uniforms similar to those introduced by the Japanese were worn, with children 
dressed in simple white shirts. On Pulau Penyengat, the standardization of uniforms 
was not thoroughly implemented due to the extreme poverty of many residents in the 
1950s. Adults on Pulau Penyengat recall the simplicity of the school dress code 
during the Old Order: 
Our uniforms were very simple... I just wore a white shirt. We did not have 
these handsome red and white clothes... just a white shirt. ... There were no 
sports shoes like these kids have these days. Many children did not have 




In the New Order, ‘uniform fever’ spread across the nation, as examined in 
Chapter Five (Nordholt 1997b, 1997a). Jakarta’s national vision of a modern, 
developed and orderly society translated into the creation of policies that encouraged 
the standardization and homogenization of its citizenry (Friend 2003). These policies 
resulted in the rapid growth in the number of uniforms and in heightened control over 
when and where each was worn. Each uniform represented a different aspect of 
national ideology and has been maintained in the post-Suharto era, with the addition 
of a Malay uniform for Saturday classes. What follows is the current uniform 
schedule for an elementary school on Pulau Penyengat:  
Table 6 - Pulau Penyengat elementary school uniform schedule 
Monday formal uniform: red and white, including tie and cap, socks must be 
white (Figure 6.1a); for Flag Ceremony leaders: White shirt and 
shorts/skirt, black peci [velvet cap], red cravat (Figure 6.1b) 
Tuesday regular uniform: white shirt, red shorts/skirt, any colour of socks 
(Figure 6.1c) 
Wednesday Pramuka35 [Scouts] uniform: khaki shirt, brown shorts/skirt, tie 
(figure 6.1d) 
Thursday regular uniform 
Friday sports uniform: orange tracksuit (Figure6.1e) 
Saturday   baju Melayu [Malay clothes] (Figure 6.1g) 
Nat’l holidays batik shirt (Figure 6.1f) 
*some students have an additional uniform for supplementary Islamic school 
 
Figure 6.1 - School uniforms on Pulau Penyengat (from left: a, b, c, d, e, f, g) 
 
 
                                                          
35 ‘Pramuka’ comes from the words ‘praja muda karana’, meaning ‘the young people who like to 
work’. Pramuka is the national Scouting organization dating back from Dutch times. Many schools in 
Indonesia, including those on Pulau Penyengat, are involved in Pramuka. On Pulau Penyengat, joining 
Pramuka is mandatory and dressing in the Pramuka uniform is compulsory, although there are few 
activities. Children on the island feel that Pramuka activities are boring as they usually involve a clean-
up project or some other manual labour or make-work project. 
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The purchasing of each uniform is the responsibility of the parents. Since wearing the 
official uniforms is a mandatory component of attending school, children whose 
parents cannot afford to buy them uniforms frequently drop out of school. The many 
costs of school, including uniforms, were reasons commonly cited on Pulau 
Penyengat by people to explain why they had dropped out of school.  
The school on Pulau Penyengat receives regular instructions from the Ministry 
of Education in Jakarta as to what students must or must not wear, what cosmetics and 
accessories are permissible, what hairstyles are inappropriate and explains any 
changes to the uniforms. Pak Sudirman, the principal of one of the schools, shared a 
recent memo with me that banned girls from wearing tops that were ‘too tight’ during 
Friday morning exercises. Another point in the memo banned children from wearing 
‘anything colourful’, including shoes, socks, and accessories (Field notes, 11 October, 
2006). As analyzed in Chapter Five, these efforts create the appearance of order, 
discipline and compliance with the state’s agenda.  
The children I spoke with generally view their uniforms with a sense of pride, 
particularly the younger ones who have been looking forward to wearing a uniform.  
I am six years old so I can already wear a uniform. ... I like to wear it. (Manis, 
13 February, 2006) 
 
Some of the students felt it was ‘modern’ to wear a uniform, as it was only very poor 
or ‘backwards’ children such as the orang laut [sea nomads] who did not go to school 
and therefore did not wear uniforms. 
We wear uniforms to be modern. They are neat and clean and all the same. ... 
If we do not have uniforms we look like poor people or orang laut. (Linda, 13, 
2006) 
 
Several students felt that it was the uniforms themselves that made them Indonesian 
and if they did not wear them, they would not be Indonesian. 
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As Indonesians, we must wear uniforms in school because this is our national 
culture and tradition. In other places people wear other clothes. ... but we need 
to show we are Indonesian, not Chinese, not Singaporean, not Malaysian. 
(Arista, 10 May, 2006) 
 
This comment suggests the performativity of school uniforms as national identity and 
reveals that the uniforms are naturalized as an intrinsic aspect of Indonesianness. To 
Arista, the uniforms are experienced as part of a long tradition that came before her 
and represent a set of assumptions regarding national ideology. 
Despite attempts to impose a homogeneous Indonesian identity upon youth 
through uniforms, there are slippages in how uniforms are maintained that serve, in 
small ways, to thwart the state’s efforts. On one hand, this comes from individual 
students, who forget the rules about what to wear or seek to express another identity 
by altering or adding to their uniforms. For example, several students on Pulau 
Penyengat have started to use gel to style their hair in more daring ways that push the 
boundaries of acceptability as outlined in the recent memo. These ‘deviations’ from 
the norms of national dress are permitted if they escape the notice of teachers or the 
teachers do not see a conflict of interest. During my visits to the school, a group of 
girls took to going to school wearing matching accessories to demonstrate their 
friendship and to visually set them apart from the other students. One day they all 
wore pink socks and matching rubber bracelets and the teachers said nothing. From 
this example, it is clear that the rules in the state’s memo are selectively and unevenly 
enforced. For instance, Pak Sudirman felt that the ‘tight shirt’ rule was not important 
and told me he decided not to enforce the ‘no colourful clothes’ (meaning socks and 
shoes) rule, since he felt it was not important except during Upacara Bendera. When I 
asked about the groups of girls who had worn matching socks and bracelets to express 
themselves, Pak Sudirman laughed and simply said that ‘girls are just like that’ (11 
October, 2006). Such examples indicate that in some cases, state employees have the 
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agency to apply state policy regarding national dress selectively in ways they see fit. 
This also illustrates that far from being a homogeneous all-powerful entity, ‘the state’ 
is composed of individuals who contribute to the imperfect dissemination, 
enforcement and maintenance of national identity. Furthermore, the state’s version of 
national identity is constantly negotiated, challenged, and boundaries are perpetually 
being redrawn. 
Further disruptions to the state’s nationalization strategies were revealed in my 
discussions with children, to whom the meaning behind each uniform was unclear. 
For example, in one discussion group with four boys at a cafe next to the square, I 
asked them about the khaki uniforms they were wearing that day (Group A, 7 April, 
2007). It emerged that the children knew neither what the uniform was called nor 
what it signified. The children knew that all Indonesian students had to wear that 
uniform. One boy was not sure if children in other countries might also wear the 
Pramuka uniform. In an effort to answer my question about their uniforms, the group 
asked over a dozen children passing by on their way home and none knew. The 
children continued to ask passing students until the principal, also the owner of the 
cafe, interrupted to explain that these uniforms were Pramuka, or Scouts uniforms. 
However, while the students did not know the meaning of the uniforms, they did 
understand that the wearing of these uniforms was widespread and that the order came 
dari atas, or ‘from the top’, rather than just from their principal, their kelurahan or 
their province. 
Other children were mildly critical or displayed a lack of enthusiasm for the 




We have so many uniforms – it makes me confused! I do not care if we have 
so many, maybe one or two is enough. One for every day and one for 
ceremonies. Yes, that is enough. (Gary, 13 February, 2006) 
 
In Gary’s comment, it is clear that he does not enjoy wearing all the different 
uniforms, although he does not openly resist. His lack of enthusiasm reveals cracks in 
the state’s hegemony, for if the state was completely successful, Gary would be more 
passionate about the uniforms and what they represent. That Gary continues to 
grudgingly wear a different uniform to school nearly every day of the week suggests 
wearing uniforms is more of an empty performance than a deep commitment to and 
passion for the nation.  
The group’s answers illustrate that while the state attempts to inculcate 
students with nationalist ideology through dictating the clothes they wear on six days 
of the week, the state’s intended meaning can be lost on the students. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, Sen and Hill (2000) make the point that the social, political, and 
cultural context of reception is crucial. As discussed in Chapter Two, they 
demonstrate the impotency of the propaganda on the military’s internet web page 
when no one reads it and illustrate how meanings can be interpreted in a variety of 
unintended ways, as in the example of the U.S. television character MacGyver being 
widely interpreted as a ‘defender of human rights’. Similarly, the boys’ ignorance 
about the uniforms is perhaps not fruitfully understood as resistance, which implies a 
level of conscious decision. It does, however, illustrate how meanings get lost or 
ignored in ways the state cannot anticipate or control. Similarly, the group of girls 
wearing matching socks and bracelets to distinguish themselves and mark them as a 
group do not do so with the intention of challenging national identity but rather to 
perform another identity simultaneously.  
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Parker points out that school uniforms, particularly the ‘smart uniforms of red 
and white, the colours of the national flag’ are ‘advertising the nation-state’ (Parker 
2003: 207). In this observation she makes the valuable point that even if the students 
themselves do not understand the significance or meaning of their ‘nationalized’ 
bodies, they appear united and complicit with the state’s policies to the general 
public, ultimately serving to legitimize and normalize them. Furthermore, the state 
gives off the appearance of being present and active in the community. 
 
6.5 Senam Pagi Indonesia 
As introduced in Chapter Five and in the short ethnography at the start of this 
chapter, Senam Pagi Indonesia is the state callisthenics carried out each Friday 
morning by state workers and students. Since the Japanese occupation, morning 
callisthenics have been a compulsory component of the Indonesian school week. 
While the choreography has changed, the strategy of instilling national ideology 
through assembling all students at every school across the country to simultaneously 













Figure 6.2 – A page from the national Senam Pagi Indonesia instruction manual (1960s) 
 
As can be seen in Figures 6.3 and 6.4, the choreography of Senam Pagi 
Indonesia has changed over the decades. New choreography is constantly being 
developed in Jakarta, along with more contemporary accompanying music so that the 
exercises feel fresh and modern (Agus, 7 May, 2007). If Upacara Bendera is the 
formal, official side of the nation, Senam Pagi Indonesia is the informal and fun side. 
Videos CDs are issued periodically by the Ministry of Education featuring Senam 
Pagi experts in Jakarta teaching the latest moves.  
In contrast to the highly varied way in which Senam Pagi Indonesia is carried 
out by various government offices and across various ranks of civil servants, schools 
on Pulau Penyengat are consistent in organizing this activity weekly. Senam Pagi 
Indonesia is monitored carefully in the schools on Pulau Penyengat, sending several 
teachers per school for periodic training workshops in the provincial capital where 
they are instructed by trained Senam Pagi experts from Jakarta. On occasion, 
someone from the provincial level will come to Pulau Penyengat schools to monitor 
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the exercises and ensure that they are being conducted properly following ‘national’ 
standards (Field notes, 11 May, 2006).   
In Senam Pagi Indonesia, students are lined up in rows in the schoolyard 
facing the flagpole to form a huge grid, like a military drill. The formation prevents 
the children from bumping into each other but also makes it apparent if someone is 
not following the instructions. Teachers, teachers in training, and select senior 
students stand around the edges of the grid, correcting individual students who fall out 
of their line or are getting distracted. Through the spectacle of over one hundred 
children in identical orange tracksuits, the school yard is temporarily transformed into 
a national space.  




















Although writing in the context of fitness classes in Japanese schools, 
McVeigh (2000: 52) conveys an essence these exercises share with Senam Pagi 
Indonesia: 
These squads moved here and there, as if part of a miniature army on 
maneuvers. The point of the exercises seemed not to be to compete against 
each other nor to demonstrate their physical abilities, but rather to learn how to 
take orders, how to be mobilized and how to be moved in small units. 
(McVeigh 2000: 52)     
 
Similarly, the purpose of Senam Pagi Indonesia is less for health reasons than to teach 
students how to follow instructions obediently and how to be mobilized as a unit. This 
is confirmed by the principal as he elaborates on the purposes of Senam Pagi 
Indonesia (11 May, 2006): 
Sarah: Why do Indonesians do Senam Pagi Indonesia? 
Sudirman: We do Senam Pagi Indonesia so that our bodies are strong and we 
are healthy. ... So that children are strong and active. 
Sarah: Why not get the students to play soccer or volleyball or other sports? 
Sudirman: They do other sports as well. Senam Pagi is a way to unite people. 
All of us as students have done Senam Pagi Indonesia. 
Sarah: So Senam Pagi is a type of national strategy? 
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Sudirman: Yes. Students can play volley, badminton, soccer, here and there in 
different places... these are more individualistic. Everyone comes together for 
Senam Pagi.  
 
Rather than being an opportunity for an egalitarian activity, Senam Pagi Indonesia 
reinforces a military-like, regimented social hierarchy which positions the state at the 
top. Students themselves are positioned within the hierarchy, with senior students 
appointed as ‘Senam Pagi masters’ employed in the instruction and surveillance of 
junior students. 
Senam Pagi Indonesia serves as a metonym for the nation: a team of 
individuals who surrender their individuality for the nation, taking instructions, and 
working together in a functional hierarchy. The weekly event reflects broader national 
goals to ‘cultivate a national sports culture and improve the quality of Indonesian 
people’ while ‘cultivating national pride’ (Lumintang et al. 2005: 166-167). Senam 
Pagi Indonesia is performative in that it serves to reinforce hierarchical norms in the 
context of the school. Its repetition throughout one’s schooling serves to convince 
citizens, long after their schooling is over, that the nation and Senam Pagi Indonesia-
like group callisthenics are intertwined.  
Although the school children on Pulau Penyengat who participate weekly in 
Senam Pagi Indonesia have a range of interpretations as to why this activity exists, 
they are all aware that it is an Indonesian national activity: 
Sarah: Who does Senam Pagi Indonesia? 
Group C (13 February, 2006):  
 
Every student and pegawai negeri [civil servant] has to do Senam  
 Pagi.  
Children from primary school up to high school.   
People across Indonesia do it ... every Friday morning. 
As the above comments suggest, there is the understanding that Senam Pagi is an 
activity that is both widely practiced and mandatory. There is also a distinct sense that 
199 
 
it is mandated not by their teachers or their principal but by a higher authority. While 
many were unsure what exactly Senam Pagi was for, some students had several ideas:  
So we can be fit and healthy, not fat.  
Because it is mandatory – every student has to do it. 
Our lessons are very boring! We will be bored and sleepy if we do not 
get to play outside ... like football, Senam Pagi, games... 
Group C (13 February, 2006) 
 
Students’ understanding of Senam Pagi Indonesia reveals that they believe it 
is done for health reasons, for the reason that it is simply a mandatory part of being a 
student, and as a respite from the classroom. Many students enjoy Senam Pagi as 
much as other non-classroom activities. The atmosphere is relaxed and the teachers do 
not reprimand students who do not follow along. 
As with the civil servants, Senam Pagi has become a gendered activity that is 
seen as somewhat feminine. It was apparent that many of the older boys were not as 
enthusiastic about mastering the choreography as the older girls. Despite their 
disinterest and lacklustre participation, the boys were not reprimanded, nor were they 
expected to improve the next week. The most advanced students at Senam Pagi were 
older girls. Some of these girls practiced at home with Senam Pagi VCDs and with 
their friends after school and were nominated by their teachers to act as Senam Pagi 
leaders to stand at the front of the class to lead the exercises.  
The analysis of theatricality in Senam Pagi Indonesia benefits from Goffman’s 
approach to the notion of performance. The yard is temporarily transformed into a 
stage on which all must conform to a set of scripted actions. Offstage in the staff room 
and on the street, no one is watching. The teachers who have decided not to 
participate are ‘offstage’ in the staff room chatting. In contrast, teachers in training 
strategically perform the moves with great care and students who wish to please their 
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teachers make a point of trying hard to gain favour through a strong performance in 
Senam Pagi Indonesia. While the schoolyard is located at the edge of a public path, 
there are no spectators. The performance is primarily targeted at the performers 
themselves. Occasionally, adult members of the community may join Senam Pagi 
Indonesia at the school, not out of a desire to express patriotism, but rather for their 
own health goals: 
We join because we want to be fit. My friend will get married so she wants to 
lose weight! (Zuwirna, 7 May, 2006) 
 
While Zuwirna and her friend are aware that they are in effect sneaking into a national 
activity for schoolchildren, the nationalistic aspect is ignored as they strategically use 
Senam Pagi for their own purposes. Despite a level of consciousness about their 
participation and the purpose of the exercises, there is a subconscious element in 
Zuwirna and her friend’s participation. After years of participating in Senam Pagi 
Indonesia, it is intuitive that the exercises are a viable method of getting fit. As 
discussed earlier, the actual level of fitness required in Senam Pagi is extremely low. 
However, on an unconscious level, Zuwirna and her friend do not question the state’s 
definition of Senam Pagi as ‘exercise’.   
 
6.6 Upacara Bendera 
Upacara Bendera is the most formal and consciously nationalistic of 
performances in which students on Pulau Penyengat engage. The ceremony is 
conducted much like that conducted by civil servants as seen in Chapter 5, with more 
emphasis on the pedagogical aspects of the ceremony. It is conducted with a 
thoroughness and rigour not seen in other aspects of schooling on Pulau Penyengat 
and teachers who are often late in arriving at work are not late for Upacara Bendera 
(Field notes, 11 May, 2006). During the ceremony, students are taught how to behave 
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in a way that is ‘appropriate’ for a national ceremony. They are also instructed on 
national trivia and inculcated with a sense of hierarchy. In what follows, I describe the 
Upacara Bendera at an elementary school in Pulau Penyengat. 
Over one hundred primary school students walk or are escorted on the backs 
of motorcycles through the village to their primary school early Monday 
morning. I am told that classes normally begin at 8:15 a.m. but on Mondays, 
students are instructed to come to school early for the Upacara Bendera, or 
flag ceremony. While this ceremony is performed every week, there is 
confusion as to what time it starts. Some students and teachers tell me it starts 
at 7:30 a.m., others say at 7:45 a.m. Many of the children come to school 
early and mill around in groups with their friends or play games. 
As the children arrive in the school yard, they bend over and press 
their foreheads against the fingers of the outstretched hands, or sayang, to any 
teachers they see in the yard. 
The children are dressed smartly in white shirts and red skirts for girls 
and red shorts for boys, red ties, red and white caps, white socks and black 
shoes. Students playing special roles in the ceremony wear all white, with a 
red neck puff, and black velvet peci, the same ensemble worn by Sukarno and 
Hatta when they proclaimed Independence. The teachers wear their crisp 
daily khaki safari suits (Figure 6.6) or their more formal national uniform of 
matching batik shirts (Figure 6.9). 
 
 





Several teachers and older students are arranging the students in lines at one 
end of the school yard while the rest of the teachers are chatting in the staff 
room. The school has two wings that form an ‘L’ along the large school yard. 
About two thirds of the students stand in lines to form the third side of a 
square, with the other third forming the fourth side of the square. In the centre 
is the flag pole. Most of the teachers are in the staff room having tea while the 
students are being assembled by several of the older students. Once the 
children are in formation, a female teacher shouts loudly across the yard to 
the children in a military style, drowning out the sounds of the other teachers 
socializing. She warms the children up for the ceremony by asking some 
important elements in Indonesian national history36: 
 
Teacher: The founding principle for Indonesia is Panca-.... 
Class: -sila! 
Teacher: And how many tenets are there of Pancasila? 
Class: Five! 
Teacher: and Pancasila was created in? 
Class: ‘45! 
Teacher: Created by President...? 
Class: Sukarno! 
Teacher: And Sukarno is the father of Indo-...? 
Class: -nesia! 
Teacher: Class 1 to 6 – do the ceremony nicely! 
Teacher: Class 1 – do you hear me? 
Class: Yes! 
Teacher: Class 2 - What year did we gain Independence? 
Class: ’45! 
Teacher: What year? 
Class: ’45! 
Teacher: How many years have we been independent? 
Class: 61! 
Teacher: How many? 
Class: 61!  
Teacher: Who said 70? 
Teacher: Anyone who thinks 70? Class 3 – are you ready for the Flag 
Ceremony? 
Class: Yes! 
Teacher: Class 4? 
Class: Yes! 
Teacher: Class 5? 
Class: Yes! 
                                                          
36 The teachers often use a particular method in which the students who are asked shout out answers in 
unison and to finish the last word or syllable of the teacher’s sentence. This has also been noted in 
Bjork’s (2005) book Indonesian Education: Teachers, Schools and Central Bureaucracy in which he 
contrasts methods of teaching at state schools with private schools as well as in Parker’s book From 




Teacher: Class 6? 
Class: Yes! 
Teacher: If you are ready then we will begin the Flag Ceremony! 
 
The only sounds that can be heard are roosters crowing and teachers chatting 
outside the staff room. When the shouting teacher finishes, she and the other 
teachers form a line along one wing of the school facing the flagpole and the 
students across the yard. Four students dressed identically in white line up 
next to, but a distance from the teachers. This line of teachers and students 
forms the Upacara Bendera elite (Figure 6.6).   
 
 
Figure 6.6 - The Flag Ceremony elite 
 
The Komanden, or Commander, of the ceremony is a ten-year-old girl, who 
stands in the line of ceremonial elite holding a microphone. She directs the 
ceremony, reading a standardized introduction outlining the components of 
the ceremony to come. The Komanden orders one of the troop leaders to 
address the ‘troops’ and conduct the ‘inspection’. The student marches until 
she is across the yard in front of the student body. Everyone is silent while she 




Gerak! [March!]  




The Komanden calls on the girl and two boys beside her to begin the flag 
raising part of the ceremony. The girl is the leader and maneuvers them to the 
flag pole with a series of commands. As they are not allowed to march on an 
angle, they walk out into the yard until they are in line with the flag pole then 
make a 90 degree turn and march until they reach the flagpole. There is a 
ceremonial unfolding of the flag. The students attach it to the pole.  
 
 
Figure 6.7 - Raising the flag 
 
 
Komanden: The flag is ready! Salute! 
 
There is complete silence and everyone is very serious. All students and 
teachers salute the flag. I also salute the flag. I have been told earlier that I 
may watch and photograph the ceremony on the condition that I salute for the 
duration of the flag being pulled up the flag pole. 
One of the children formally conducts the students in singing Indonesia 
Raya while the flag is raised. The students in white are pulling up the flag 
slowly to time it with the end of the song. The song is about to finish and the 
flag is hastily yanked up to the top of the pole. The Komanden orders the 
students to stand at ease. Some students are showing signs of restlessness. 
The Komanden begins to read out the introduction to the ceremony 
that she had read earlier until a teacher comes over and tells her what she 
should be reading. She then calls out the five tenets of Pancasila loudly 

















Two boys from the youngest class have placed their caps on backwards and 
are looking around and giggling (Figure 6.10).  
The principal emerges from the lines of teachers and climbs onto a 
wooden box next to the flagpole facing the students. He gives a speech to the 
children about the struggle for Independence.  
It is now uncomfortably hot and the children are sweaty and fidgeting. 
One girl sways back and forth dizzily and a teacher takes her to sit down in 
one of the classrooms under a fan. 
The principal goes on to discuss the ways in which the students can 
improve themselves for their nation. He covers common national themes of 
service to the state, development and national values. He talks about the moral 
obligation the children have to carry out their duties as good citizens, such as 
obeying their parents, improving their bodies through eating healthy food, 
doing exercise, bathing regularly, and improving their minds through studying 
hard, reading books, and not watching cartoons too often. 
A boy tells a teacher he feels sick and is also taken to a classroom to 
sit under a fan. 
The principal continues to lecture the children on their general duties: 
to do their homework, to study English hard so they can be maju [advanced], 
not bodoh [stupid, ignorant]. He gives anecdotes about students who did 
something naughty when they should have obeyed their parents. When his 
lecture comes to an end, about a dozen students are ordered to stand in a line 
next to the flagpole, visible to the rest of the school. These are students that 
the teachers have noticed have not properly obeyed the dress code for Upacara 
Bendera. The boys who had put their caps on backwards were there, including 
several children who had worn colourful socks that day, rather than the 
mandatory white. Another child did not have shoes that were considered 
appropriate. These students are scolded one by one in front of the rest of the 
students until some are close to tears. 
After the ceremony ends at about 8:15, students are given time to rest 
before classes begin. The teachers retire to the staff room for snacks, tea and 
cigarettes and the children play in groups or buy sweetened ice from the man 
who runs a little canteen on the school grounds. Classes should have begun at 
















Figure 6.10 – Minor non-conformity at the Flag Ceremony 
 
The ceremony temporarily nationalizes the space and, for the duration of the 
ceremony, the school yard is referred to as the Lapangan Upacara, or the ‘ceremonial 
field’. Significantly, it is through performance that the space is transformed into a 
sacred, national place. The creation of a temporary sacred national space cites earlier 
ceremonies that, through repetition and over time, have become a normalized 
performance of national identity. There is a sense of exclusivity that sharply 
demarcates who are the performers (those on the Lapangan Upacara) and those who 
are not. Unlike in Senam Pagi Indonesia, members of the public may not join in this 
performance of sacred nationalism. The performers are positioned as being the ‘new’ 
(modern, disciplined, uniformed, powerful) exemplary citizens to which the audience 
(positioned as kampungan, undisciplined, un-uniformed) can aspire. 
Here again, the performers’ bodies are a metonym for the state: they are 
visually homogenous and move together in coordinated, ordered mass. This is 
particularly apparent in national televised Upacara Bendera events broadcast on 
national holidays. Students from each province are chosen to participate in the 
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ceremony in Jakarta. Selections are made based on students’ height and bodily 
dimensions. Successful students are trim and their heights fall within a three 
centimetre range (Agus, 7 May, 2007). The specified height is in the range of about 
165-167 centimetres, a height much taller than average. These official dimensions are 
widely known and exclude most students, particularly in regions with populations that 
tend to be shorter. Significantly, the national ideal does not attempt to be inclusive 
and celebrate a heterogeneous-looking population in Upacara Bendera. In such 
televised ceremonies, the powerful image of hundreds of identical uniformed bodies 
represents the strength of the state.   
Acting out a set of choreographed nationalistic moves has long been a key part 
of the school curriculum. Conscious performance is a strategy many participants 
employ to survive Upacara Bendera without getting noticed and singled out for 
scolding. This conscious level of performance is most effectively demonstrated by 
one of the seniors on Pulau Penyengat in the context of the Japanese occupation. As 
he explains, appearing to respect the Japanese flag and the emperor was crucial to 
surviving national ceremonies: 
I stood up as straight as I could and sang loud. We were not allowed to just 
[mouths words with no sound] you know! We had to memorize them all in the 
Japanese language, which is very difficult… We saw the Japanese flag rise … 
we had to look towards Japan and if we were not very serious and absolutely 
quiet we would be beaten (Pak Hari, August 16, 2006).     
 
What is key in Pak Hari’s recollection is that he performs knowingly, that is, acting in 
a particular way was a conscious strategy. The memories seniors hold of school were 
of performances, the bodily actions they were taught and made to repeat again and 
again against the constant threat of punishment. Each memory involved repetition: 
counting in Japanese in unison, marching, learning how to react to Japanese military 
commands, saluting the flag and so on.  
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Pak Hari’s comments are strikingly relevant to today’s Upacara Bendera. 
Seniors who attended school during the Japanese Occupation were able to sing the 
entire Japanese anthem as well as enact various military moves. Pak Hari suggests 
that many aspects of school after Independence remained the same: 
After Independence ... there were only a few changes at school. We did not 
learn Japanese anymore but we still sang all the same songs – they just 
changed the lyrics into Indonesian.  
 
Pak Hari stands up with his back straight, his face suddenly focused and 
serious, with an expression of solemn pride like a soldier in line for 
inspection. He turns and faces the direction of Japan and loudly sings a 
nationalistic Japanese song, looking off into the distance. He then repeats the 
same song, only this time in Bahasa Indonesia.  
 
See? It’s the same song! So many things we [Indonesians] got from the 
Japanese. ... We still march like this... 
 
He stands up and marches several paces with his back straight. (Paki Hari, 17 
August, 2006) 
 
Pak Hari’s comments reveal that an important aspect of school under the Japanese 
required the active performances of the students and that many of these aspects were 
maintained after Independence. The continuity he describes suggests that when 
national performances in Indonesia were developed, they were citing the already-
familiar performances of Japanese identity. It can be understood as performative in 
the necessity of repetition or ‘citational practices’ (Butler 1997), which perpetuate 
their meaning and maintain the power associated. Through repetition, meanings 
embedded in these performances, such as hierarchy and respect for a higher 
bureaucratic power, are normalized to the performers.  
There is the local sense that the ceremony has remained the same since 
Independence, that despite many changes in political regimes, economics, and so on 
in Pulau Penyengat, the school experience in teaching nationalism has not changed. 
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Sarah: If I watched Upacara Bendera here 30 years ago and again today, what 
would be the difference? 
 
Nothing is different – only the uniforms are more sharp/tidy. (Bu Niar, 7 June, 
2006) 
 
It was the same. Nothing has changed. The ritual is the same as before. But 
now people don’t have as much spirit as they used to and they are not as 
disciplined. The teachers are often late... sometimes even for Upacara 
Bendera! Their attitude is not serious enough ... too “relax” ... too kampung ... 
(Pak Sudirman, 15 February, 2006)  
 
I think the ceremony is more elaborate these days. There is more advanced 
equipment, especially in government offices ... there are speakers, more 
uniforms... Basically it is the same because it is a national tradition. It cannot 
be changed. It is something fundamental to the Republic of Indonesia. 
(Rosyani, 16 February, 2006) 
 
The ceremony is the same ... national rituals cannot change. ... maybe the 
uniforms have changed somewhat but the basic principles and program do not 
change. The ritual reflects the principles of Pancasila ... those cannot be 
changed. ... For example, a school or office cannot change Upacara Bendera. 
There is a standard book where the rules of Upacara Bendera are written so 
we can all be the same, so that the ceremony is standard throughout Indonesia. 
... If we all do different things ... oh no! This means Indonesia will break into 
many pieces! (Haz, 16 October, 2006)  
 
Despite the gravity of Upacara Bendera and the rigid performances expected 
of the children with the threat of punishment, the students do not become nationalistic 
robots. During the ceremony itself, they find small ways of expressing themselves and 
finding humour during what is meant to be a serious, emotional moment of national 
reflection. In Figure 6.10, several students have put their caps on backwards, an act 
that elicited giggles until they were caught and scolded. Also, while the ceremony is 
performed weekly for the duration of one’s education, students often have difficulty 
remembering simple aspects of the ceremony, suggesting that many of them are not 
paying attention. For example, while the five tenets of Pancasila are read out loud 
every Monday at the Upacara Bendera and their school lessons include the study of 
Pancasila philosophy, many students I spoke with could not remember all five tenets 
(Field notes – Group B, 10 May, 2006).  
211 
 
The students chosen to help with the running of the ceremony are selected by 
the teachers. As one teacher says, 
We choose children who are well-behaved and are good in school, do their 
homework with diligence. Children like this, who are responsible and show 
respect for the ceremony... this is important. They need to be taught to respect 
the Red and White... and they need to learn to be disciplined and maju. 
[progressive] ... These students are examples for the others to see. (Haji Tuti, 
11 October, 2006) 
 
 Students who are selected are those who are able to behave in an ideal way: 
subservient and respectful of authority and the students themselves know the 
characteristics needed to be selected as an Upacara Bendera leader: 
Students who are polite and obey their teachers. 
Students who are not naughty and know the rules. 
(Group B – May 10, 2006) 
 
I suggest that through repetitive performance such as in Upacara Bendera 
several concepts are inculcated in students. First, they learn a sense of hierarchy and 
where they fit into this hierarchy. Second, they gain an understanding of what one 
must do to rise in the hierarchy. It is the students who are best able to perform as 
subservient who excel and are asked to represent the school at regional Upacara 
Bendera events on national holidays. This is not to suggest that students are simply 
strategic in their performances in order to advance themselves. Third, despite many 
students’ boredom or strategic engagement with Upacara Bendera, it still 
successfully evokes feelings of national pride and connectedness in the students. This 
illustrates multiple layers of performance that occur simultaneously: one that is 
conscious and, at times, strategic and a deeper, subconscious level at which there is an 
emotional sense of unity and belonging, both of which serve to perpetuate national 
identity and an acceptance of the ceremony as permanent, unchanging and essential.  
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6.7 ‘Ethnic’ education 
As has been examined in Chapters Four and Five, the Indonesian state’s 
philosophy of ethnic diversity is encapsulated in the national motto of ‘Unity in 
Diversity’. This concept has been translated into specific policies designed to direct 
allegiances away from regional identities and inculcate in students a sense of the 
nation. While the Old Order government did not spend a great deal of attention and 
resources on inculcating ‘Unity in Diversity’, the New Order government actively 
‘promoted a new understanding of being Indonesian … premised on being modern, 
classified and orderly. Indonesians could see themselves on display in Taman Mini in 
Jakarta where every ethnic group had its quaint distinctive culture, all joined together 
through the homogenizing experience of a national superculture of modernity’ (Owen 
2005: 238). Since the 1970s, a key part of the national school curriculum has been the 
study of the various cultures in Indonesia. Taken from one of many illustrated 
publications and textbooks depicting ethnicity, Figure 6.11 shows the state’s Taman 
Mini-style understanding of ethnicity through representing each province as a 













Figure 6.11 - 'Unity in Diversity' text (Rahimsyah 2007) 
 
Figures 6.12 and 6.13 depict the ethnic costume displays at the National 
Museum in Taman Mini. Each mannequin couple is dressed in a wedding costume 
representative of their province of origin. While internal variation and diversity exists 
in each province, this is conveyed neither through the displays at the museum nor 
through the state’s philosophy, both of which imply an uncontested, homogenous 


















In this section I examine three aspects of education which serve, through 
performance, to enforce the state’s vision of Taman Mini-style ‘Unity in Diversity’ on 
students: costumes students wear in the National Day Parade, Saturday school 
uniforms, and traditional games taught in P.E. class. These aspects of ‘ethnic 
education’ teach students about Indonesia’s many cultures as if each culture is 
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bounded and exists discretely in its own province. Drawn from the same philosophy 
as Taman Mini, ethnic costumes are a key way by which students are taught about the 
many ethnic groups. This section examines the performative aspects of ‘ethnic 
education’ that occur outside of textbooks and classroom lessons.  
A large portion of parades to commemorate Hari Kemerdekaan [Independence 
Day] consists of high school students. Schools from around the province participate, 
with each school following a program set by the state. Each high school from the 
surrounding islands sends a contingent of students to travel to Tanjung Pinang for the 
parade. Because Pulau Penyengat does not have a high school, students travel to 
Tanjung Pinang daily for classes and in the parade, they participate together with 
classmates from Tanjung Pinang.  
Each school is introduced with a banner carried by students in their formal 
uniforms. The schools looks nearly identical: students are dressed in costumes 
representing various aspects of national ideology such as national sports programs, 
pembangunan programs (as examined in Chapter Five), and ‘Unity in Diversity’. The 
intention of the parade is for students to perform various facets of national identity 
(Pak Acay, 13 August, 2006). The costumes featured in the parade display how the 
state imagines itself and how it wishes to be seen by its citizenry, rather than serving 
as a chance for students to display how they themselves imagine the Indonesian 
nation and what is valuable or special to them about Indonesia.  
In schools that have no libraries or computers, significant resources have been 
allocated towards collecting costumes with which students act out the national 
concept of ‘Unity in Diversity’. The students are selected by their schools to 
participate and there is an attempt to fill each province’s costume set with students 
whose family originates from there. Since there is a high level of diversity among 
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students in high schools in Riau, it is usually possible to have Batak students wearing 
Batak clothes, Javanese wearing Javanese clothes, and so on. However, for other 
costumes of provinces not represented in the student body, students are assigned an 
ethnic costume with the aim of matching their facial features and skin colour to how 
the students imagine the ethnicities look. For example, students whose skin is 
considered dark will be put in ‘tribal’ costumes from the ‘primitive’ provinces. 
Students with lighter skin and more delicate features will wear costumes from Java 
and Bali. One woman in her 20s recalled being asked to participate in the parade 
dressed as a Sundanese (West Javanese) when she was a high school student. 
I was very happy to be asked to be Sundanese! Sundanese women are known 
for their beauty and for their fair skin. ... Thank god I was not asked to be an 
Irian Jayan or Papuan! [laughs] (Veronika, 13 August, 2006) 
 
Racial features are openly assigned value and reflect widely-held assumptions in 
Indonesia about the existence of a hierarchy of ethnicities that links physical features 
and way of life to one’s intellect and potential. 
 What follows is an ethnography of the parade featuring students dressing in 
costumes representing the provinces.   
The parade has gone on for hours with dozens of schools parading hundreds 
of costumed students. It is now past noon and the schools continue to pass. 
There is no shade and it is getting hotter. Yet another high school approaches 
led by a teenage girl wearing her formal uniform complete with tie and cap. 
She is serious and stares straight ahead like a marching soldier and holds a 

















Figure 6.14 - Students display 'Unity in Diversity' at the National Day parade 
 
The students are lined up in rows behind their modern leader. The costumes 
are elaborate and professional. They are not homemade and certainly not 
made by the students themselves. Many of the girls wear elaborate bridal 
make-up. The students do nothing but walk side-by-side in an orderly fashion 
with their costume partner. While they walk, the students chat, but there is no 
vocal component to their performance. 
 Spectators standing around me guess the province represented and 
debate over some they cannot recognize. “...Jambi Province... Bali... Central 


























Figure 6.15 - 'Unity in Diversity' on parade 
 
















Figure 6.17 - 'Unity in Diversity' on parade 
 
This parade demonstrates the state’s control over how ethnicity is expressed 
and illustrates how students are a key part of how the state communicates this to the 
citizenry and to the student performers themselves. In wearing costumes that support 
the Taman Mini-style state philosophy, each ethnicity is equal, but equally superficial: 
culturally diverse provinces – and culture itself – are reduced to material culture, in 
this case, a costume. Students perform a de-politicized pastiche of ethnicity that 
serves to naturalize official nationalism. While the students are clearly conscious they 
are performing an ethnicity (often not their own) through dressing in an elaborate 
costume in public, they are performatively reproducing the state’s ideology.     
This type of public performance of ‘Unity in Diversity’ began in the New 
Order. Due to recent decentralization policies and the formation of Riau Islands 
Province, there has been a heightened sense of ‘ethnic’ identity, albeit in a way that 
tends to fit into Taman Mini-style categories. This heightened sense of ‘ethnic’ 
identity has resulted in recent changes in Pulau Penyengat schools that encourage 
students to perform a version of Malayness. In what follows, I examine a new 
220 
 
addition to the set of school uniforms and new activities in physical education (P. E.) 
classes, two examples of recent strategies designed to enlist students to perform 
national identity through a Taman Mini-style ethnicity in educational contexts. 
The first strategy is the recent addition to the weekly uniform schedule to 
include the wearing of ethnic costumes to school on Saturdays, a policy that was 
introduced in Chapter 5 in the context of state workplaces. Although many children 
on Pulau Penyengat have a parent who is ethnically Bugis, Javanese, Chinese, and so 
on, they are not permitted to wear any other traditional clothes aside from the official 
provincial uniform of baju kurung for girls and the baju Melayu for boys (Figure 
6.1g).  
Students felt that the new Malay clothes were confusing and they were 
worried about wearing the wrong uniform on the wrong day. Many children 
complained about how hot Malay clothes are. However, several teenagers felt that the 
Malay clothes were a good idea and enthused that every Saturday students across 
Indonesia were all wearing different cultural costumes:  
Wearing baju Melayu [Malay clothes] is good – it reminds us of our culture 
and traditions so we do not forget we are Malays. Every Saturday students 
across Indonesia wear their traditional costume... Javanese wear batik and 
kebaya [form-fitting lace blouse], etc. (Ninik, 17 February, 2006) 
 
Children should be proud to be Malay, not ashamed! ... we don’t wear Malay 
clothes everyday because we are Indonesian, not Riau separatists! And Malay 
clothes are very hot! ... We wear baju kurung once a week as a sort of symbol 
of our culture. (Lela, 17 February, 2006) 
 
Why are Malay clothes worn in schools? So that children will know that they 
are Malay – not Javanese, not Batak. (Ina, 18 March, 2006) 
 
The comments about the Malay uniforms convey an element of conscious display. 
This is no longer what people generally wear except on special occasions (wedding, 
funerals, parties, formal wear) and when they wish to project their Malayness.   
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The second strategy is the recent introduction of indigenous games into P.E. 
classes on Pulau Penyengat. Children on Pulau Penyengat no longer play the 
indigenous games their parents and grandparents played in their free time and prefer 
watching TV, doing karaoke in their living rooms, and reading comic books (see 
Chapter Seven). However, local games have become part of the school curriculum 
and part of National Day celebrations. Games such as walking on coconut shells are 
taught to children formally at school on Pulau Penyengat (see Figures 6.18 and 6.19). 
These are simple village games traditionally played by children because the materials 
were easy to find and the equipment could be made by the children themselves. The 
worry of lost culture is tempered by the realization that their children need a more 
modern education that is not available on Pulau Penyengat. 
 











Figure 6.19 - Indigenous games in after school team activities - takro lesssons 
 
Educators on Pulau Penyengat are enthusiastic and somewhat nostalgic about recent 
‘ethnic’ additions to the curriculum. 
This is part of Malay culture. ... The physical education class until now was 
standardized across all of Indonesia – all students were taught approximately 
the same things... Senam Pagi Indonesia, volleyball, etc. So the purpose of 
these cultural activities is to teach something that is local, something important 
to our local culture. (Pak Sudirman, 11 May, 2006)   
 
 Teachers on Pulau Penyengat feel these changes are important:  
Wearing baju kurung is good ... playing Malay games is good... it’s good for 
the children... they will not completely lose their culture. They will be made 
aware of it and hold on to it. (Fatimah, 18 March, 2006)  
 
Through ‘Unity in Diversity’, ethnicity and culture are co-opted by the state 
for nation-building purposes. As has been examined in this section, ‘Unity in 
Diversity’ is played out through the bodies of students on Pulau Penyengat who are 
obliged to perform national identity through a pastiche of ethnic culture. The aspects 
of culture that the state seeks to nurture are apolitical and non-threatening to the 
concept of Indonesia. In the case of student performances of Malayness on Pulau 
Penyengat, Malay culture is reduced to a few activities that make ‘cultural difference 
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a matter of only superficial importance’ (Parker 1992a: 23-24). The message 
communicated is that citizens have external differences in dress and customs, but 
these are not in conflict with their identity as Indonesians, and even serve to underpin 
Taman Mini formulations of national identity. 
 
6.8 Summary 
In this chapter, I have demonstrated how schools are important sites for the 
inculcation of national identity. In addition to curriculum, as explicated by other 
scholars, performance and nation-building in educational contexts in Indonesia are 
intertwined in important ways. I suggest that identities that are already familiar 
through repetition are performatively acted out in a way that serves to normalize and 
constantly recreate them. The four examples of uniforms, Senam Pagi Indonesia, 
Upacara Bendera and ‘ethnic’ education illustrate how the state discourse on national 
identity is not taught simply as a set of abstract concepts in textual form but is also 
expected to be maintained bodily through performance. For example, as 
demonstrated, the Upacara Bendera teaches students about national values and 
history through re-enactments of key moments in national history. Through the 
citation of recognizable acts (made so through repetition), national performances 
serve as a key way in which children imagine the nation and their role in it.  
Through school-based performances, students are also taught their relationship 
to the state and their position in the nation. In my analysis of the empirical examples 
in the chapter, I suggest that a social hierarchy is reproduced in national ceremonies 
that position the student body and staff at various levels in the hierarchy. Those 
placed higher in the hierarchy hold more important positions in national 
performances, as can be distinguished by their clothes and how they are positioned in 
performances.    
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As has been examined, the visual standardization of students is a priority. The 
state has set rules and protocol as to how students should dress and how they should 
behave in an attempt to control and standardize its citizenry. As has been shown in the 
empirical work in this chapter, the attempts at standardization demonstrate that the 
state does not nurture individuality or different interpretations of the nation. The 
individual’s identity is realized through official categories of diversity that serve to 
support the state. The visual standardization of students through uniforms and 
performances also creates the appearance of complicity with the state and the 
impression that state presence is everywhere. 
Through investigating students’ views of the national performances in school, 
it is apparent that, despite attempts at standardization, performances hold multiple 
meanings to the performers. Parker (2002: 3) points out that despite the hegemonic 
way in which the education system has attempted to create Indonesian citizens, the 
hegemony is not total and schools do not always produce ‘clone-like, model 
Indonesian citizens’. The process of inculcating national ideology presents many 
opportunities for ‘slippage’ in the maintenance and perpetuation of national ideology. 
For example, the teachers’ understanding of the national ideology, their ability to 
teach students how to perform as ideal citizens, and the ability of students to 
understand the material all serve to produce variation in the state’s intended version of 
national identity. At times, students misunderstand the intention of state 
nationalization practices and negotiate new local meanings for national performances. 
They may strategically comply or resist or reinterpret official meanings for a variety 
of purposes: to avoid punishment, to impress teachers, or to gain a better social 
standing among their peers. However, through the empirical examples, it is clear that 
the state’s inculcation of national identity has been largely successful. While students 
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may not enjoy the methods of inculcation or may not fully understand all aspects of 
their performances, the key ideas of Indonesian nationalism such as ‘Unity in 






























Today is Sunday on Pulau Penyengat and the sun is sinking below the treeline. 
Crowds have gathered in the square next to the mosque to watch young men 
and boys playing takro with a rattan ball. The spectators socialize and cheer 
when a player kicks his foot over his head and slams the ball to the ground 
over the net. Clusters of people sit on the edge of the stage next to the square 
chatting and watching teenage boys and girls rehearsing a Malay dance. The 
dancers are accompanied by the energetic beat of the gendang, played by 
student drummers and their teacher. Down the street, two teams of middle-
aged women wearing shiny football-style uniforms are playing a game of 
volleyball. (Field notes, 16 July 2006)  
 
 Initially, these activities seem unrelated and appear simply as things that 
residents of Pulau Penyengat happen to enjoy in their free time. However, upon 
further examination, these activities share several common features. The first is that 
they (in their present form) were not initiated by villagers themselves as part of an 
indigenous repertoire of pastimes. All of these activities were introduced at various 
times by the state to induce citizens to spend their leisure time in particular ways that 
link to nation-building. These activities are intended to ‘improve’ the quality of the 
average citizen for national purposes and are maintained by various levels of the state 
through funding and other means.  
The second commonality across these activities is that a high percentage and 
diverse range of citizens are encouraged to participate. High participation is important 
as it is the act of doing that makes the program a success and fulfills the state’s goal of 
changing the conduct of its citizens. To many citizens, leisure activities37 help to 
make the ‘imagined community’ of the nation (Anderson 1991 [1983]) real, tangible 
                                                          
37 In this chapter I adopt Neulinger’s (1981) definition of leisure as describing a state of mind and 
something done voluntarily for pleasure. While people do an assortment of leisure activities including 
sleeping and work-oriented tasks, I focus only on structured play. I define play as something done in 




and understandable in a way that is offered through consent rather than coercion, in 
contrast to the national performances examined in the workplace and in schools in the 
previous two chapters.  
The management of leisure activities has been an important strategy of 
Indonesia’s post-Independence nationalization process that has largely been neglected 
in scholarly work. A study of state-initiated leisure activities will shed light on 
another dimension of the nation-building process in Indonesia and to what extent the 
Indonesian state has carried out programs at the village level in the context of Pulau 
Penyengat. The concepts of performance and performativity are helpful ways in 
which to frame an examination of leisure activities, which, though they may be 
perceived as unstructured, are in fact highly regulated, requiring a set of scripted 
actions, a participating cast, and a particular ‘stage’ designed exclusively or 
temporarily transformed for that activity. Embodied performances in leisure activities 
also frequently play a crucial role in popularly representing and conveying national 
identity to a large and diverse group of citizens. Furthermore, the accessibility of 
leisure activities allows a wide range of people to enjoyably experience the ‘soft side’ 
of the state either as audience or performer.  
In the previous two chapters, I explored performances of national identity in 
the realms of work and education on Pulau Penyengat. In the workplace and in 
educational contexts, performances were intended to produce conformity and 
consistency among the performers according to the state’s national choreography. For 
the performers, the main objective is not to stand out but to blend in. While 
conformity to and mastery over a repertoire of specialized actions in leisure activities 
are necessary, there is also the expectation that these activities serve the pragmatic 
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role as a training ground to scout for potential stars that stand out among their peers 
and who will bring prestige to the nation.  
This chapter broadly seeks to investigate how the Indonesian state has 
extended its agenda of nationalization to the leisure time of its populace. Looking at 
the context of Pulau Penyengat, I examine the everyday leisure activities and 
infrastructure maintained by the state which encourage citizens to use their free time 
in ‘productive’ and ‘appropriate’ ways that support national goals. In the sections that 
follow, I look specifically at sport and dance as two key areas which bring the body at 
play and the nation together. They are also areas in which residents of Pulau 
Penyengat have been, and continue to be, encouraged to actively perform a version of 
national identity through the use of state-funded and maintained recreational 
infrastructure.  
This chapter begins with an overview of the leisure studies literature, 
examining how leisure has been used to improve the individual citizen and in nation-
building. I then examine how sports and dance are linked with nationalism, and how 
scholars of Indonesia have approached leisure. I examine how certain leisure activities 
were linked to the rise of nationalism before a brief overview of recreation during the 
Japanese Occupation on Pulau Penyengat and in Indonesia more broadly.   
Next, I focus on four leisure activities introduced by the state on Pulau 
Penyengat: volleyball, takro, Gerak Jalan [marching competitions], and dance. I 
examine how the Old and New Orders used recreation for national purposes and to 
what effect, while linking changing national ideology and developments in Jakarta to 
the remote village context of Pulau Penyengat. I pay particular attention to the wave 
of developments in the post-Kepri era and how leisure activities are once again being 
employed to encourage performances that reflect a national ideological shift.  
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Finally, I turn to how the population has responded to these programs. While 
sports and performing arts programs are just as much a part of official notions of 
national identity as the more formally regulated performances seen in Chapters Five 
and Six, they are understood by villagers as being more voluntary and enjoyable than 
those in the realms of work and education and are therefore challenged in rather 
different ways. In the context of sports and dance on Pulau Penyengat, it is more 
relevant to examine how villagers reinterpret and ignore official activities rather than 
framing the analysis in terms of resistance. Throughout each chronological section, I 
examine the people who are targets of recreational programs as well as the particular 
activities that have, over a host of other possibilities, been selected for development 
by the state. 
By focusing on the leisure activities introduced by the state rather than on 
indigenous or popular leisure activities, I do not wish to suggest that it is only through 
state-initiated activities that national identity is understood and performed. Several 
scholars of Indonesia have pointed out various leisure activities that have emerged 
from popular culture to take on national meaning. For example, Jeremy Wallach 
(2008) has examined dangdut music as a popular pastime that has become a 
grassroots symbol of national identity. In this chapter, however, I focus only on 
activities that reach villagers in Pulau Penyengat through state programs and are 
recognized as ‘national’ by the villagers themselves.  
 
7.2 Leisure and population improvement 
 
After many calls over the past two decades to bring scholarly attention to 
leisure (Hargreaves 1986; Bale 1993; Brownell 1995; Bale 1996; Rojek 1999; 
Brownfoot 2000; Bale and Cronin 2003; Bale and Vertinsky 2004; Rojek 2005), there 
is now a burgeoning literature that examines a range of leisure activities from a 
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variety of disciplinary perspectives. In A History of Leisure Studies, Peter Borsay 
(2006: 1-2) roughly delineates the various categories of experience through which we 
live our lives as work, education, religion, civil life (which includes politics and 
voluntary work), and ordinary life. He then defines leisure as ‘what is left once these 
categories have been removed’. Up until the 1960s and 70s, leisure studies tended to 
take a ‘sunny view of leisure as a melange of personally life-affirming, wholesome 
relations that expand social harmony and order’ (Rojek 2005: 12). In more recent 
decades, leisure theorists have explored more critical questions of domination, 
oppression and manipulation in leisure forms and practice. Scholars of leisure are now 
interested in understanding ‘how we are variously positioned in leisure forms and 
practices and how power relations permeate our motivation and experience of leisure’ 
(Rojek 2005: 12). 
Much of the work in leisure studies has been carried out by cultural studies 
scholars (Shaw 1994; Grossberg 1997; Morley 1998), historians (Bailey 1978; Burke 
1995; Huggins 2000; Borsay 2006), sociologists (Jarvie and Maguire 1994; Rojek 
1999, 2005) and anthropologists (Giamatti 1989; Dyck 2000; Springwood 2000), yet 
this body of scholarship is inherently geographical in that it prioritizes the place and 
context of these activities and offers an embodied way of understanding identity and 
social interactions. Recent work in cultural geography speaks to the leisure studies 
literature, although it does not explicitly make this connection. In David Matless’s 
Landscape and Englishness (1998), for example, he writes in detail about the 
emergence of leisure activities such as hiking and dancing, how they are linked to 
place and identity and how the state attempted to shape its citizenry through creating 
or designating particular places in which the populace was ideally intended to engage 
in appropriate leisure activities. The geographical literature on sports has contributed 
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an understanding of how sport is linked to place, location and landscape. In his 
extensive writing on sports geography, John Bale and others (Bale 1989, 1993; Bale 
and Moen 1995; Bale 1996; Bale and Sang 1996; Bale and Cronin 2003; Bale and 
Vertinsky 2004) consider variations in sports across regional and national borders and 
ways in which sports have influenced the cultural landscape. However, the general 
omission of sports and leisure from the geographical literature, is ‘peculiar and 
paradoxical because geography, like sports, involves the analysis of space and place’ 
(Bale, 1993: 5). While the imbalance has begun to be addressed in recent decades, it 
has frequently been noted that there is a strong western bias in the literature with 
‘information on the other continents … at best fragmentary, often collected in wide-
ranging surveys’ (Van Bottenburg 2001: 13; Brown 2006). Furthermore, the 
geographical literature on sport lacks a depth of critical analysis in its tendency to take 
a ‘Carl Sauer’ approach by focusing on categorizing sports and their location patterns. 
Sports geography has generally focused on the historical and geographical roots of 
modern sport, the growth and globalization of sports, and the physical location of 
sports (Bale 1978, 1982, 1986; Brailsford 1987; Bale 1989, 1993; Bale and Moen 
1995; Bale and Sang 1996; Bale 2003; Bale and Vertinsky 2004). Literature in recent 
years has begun to address the more cultural aspects of sports, treating sports as an 
aspect of cultural life akin to film, music, cinema, and so on (Bale and Cronin 2003). 
 As Morris (2004: xv) observes, ‘the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries defined a period when the “problem” of the body and the “problem” of 
nationalism came together in complex and interesting ways.’ Leisure activities have 
the unique capacity to simultaneously change the bodies and minds of individuals and 
to effectively bind people as a nation. For the purposes of my thesis, I am interested in 
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how leisure activities on Pulau Penyengat have been used by the ruling elite for the 
two inextricably linked purposes of improving the individual and nation-building.  
 
7.2.1 Improving the individual through play 
Leisure activities have long been seen as an opportunity to ‘improve’ the 
quality of citizens’ bodies and conduct for national purposes, including improving 
morals, cultivating discipline, redirecting aggression, and building physical strength. 
Scholars from a range of backgrounds have examined bodily improvement in various 
empirical contexts, most frequently Europe (Krüger 1987; Kershaw 1998; Mangan 
1999, 2000; Gori 2004), the USSR (Makoveeva 2002), China (Morris, 2004), and 
colonial Asia (Brownell 1995; MacDonald 1999; Brownfoot 2000; Mills and Sen 
2004). In many of these contexts, scholars have examined how bodily improvement 
was believed to most effectively occur through fitness and sport, and to a lesser 
extent, through dance. The Soviet philosophy viewed ‘the development of sports as a 
way of overcoming human imperfection’ (Makoveeva 2002: 9). In the context of 
Victorian England, Bailey (1978) writes that ‘improved’ bodies toughened people up 
against the debilities of city life, maintained a readiness for armed service, and taught 
self-discipline in teamwork. Nazi Germany is an illustrative example of the belief that 
the individual’s body and the state were closely linked and advocated rigorous 
physical training in schools: 
the folkish state must not adjust its entire educational work primarily to the 
inoculation of mere knowledge, but to the breeding of absolutely healthy 
bodies. The training of mental abilities is only secondary. And here again, first 
place must be taken by the development of character, especially the promotion 
of willpower and determination, combined with the training of joy in 
responsibility, and only in last place comes scientific schooling. (Hitler 1961: 
408) 
 
Furthermore, there was the underlying notion in Nazi philosophy that physical 
education and sport were not simply performed by the individual for individual fun, 
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relaxation or prestige, but rather as a national duty in the service of the nation-state. 
(Krüger 1987: 8) 
As body improvement is the target of many state-initiated leisure activities, the 
body has also been a particular focus in the area of postcolonial discourse and 
analysis. In The Rhetoric of Empire David Spurr (1993: 22) emphasizes how ‘the 
body of the primitive’ was an important way by which the colonized were represented 
and argues that ‘the body, rather than speech, law or history, is the essential defining 
characteristic of primitive people’. Others point out that colonial travel writers were 
aware of the bodies of the colonized and that ‘physique was a particularly important 
theme in the European construction of the athleticism of various groups of people in 
the colonized world’ (Bale and Cronin 2003: 2).  
Not only can bodies be improved through play, but conduct can also be 
shaped. Sally Anderson (2003) examines how inner city children in Copenhagen 
receive instruction about how to effectively strike the shuttlecock, but also in how to 
comport themselves in an appropriate manner according to current Danish values and 
ideals. In the context of the Soviet Union, Edelman (1993: 3) observes that ‘sports 
events in the USSR had been organized with the official goal of instilling discipline, 
order, and culture in the masses. Well-trained and obedient athletes were supposed to 
serve as examples for those who watched’. According to the Victorian view, there 
was a link between morality and physical virtues. Sports were seen as a means of 
‘character formation, of training captains of industry and empire in such character 
traits as loyalty, self-discipline, competitiveness and leadership ensconced in an 
unwritten code of sporting ethics’ (Riordan 1991: 10). During Victorian times, 
English boarding schools such as Harrow and Eton ‘considered playing a rough game 
with strict rules a way to teach discipline and endurance’ (Colombijn 2000: 174). 
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Similarly, Edwin Dingle, writing in England in 1908, argued the benefits sport offered 
in shaping one’s character (Motor Car and Athletic Journal, March 1908, p. 5. Cited 
in Brownfoot 2000: 131): 
It is generally conceded that nothing has a more beneficial or permanent effect 
in the formation of character than participation in health giving sports. … The 
youth is taught self-reliance and self-restraint, alertness and quickness of 
decision, the spirit of healthy rivalry and the more generous instincts of a true 
sportsman, ready to admit defeat from a better man. 
 
Similarly, a British missionary in Kenya wrote that:  
a game of football in the afternoon was played for moral benefit as much as 
recreational relief … to stiffen the backbone of these boys by teaching them 
manliness, good temper and unselfishness – qualities amongst others that have 
done much to make them a Britisher’ (Bale and Sang 1996: 77).  
 
Altering the body through fitness became a key strategy by both state and empire for 
transforming the ‘lazy’, ‘undisciplined’ subjects with local loyalties into strong, 
disciplined citizens with a single, common purpose (Alatas 1977).  
 
7.2.2 Nation-building through sports 
Leisure activities have long been considered to be more than pleasure-bringing 
pastimes and have been recognized by ruling elites as an effective tool for binding 
people and redirecting loyalties. In Victorian England physical recreation was 
endowed with ‘a battery of serious purposes … thought essential for the continued 
success of the Anglo-Saxon civilisation’ (Tranter 1998: 2). Alan Guttmann (1994: 5) 
quotes a headmaster of Harrow School from 1881-1895 as saying that ‘it is written 
that England has owed her sovereignty to her sports.’ Leisure and recreation are seen 
as important ways in which to reach the ‘masses’ in a way that engages them 
physically, that allows them to participate or perform their citizenship to the nation. 
As Tarling (2001: 288) argues, ‘tied to the nationalist cause, and indeed to 
‘development’, was a sense of popular participation.’ Brownfoot usefully highlights 
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the multiple scales at which sports operate through her study of the British in Malaya. 
Sport was seen as a crucial tool with which to bind the British living in Malaya 
together and was ultimately ‘advantageous to the individual, the group, the wider 
community and the Empire’ (Brownfoot 2002: 131).  
After gaining independence, many former colonies saw the political potential 
in sports. A successful national team encourages citizens, who would otherwise have 
few opportunities for participation in national politics, to identify with the nation 
(Houlihan 1997; Colombijn 2000). For example, Castro realized the political potential 
of sports when he heralded Cuba’s Olympic success as ‘a sporting, psychological, 
patriotic and revolutionary victory’ (Fidel Castro, El Deporte 3 1976 p. 1, cited in 
Riordan 1992: 7). As part of the strategy to transform and modernize the population, 
the leaders of Indonesia, like many former colonies, turned to sports immediately after 
Independence (Bale and Cronin 2003).  
Many Marxist historians share the belief that modern sports emerged during 
the industrial revolution as a way to mould people into better workers. This argument 
follows that sport was introduced to the working class to raise the productivity of the 
workforce as sport emphasized ‘special motor skills, competition and leisure’ 
(Rigauer 2000: 34). Others contend that sports have a depoliticizing effect on society, 
inducing political apathy and reproducing culture in a way that supports the needs of 
capitalism (Althusser 1971). Brohm (1978) argues that sport and recreation practices 
are part of a structure in which the dominance of the elite is secured and reproduced. 
According to this argument, political inclinations are replaced with passion for 
supporting sports teams, thus serving to depoliticize the workforce.  
On the other hand, in Alan Guttmann’s book Games and Empires (1994) 
which examines how sport was intertwined with imperial strategies, he demonstrates a 
236 
 
great deal of evidence that links modern sports to political movements. For example, 
he points to various nationalist and politically-motivated gymnastic clubs in 19th 
France and Germany whose philosophies of exercise stemmed in part from a 
preparedness for action and a desire to avoid military defeat. In fact, one gymnast club 
was perceived as such a legitimate political threat that it was banned by the Prussian 
Empire. As Morris (2004) points out, there are striking parallels between fitness 
regimes in a broad spectrum of state regimes: ‘Body discipline of various kinds … is 
integral to imperialism and to the way in which various kinds of nationalism 
developed in the postcolonial world’ (Morris 2004: xv).  
In the case of Indonesia, the development of modern sports associations was 
key in both the local struggle for independence and the Republican nationalists’ 
strategy for securing legitimacy, international support, and respect. Indonesia’s leisure 
and recreation philosophy reflects broader international trends. While Indonesia’s use 
of sport in nation-building parallels that of other former colonies, Indonesia has had a 
unique combination of foreign influences whose presence continued to be felt during 
a time when Indonesia was deeply engaged with building a national identity. 
Proponents of sports studies argue that it is through sports that bodies are 
frequently linked to power structures (Brownell 1995; Sands 1999; Morris 2004; 
Hargreaves and Vertinsky 2007). This is particularly the case in postcolonial 
countries, where sport is a legacy of colonialism. Many countries, including 
Indonesia, owe many of their present-day sporting traditions to colonists who brought 
modern sports to the colonies, often initially as a form of social control both for 
indigenous populations and colonizers. As Bale and Cronin (2003: 5) point out, sport 
was ‘part of the “civilizing” mission of imperialism, and thus an essential part of the 
colonial experiment.’  
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Sport is a key part of Indonesian national culture yet has garnered very little 
attention to date from social scientists. Considering the importance of sport in 
Indonesian society in terms of the number of participants in all levels of sports, the 
vast numbers of spectators, the state commitment, and the amounts of money 
involved, the paucity of studies which examine sport is striking. Furthermore, most 
histories of Indonesia hardly mention sports activities, despite the fact that this is an 
area rife with class tensions and racial assumptions, and actively involves the bodies 
of the citizenry in their everyday lives. There have only been three recent accounts 
published in English about sport in Indonesia38. The first is Freek Colombijn’s (2000) 
paper on ‘The Politics of Indonesian Football’, the only paper to date that explores the 
development of Indonesian football over the past century. In examining football, he 
observes continuity across the colonial period, the Old Order, and the New Order in 
how all sides have politicized football by using it as an instrument for political goals. 
Colombijn points out that the study of sports is crucial to understanding nationalism 
in Indonesia and that further research is needed in this area. The second is Iain 
Adams’s (2003) descriptive essay in the edited collection Sport in Asian Society: Past 
and Present called ‘Pancasila: Sport and the Building of Indonesia – Ambitions and 
Obstacles’ in which he provides a broad overview of the development of sport in 
Indonesia. His decision to examine sport through the lens of Pancasila is ultimately 
unsuccessful as the two are not convincingly connected in any meaningful way. While 
Adams correctly argues that sport has been an integral aspect of Indonesian nation-
building, structuring his argument through Pancasila proves too limiting and does not 
help us to better understand the interplay between politics, nation-building and 
                                                          
38 Two earlier studies by Pauker (1965) and Sie (1978) focused on the formation of GANEFO (Games of the New 
Emerging Forces). GANEFO, consisting of only ‘emerging nations,’ was established in Indonesia in 1962 as a 




Indonesian sport. The third is Colin Brown’s (2006) paper ‘Playing the Game: 
Ethnicity and Politics in Indonesian Badminton’ in which he provides a descriptive, 
historical account of the development of Indonesian badminton and how racial 
politics with Chinese Indonesian have been played out in the context of badminton. 
These scholars argue that much more attention still needs to be paid to sports in 
Indonesia as its national history can effectively be told through the development of its 
sports. This can be seen in the many international influences on Indonesian sport, 
which is linked to leisure and fitness philosophies from Europe, Japan, and the 
Communist world.  
 
7.2.3 Dance and national identity 
Over the last decade, dance has also been explored as an activity in which 
national identity is performed in various contexts including South America 
(Savigliana 1995; Archetti 1999), Britain (Matless 1998; Foley 2001), Asia  
(Hitchcock 1998; Talamantes 2006; Cohen 2007; Cohen, Royo, and Noszlopy 2007), 
native American communities (Axtmann 2001), and in immigrant communities 
(Goldstein 1998).  
Indonesia has been the subject of several recent articles which examine how 
dance and national identity are intertwined. As the state has striven to modernize, 
develop and unite a diverse population, dance has been a target of state policies of 
‘folklorization’ and ‘exoticization’. ‘Folklorization’ refers to the relocation of 
indigenous customs from their original settings to new contexts, usually under the 
direct sponsorship of the state and ‘exoticization’ refers to the ‘selling’ of customs 
either to a tourist market or its own populace (Urban and Sherzer 1991). At the same 
time the Indonesian state has sought to homogenize national identity through its 
national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika [Unity in Diversity] (Picard and Wood 1990). 
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As Soedarsono (1968) writes, the national motto negated the individuality of 
Indonesian cultures in a way that affected traditional dance. The state sought to 
‘dispose of its old-fashioned characteristic,’ shifting dance from traditional sites of 
temples and palaces to secular public spaces (Talamantes 2006: 366). As a result of 
these changes, tensions have emerged between the locals and the state that have been 
explored in several recent papers. 
Talamantes (2006) examines how local dance in Bali can serve to contest 
national policies on dance and circumvent the state’s efforts to establish a pan-
Indonesian identity. With the rise of cultural tourism in Bali, the government and 
ruling elite adopted policies that both protected and marketed dance in Bali in an 
effort to gain control over the production of dance. As a result, dance has been 
institutionalized, codified, and standardized in a way that was more in response to a 
‘pan-Indonesian stride toward modernization and development rather than to local 
cultural and religious requirements’ (Talamantes 2006: 365). However, certain dances 
have remained intertwined with religious practices and dancers have borrowed and 
modified outside (state) influences without breaking allegiance to ancestral traditions. 
Despite sharing some similarities with sport, dance and sport have seldom 
been brought together in academic study. The most significant contribution to bring 
sport and dance together has been made by the social anthropologists, Noel Dyck and 
Eduardo Archetti. In their edited collection, Sport, Dance and Embodied Identities 
(2003), they treat sport and dance as ‘ethnographically distinctive but analytically 
commensurable forms of body culture and social practice’ (Dyck and Archetti 2003: 
1). While they observe that sport and dance have conventionally been viewed in the 
West as residing within separate and even opposed cultural realms, they point out that 
both are ‘techniques of the body’ (Mauss 1973) and have a vital capacity to ‘express 
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and reformulate identities and meanings through their practised movements and 
scripted forms’ (Dyck and Archetti 2003: 1). Both sport and dance can arouse 
widespread participation and varied interpretations by performers and their audience. 
Furthermore, they are not merely entertainment and recreation but are powerful tools 
for ‘celebrating existing social arrangements and cultural ideals or for imagining and 
advocating new ones’ (Dyck and Archetti 2003: 1).  
 
7.3 The Development of leisure in the Indies 
7.3.1 Pre-rationalized leisure 
‘…it may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalization of society or of 
culture, but to analyse such a process in several fields, each with reference to a 
fundamental experience’ (Foucault 1982). 
 
The story of the rationalization of leisure begins in Europe, where 
industrialization brought about a shift in many areas of culture including leisure 
activities that was characterized by modernization and rationalization (Bale 1993). 
Some scholars contend that the very concept of leisure emerged out of the particular 
conditions of industrialization, giving rise to the distinct spheres of work and leisure. 
John Clarke and Chas Critcher (1985: 85) observe that the concept of leisure cannot 
be separated from work:  
looking overall at the trends evident by the 1840s, the clearest impression is of 
the wholesale changes in the rhythms and sites of work and leisure enforced 
by the industrial revolution. It was during this period that what we have come 
to see as a discrete area of human activity called “leisure” became 
recognizable. 
 
Others believe that the rupture created by industrialization has been overstated in the 
transformation of leisure time. Peter Borsay (2006: 9; see also Burke 1995) rejects the 
hypothesis that there is a fundamental discontinuity between pre-industrial and 
industrial society in Europe: 
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Though transformations of a radical nature in the form and character of leisure 
have occurred, there are also underlying continuities … which make it 
permissible to examine the same category of experience in 2000 as in 1500.  
 
While not to deny a greater rationalization of society, Borsay (2006) takes the 
approach that there are shared qualities in leisure activities such as music, games, 
festivals, and so on that reveal a frame of mind similar to today. While leisure may be 
able to be understood as a category prior to the industrial revolution in Europe, it is 
widely accepted that the fundamental nature of leisure activities greatly changed 
during this time. Many aspects of life grew increasingly rationalized and there was a 
‘general sportization of pastimes’ (Elias 1982). Bale (1993: 13) writes about this shift 
in the context of football in Europe:  
...football in medieval and pre-modern Europe was much more a form of play 
and carnival than of seriousness and sport. Its fun-like character was reflected 
in the landscapes in which it was played. No specialized sites existed for 
football; it was played, not simply in places usually used for other activities, 
but also while other activities were going on. The sixteenth- and seventeenth-
century marketplace and street, for example, were environments not simply for 
transportation and movement but also for a wide range of other activities, 
including play. Hogarth’s Night showed the street as an untidy place, work and 
play being spatially intertwined. The street was a meeting place and a market 
place, a place for refuse and for refuge, a place for washing and eating; it was 
also a place for entertainment and playing, with street football being one of the 
things that was played. 
 
Similar observations are made by Brown (2006) in his discussion about the 
development of badminton in Indonesia. Badminton in the 19th century, he argues, 
was ‘as much about entertainment as about physical exercise or participation’ and 
pasar malam [night market] would stage tournaments (Brown 2006: 74). As Brown 
(2006) points out, badminton was played in the 19th century in the carnivalesque 
environment of the night market, indicating that at that time, the sport was present but 
not yet rationalized. Bale (1993:15) observes that  
during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries society at large experienced 
a growing rationalization and geographic confinement, such space-
consciousness accompanying a growing time-consciousness among the 
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population, associated with the rise of capitalism. An increasing division of 
labour was accompanied by an increasing division of space and time. There 
was a time for work and a time for play; there were also to be specific places 
where various activities, previously found in streets and on commons, could 
now be undertaken in the emerging “carceral city”. 
 
While a range of leisure activities existed in Indonesia prior to the Dutch 
colonial occupation, they were not organized by the leadership but by individuals. 
Traditional leisure could be described as ‘localised in its geographic range, irregular 
in its availability and timing and largely devoid of institutional structures and 
commonly accepted written rules’ (Tranter 1998: 1). Activities in this era were highly 
localized, styles and rules varied from place to place and the venues for activities had 
many other purposes, in contrast to rationalized leisure examined in the next section. 
In the Malay world, including the Riau Islands, many pastimes required craft skills 
and manual dexterity, such as kite flying, top spinning, races on bamboo stilts and 
takro (Brownfoot 2000). While nothing has been written specifically on the leisure 
activities of Pulau Penyengat or of Riau, the above activities were popular with the 
common folk, in addition to music and dance, as evidenced by the stories of old 
timers on the island. Due to the close relationship to the sea, villagers in Penyengat 
have also traditionally engaged in fishing and boat racing in their free time 
(Colombijn 2000). ‘Blood sports’ such as cock fighting were common as well as other 
forms of gambling (Adams 2003). In the colonial and pre-colonial eras, the elite of 
Pulau Penyengat, as with Malays in other parts of the Malay world, were highly 
literate and enjoyed writing poetry in their free time (Putten 2002, 2006).  
 
7.3.2 Leisure and the nationalist movement 
Many Dutch leisure activities gained favour with Indonesians as they gained 
exposure to Dutch culture (Mrázek 1997). Youths attended dances, Dutch fashion was 
widely adopted in urban areas, and many began to play Dutch-introduced sports such 
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as football, swimming and badminton (Mrázek 1997; Colombijn 2000). Not 
surprisingly, this emulation of Dutch culture became highly politicized by the 
colonized and roused the passions of nationalists of all stripes. Many felt the Dutch 
were corrupting the youth and luring them into forgetting their own culture (Nordholt 
1997b). Long before independence, leisure activities frequently play a role in 
emerging nationalism (Tuastad 1997). In recent years, scholars of Indonesia have 
examined the relationship between leisure and the nationalist movement through such 
activities as sports (Colombijn 2000; Adams 2003; Brown 2006), theatre (Asmara 
1995; Bodden 1997; Hellman 2003; Bodden 2007), music (Yampolsky 1989; 
Simatupang 1996; Wallach 2002),television and media (Kitley 1997, 2000; Sen and 
Hill 2000), wayang kulit (Hatley 1982; Nagy 2006), clothes (Nordholt 1997b; Siegel 
1997; Mrázek 2002) and theme parks (Pemberton 1994; Siegel 1997; Errington 1998; 
Hitchcock 1998).  
During the struggle for Indonesian Independence and in the following years, 
there was a strong link between nationalist activities and sport. Sports were an 
important part of the nationalist movement starting from the 1920s when the creation 
of sports facilities and programs were prioritized by young nationalist groups. Sports 
became a way to express identity, to perform, and to instil key values and ideology in 
the bodies of supporters, and the decades before WWII saw a dramatic increase in the 
proportion of the (male) population seeking out organized sports, particularly football. 
As the nationalist movement was driven primarily by youth, many nationalists took 
advantage of the popularity of many recreational activities by targeting youths and 
sought ways to influence them (Adams 2003). One of these ways was through the 
creation of sports clubs that emerged as centers of resistance to colonial rule, carrying 
out nationalist activities and inculcating members with concepts of nationalism and 
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independence. Adams (2003: 297) argues that ‘in some ways the independence and 
nationalistic fervour of Indonesian youth was kindled through sport’. To many 
nationalists, engaging in nationalized sport was seen as a political act since 
participation rejected colonial racial and class hierarchies. While sports in 
(post)colonial contexts are frequently discussed as hegemonic, this view does not 
fully recognize the complex range of ways in which sports have been used locally by 
nationalists.  
In 1930 seven teams of indigenous football players formed a national 
association, Persatuan Sepakbola Seluruh Indonesia (PSSI), ‘All Indonesia Football 
Federation.’ The Malay name indicated an exclusively indigenous membership and 
the use of ‘Indonesia’ rather than ‘Hindia Belanda’, or the ‘Dutch East Indies’, the 
Dutch colonial name for the archipelago, betrayed nationalist sympathies (Colombijn 
2000). While this association was limited to Java and had no interaction with other 
areas of the Indies, the fact that PSSI took ‘the boundaries of the colony as the 
potential limits of the football federation, must have had a role in imagining the nation 
as a community’ (Anderson 1991 [1983]; Houlihan 1997; Colombijn 2006: 183). 
Youth groups in Palembang used football clubs as camouflage for political activities 
(106, cited in Zed 1991; Colombijn 2000: 183) , making ‘the dividing line between 
the moderate nationalism movement playing football and a football association 
supporting nationalism … blurred’ (Adams 2003).    
While not all nationalist groups in Indonesia placed emphasis on sports in their 
attempts to construct a nation, the Republican leaders in independent Indonesia shared 
a deep faith in modernity and progress that guided policy. They borrowed heavily 
from colonial understandings of human progress. Indonesian national development 
started with the Dutch-derived assumption that the Indonesian populace was 
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incomplete and required the intervention of external forces to produce the conditions 
for both material and social advancement (Du Bois 1991). The effect of Dutch 
colonialism has been built into the notions of race, progress, modernity and 
development as hierarchies (Pieterse and Parekh 1995).  
  
7.3.3 Recreation under the Japanese occupation 
 Very little has been written to date about how the Japanese treated leisure 
activities during their occupation. Colombijn (2000) points out that for European men 
in the Indies interned by the Japanese during the war, sports were a key tool of 
survival and had an important effect on their identities. Since many Europeans had 
lived in the Indies for generations, many felt only marginally connected with their 
own homelands. During the Second World War, serious international football matches 
were played in Japanese prisoner of war camps between the Scottish, English and 
Dutch (Colombijn 2000). These matches divided the Europeans along national lines, 
serving to redirect their emotions towards motherlands and away from colonial 
identities and allegiances. The sports activities Indonesians had organized in the 
decades before the war were seen as a threat to Japanese power and all sporting clubs 
were quickly shut down (Colombijn 2000). In their place, the Japanese established the 
‘Tai Iku Kai’, a ‘general sports organization for martial arts and other semi-military 
exercises’ (Colombijn 2000: 184). The Japanese also initially maintained the Dutch 
ban on pencak silat, the martial art found around the region, which they also 
perceived as a threat. However, in an attempt to win over the local population, the 
Japanese later lifted the ban and set out to reintroduce pencak silat in a way that 
allowed them to more effectively control it through standardization (Maryono 2002). 
The Japanese rationalized pencak silat on a massive scale, taking a martial art that 
varied in style from region to region and standardizing it for the first time, even 
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publishing and widely distributing the first ever manual on pencak silat moves 
(Maryono 2002). 
 
7.4 Post-Independence leisure: ‘Completely new Indonesians’ 
We want to create a completely new Indonesian nation, completely new 
Indonesian people, completely new Indonesians. Even physically they are 
completely new. Yes, physically new. I remember having said in one of my 
speeches in Solo in 1956: How wonderful it would be if we could create a 
completely new Indonesian person! … Our revolution … is not only a national 
revolution, but … is even a revolution to create new human beings.  
--Address by President Sukarno to the Indonesian Women’s Congress 
(Jakarta, 6 February 1961, #270A) 
  
This section examines how the state attempted to shape the bodies and 
behaviour of its citizenry through several leisure activities in the post-Independence 
era: volleyball, takro, Gerak Jalan [marching competitions] and dance. First, 
however, I provide a brief history of how post-Independence governments linked 
leisure and nation-building. 
Immediately after Independence was proclaimed in 1945, the new national 
leadership felt Indonesia had to rapidly change and modernize in order to reach 
national goals. As discussed in previous chapters, the Republican leaders were deeply 
invested in the moral priorities of the Dutch and Japanese. They inherited many of the 
racist colonial assumptions that Indonesian people’s supposed laziness, lack of 
discipline and other character deficiencies made the population itself an obstacle to 
national development and nation-building (Alatas 1977). The Old Order leaders 
concentrated on broadly addressing these deficiencies at the workplace and in schools. 
They also introduced rationalized sports into the lives of its populace in an effort to 
carry out the agenda of modernization in citizens’ leisure time. 
According to Alan Guttmann’s Marxist analysis, it was in the ruling elite’s 
best interests to have a workforce that was ‘physically healthy, manually dextrous, 
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submissive to the temporal and spatial requirements of assembly-line work, and 
politically docile’ (Guttmann 2000: 255). In other words, altering the bodies and the 
behaviour of the population was inseparable from visions of modernity and 
industrialism. This can be seen in Indonesia where, influenced by Soviet Marxist 
philosophy, early Republican leaders very much saw industrial advancement as the 
ideal path for Indonesia to take. Sports were one way in which the bodies of the 
working class were increasingly targeted for improvement in a variety of cultural 
contexts in the industrial era. Improving the workforce through sport was believed to 
be effective as 
the muscular exertion and skills associated with sports participation are 
alleged to contribute to the workers’ health and manual dexterity; the need to 
accept the rules of the game socializes factory hands to routinized work; and 
the entertainment afforded by sports spectacles diverts the exploited workforce 
from political action. Modern sports are, therefore, an instrument to preserve 
the class structure of capitalist society. (Guttmann 2000: 255) 
 
The value of sports propaganda in supporting nation-building and in 
conferring legitimacy in the eyes of the international community was quickly realized 
in Indonesia. Sports were seen as possessing a unifying power that could focus the 
population’s loyalty towards Jakarta. Sports were also something nearly anyone could 
take part in and Sukarno, influenced by Soviet notions of gender equality (Jancar-
Webster 1978; Pascall and Manning 2000), encouraged all citizens equally to 
participate (Presidential address, 1953, #0143). Furthermore, the fact that the most 
advanced and powerful states also had the most advanced sporting culture was not 
lost on early nationalists. In 1947, while the Dutch were attempting to reclaim the 
Indies, the Sukarno government founded the Olympic Committee and the Persatuan 
Olahraga Republik Indonesia (PORI), the ‘Federation of Sports in the Republic of 
Indonesia’ inaugurated by Sukarno himself and intended as the ‘sole vehicle for 
national sporting activities’ (Brown 2006: 78). Athletes were soon sent abroad to 
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participate in international sporting events. Indonesian officials were sent along with 
the athletes in order to learn about staging them. 
Sukarno managed to secure the 1962 Fourth Asian Games for Indonesia, to be 
hosted in Jakarta. He embarked on a grandiose building programme, ordering the 
construction of a national sporting complex which included a new football and 
athletic stadium, called Senayan, with a capacity of 100,000 spectators, smaller 
stadiums for other sports, the first-class Hotel Indonesia, and the Welcome Monument 
(Leclerc 1993). Senayan became the icon of the Old Order and satellite smaller 
stadiums were built in provincial capitals across the country to engage the wider 
populace in sports. At this time, national sports organizations were set up and sports 
infrastructure was created with the idea that young athletes would have the chance to 
develop their talents and the most talented of each province would ultimately form the 
national team.  
Throughout his leadership, Sukarno looked to the communist world for 
guidance, even declaring the Jakarta-Beijing axis in his presidential address on 
Independence Day in 1965. The Soviet Union and Mao’s China placed emphasis on 
sport as a way to fulfill national goals. Mao’s slogan of ‘New Physical Culture’ was 
echoed in Old Order policies that emphasized a break with tradition and implied 
modernity and development. He followed the communist ‘sports for all’ philosophy in 
part to quickly ‘improve’ the citizenry but also to set up a system by which 
widespread sports programs could produce and spot gifted athletes that could 
represent Indonesia internationally (Azis and Laksmi 2006). This involved a massive 
effort to introduce the country to European sports they had never seen before and 
spark a sense of national pride39. The effort also sought to involve the citizenry in 
                                                          
39 Sukarno’s government distributed tens of thousands of televisions across the country to ensure an audience for 
the Asian Games. Pulau Penyengat received its first television at this time, a communal set run by the village head. 
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some form of exercise and recreation. It was part of a plan-filled system: every 
school, workplace, city, region, village, kelurahan, and so on, were expected to reach 
quotas of participants in sports and were to incur penalties if they fell short (Azis and 
Laksmi 2006). Ironically, with the expulsion of the Dutch came adoption of European 
sports in villages across Indonesia. 
In practice, the Sukarno plan was less successful than hoped for during the Old 
Order (Azis and Laksmi 2006). Politically, it was a turbulent time and economically 
Indonesia was in extremely dire straits. Indonesians suffered from starvation and 
malnutrition and lacked basic needs such as clothes and medicine. Many residents of 
Pulau Penyengat were given regular rations of rice during these years. Despite the 
massive state efforts to create sports infrastructure and to encourage the citizenry to 
participate in sports programs, sports were a low priority.  
 
7.4.1 Volleyball and other ‘modern’ national sports 
The massive push towards developing sports facilities in Jakarta after 
Independence was felt in towns and villages across the country. Spatially, the sporting 
culture took the form of facilities concentrated in provincial capitals. A modern sports 
complex was constructed in all provincial capitals at this time (Azis and Laksmi 
2006), including Tanjung Pinang. In Pulau Penyengat, sports infrastructure was 
constructed all over the island, including badminton courts (Figure 7.1), volleyball 
courts, and a sepak bola [football] field (Figure 7.2).  
Participation in state sports programs on Pulau Penyengat has been uneven. 
Volleyball is the long-time favourite sport to play on Pulau Penyengat. Villagers have 
enthusiastically put together volleyball teams made up of friends and family members 
and there are tournaments organized by the state between kelurahans in the Riau 
Islands. Football, on the other hand, has not been adopted and is only played on 
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Independence Day in an event organized by the state. While football is easily the most 
popular sport in Indonesia, Pulau Penyengat residents offer various rationalizations as 
to why it has not become popular on the island. Similarly, badminton is only 
sporadically played in Pulau Penyengat, with the high cost of equipment cited as the 
reason. This variation in participation demonstrates how residents on Pulau Penyengat 
are free to choose what to participate in. While the state may build facilities for 
activities, it is no guarantee that the people will engage in them as the state intends.  
In what follows, I turn to the responses participants have provided about 
national sports programs. One volleyball player, a primary school-educated housewife 
in her early 40s, commends the efforts of the state to encourage such leisure activities 
and employs the state’s own terminology when expressing herself: 
It’s good we have these facilities … they are quite simple but adequate. … 
Sports make our bodies’ healthy and strong. … it is good for young people, it 
encourages discipline … it’s something to do that is positive … (Rini, 12 
November, 2006) 
 
Many villagers point out the potential for monetary gain and social prestige in state 
sports programs. As mentioned earlier, one of the current members of the national 
women’s volleyball team is from Pulau Penyengat. She has successfully risen through 
the national system that scouts out talented athletes from villages from across the 
country and trains them at institutes in Jakarta. Since volleyball has yielded tangible 
results in Pulau Penyengat, it is treated as a possible (if remote) career choice and 
some parents encourage their children to join. While this has made the connection 
between volleyball and economics explicit in Pulau Penyengat, it also reinforces and 
naturalizes the various levels of state bureaucracy while cementing the notion of the 







Figure 7.1 - Neighbourhood badminton court with a measured court, referee chair, lighting 
 
 
Figure 7.2 - Football field: overgrown and disused 
 
 
As has been noted in earlier chapters, the New Order government has been 
‘fond of promoting uniformity among its people and across the country’s landscape’ 
(Sekimoto 1997: 307). This was maintained by a fine-grained system of government 
bureaucracy which employed a massive number of people on many levels, down to 
unpaid positions at the village and neighbourhood level. This bureaucratic structure 
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and increased number of state workers enabled state plans to be carried out with a 
higher degree of uniformity and consistency than was possible during the Old Order. 
While more grand national facilities were built in the Old Order (Azis and Laksmi 
2006; Rangkuti and Nicholas LMS 2006), more fine-grained organization and activity 
at the village level occurred in the New Order (Lutan 2005). A direct result of this 
expansion of the bureaucracy was seen in a larger proportion of the village population 
engaged in ‘modern’ national sports. 
Despite the expansion of participants in leisure activities introduced by the 
state, there are certain unstated restrictions for participation. While volleyball is 
ostensibly accessible to all in the communist ‘sport for all’ philosophy, matches and 
tournaments are scheduled around the standard office schedule rather than, say, 
fishing patterns or other seasonal occupations as leisure activities traditionally would 
have been. During the Old Order, many residents on Pulau Penyengat were 
unemployed or worked as fishermen, coolies (in Tanjung Pinang), boat builders, or 
other independent ventures. As the economy grew and as Indonesia became more 
rationalized, a growing proportion of the population had jobs that followed an office 
work day schedule. Leisure activities are now planned around the modern work 
schedule, making some villagers uncomfortable about participating. One man in his 
early 50s initially claimed he was too old to join state leisure activities. Over the 
course of our conversation, however, other issues such as class and time emerged as 
issues that prevented him from participating. 
They all play volleyball in the evening … sometimes I am unloading a ship in 
the evening, sometimes catching prawns, depending on the tide. If you are a 
member of a team, you need to be there ... there are a lot of matches and you 
have to practice too … They also have to buy uniforms and sports gear. … 
No! The government doesn’t pay for them – the players pay themselves. 





As leisure activities have increasingly been rationalized, those not working in an 
office, in a school or in a commercial business are increasingly being excluded from 
state-organized leisure activities. Those with ‘modern’ occupations with modern, 
rationalized work/leisure rhythms are better able to participate. Thus, performing 
national identity becomes easier and more natural the more closely one is implicated 
in the national system. In this way, performing national identity in free time is an 
activity of the youth and of office workers. 
 
7.4.2 Takro 
As examined in Chapter Six, takro was re-introduced to Pulau Penyengat in 
the 2000s as a component of the school curriculum and as part of a broader initiative 
in Indonesia to cultivate local culture. In this section I examine the recent 
(re)introduction of an official state-initiated version of takro to Pulau Penyengat. 
The sun is getting lower and more people are coming out of their houses to 
enjoy the afternoon. The square is bustling with spectators and the tea stalls 
are full of men playing dominoes. The square has recently been paved and 
now has a takro court painted on the ground, complete with a giant image of a 
takro ball in the centre of the court and a smaller circle on each side to 
indicate where the players serve from. There is a professional quality net, a 
raised white referee chair and six tall poles topped with a florescent light 
creating ‘stadium lighting’ for the court.  
Along one side of the court the grand old mosque towers over the 
square while on another is the performance stage, both painted deep yellow, 
the signature colour of Pulau Penyengat’s royal family. Pulau Penyengat’s 
all-male team is practicing in shiny blue uniforms that look like football 
jerseys, complete with individual numbers on the back. The players appear to 
be between in their late teens to late-20s and all are strong and fit. The team 
representing another kelurahan from Bintan will soon be arriving by pompong 












Figure 7.3 – Warming up for a takro match in the main square 
 
   
... 
The opposing team is quite late and it is now dark out. The players have 
stopped practicing and now children and youths are playing around with takro 
balls on the court. The team finally arrives and both teams warm up. The 
court is brightly lit and is the brightest space on the island. Hundreds of 
spectators have crowded around the square to watch the match. Children sit 
on the pavement at the front of the crowd.  
 The match begins and the show of athleticism is spectacular. Players 
lift their legs over their head to smash the ball over the net with their feet. The 
athletes are working hard and the crowd is mesmerized, clapping and 
cheering for every point and for exceptionally good kicks and saves. 
 The match is over with a victory for the home team. For the next 
match, the team will travel to Batam, but the team there is weak so another 
victory is expected. I can hear some members of the audience analyzing Pulau 
Penyengat’s chances and how far they may climb in this tournament. [Field 
notes, 17 February, 2006]  
 
 Takro has generated great interest since its recent (re)introduction as a 
rationalized sport on Pulau Penyengat. It has sparked interest in younger boys to play, 
attracts many spectators, and the games are a source of excitement and pride for 
villagers, as is the professional-quality court. As described above, the most central, 
highly-visible and symbolic space on the island has been allocated to takro: the main 
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square next to the mosque and the performance stage. This sends a clear message to 
islanders that takro is a state priority. 
The takro recently introduced by the state is highly rationalized and bears little 
resemblance to how takro was historically played. As mentioned, there are spaces 
designated exclusively for takro and all teams wear uniforms. Based on comments of 
islanders, it is because of this rationalization that young men are now attracted to 
takro. Where takro was once seen as something kampungan [boorish, low class], the 
flashy uniforms that recall football jerseys, the official court, the elevated referee’s 
chair, the stadium lighting, all look to be a part of the modern world they imagine and 
wish to join.  
I like wearing a uniform…it looks very tidy and handsome, doesn’t it? … and 
it makes us look like a real team, more professional … not just some village 
people. (takro player, 13 February, 2007) 
 
Before, takro was just played by ayam kampung [literally village chickens, 
meaning kids who run around freely in the village] in a way that was informal. 
... Takro is a Malay culture and these days it is modernizing without losing its 
roots in our traditions. ... see? Now takro has already become standardized...  
(Pak Sudirman, 17 February, 2006) 
 
When asked why they thought takro has suddenly become popular again, players and 
spectators made links with the past while emphasizing its new ‘modern’ appeal: 
... because takro has modernized so teams can all play without arguing over 
the rules! (Yanto, 17 February, 2006) 
 
Takro is played throughout Southeast Asia. This is an authentic Malay sport 
that ASEAN countries all play, not imported. (Haz, 17 February, 2006) 
 
The courts and the lights are new. ... The uniforms are new... football is the 
number one sport in Indonesia – now takro looks more like football. The 
players look more tidy and modern (Ninik, 17 February, 2006) 
 
Takro has modernized... little by little Indonesia is more modernized... even 
our hobbies become modernized! (Uji, 17 February, 2006) 
 




... this is like Taman Mini! Everything is decided in Jakarta: “Now we are 
going to make a monument in each village, and now we will make a stage in 
the village, and this year we teach dance so we have dancers for Taman Mini, 
and now we support takro”. No one played takro last year! The tradition here 
was gone – the children did not play it any more. ... Now it is very popular but 
only because the government introduced it... people will not think of these 
things on their own... (Sayid, 19 February, 2006) 
 
Takro is cheap! All you need is a rattan ball! This way, the government does 




Figure 7.4 - Takro practice next to the mosque 
 
 
Like the use of ethnic costumes, takro perpetuates gender norms, and it is 
clear that takro’s gendered qualities are normalized. When I asked who plays takro, 
one woman said that it was for men only and for women to watch because that was 
the tradition.  
Desi: Women should not play takro – what would happen if a girl lifted her 
leg to kick the ball? She would show her underpants!  
 
Sarah: But you are wearing shorts. 
 




Sarah: So why can’t women who wear shorts today play takro? You are on a 
volleyball team, right? 
 
Desi: But takro is more rough, it is for men … you kick and then you could 
fall down.  
 (13 February, 2007) 
 
While it is acceptable for women of all ages to don uniforms and play volleyball or 
participate in competition marching, takro is seen as masculine. In the case of takro, 
the (re)introduction of a traditional activity serves to gender villagers according to 
traditional norms (real or imagined) in a way that volleyball does not. The 
intentionally gendered aspect of takro reveals the state’s intention to have it perceived 
as authentic by villagers through preserving it as a traditionally male domain. In 
contrast to observations made by scholars who have pointed out that aspects of the 
nation such as history, culture and nostalgia are often positioned as ‘feminine’ while 
more progressive aspects of the nation such as technology and modernity are often 
positioned as ‘masculine’ (McClintock 1993; Radcliffe 1996; Sunindyo 1998), takro 
is positioned by the state as an expression of both indigenous and national 
masculinity.  
While it is acceptable for women of all ages to don uniforms and play volleyball or 
participate in competition marching, takro is seen as masculine. In the case of takro, 
the (re)introduction of a traditional activity serves to gender villagers according to 
traditional norms (real or imagined) in a way that volleyball does not. The 
intentionally gendered aspect of takro reveals the state’s intention to have it perceived 
as authentic by villagers through preserving it as a traditionally male domain. In 
contrast to observations made by scholars who have pointed out that aspects of the 
nation such as history, culture and nostalgia are often positioned as ‘feminine’ while 
more progressive aspects of the nation such as technology and modernity are often 
positioned as ‘masculine’ (McClintock 1993; Radcliffe 1996; Sunindyo 1998), takro 
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is positioned by the state as an expression of both indigenous and national 
masculinity. Through enforcing the supposed masculinity of takro, the state is 
performatively reproducing traditional gender norms that are disrupted in volleyball.   
The group, led by Sayed and Pak Deni, overlaps with the gotong-royong group 
mentioned in Chapter Five. Pak Deni, who is in his 40s, was a deckhand on container 
ships around the world and in the 1990s worked his way up to captain of a boat that 
made local trips between Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. He now works in a 
shipping office in Tanjung Pinang and was involved in helping out with the December 
2007 mayoral election, campaigning for the opposition. He is well-respected, 
relatively well-off and known for his independent thinking and his willingness to 
support the underdog. Sayed had recently quit his job at a resort in Bali, where he 
gained exposure to a different process of cultural construction. While many Balinese 
would disagree, Sayed felt that the Balinese, in contrast to Pulau Penyengat residents, 
have effectively maintained their traditional culture and have been financially 
rewarded for doing so through tourism. He admired how Bali was not just a physical 
place but was a lived culture:  
Bali is not just Balinese buildings and decorations and resorts in Balinese style 
… the Balinese often wear traditional clothes for festivals, they make 
offerings, they study dance … they still have some tradition in their lives. 
(Sayed, 7 February, 2006)  
 
In his comments, Sayed draws an important distinction between active, performed 
identity and static symbolism. To him, it is the lived aspect of culture that is most 
valuable to encourage and most difficult to bring back in Pulau Penyengat. State 
cultural development in Pulau Penyengat has, according to Sayed, been conceived of 
in Jakarta by designers whose only experience with Riau islands culture is through 
Taman Mini.   
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He and his group began to locally campaign in 2005-2006, before the state 
established the official takro league, for locals to return to their roots and play 
indigenous sports, particularly takro, in their leisure time. This was motivated in large 
part by the growing sense that local identity and traditions have been rapidly lost in 
recent years. The group was also motivated by the growing realization that the state at 
the provincial and national level was about to get involved in Pulau Penyengat’s 
affairs permanently to oversee its development as the cultural heartland of Kepri.  
While Sayed is not critical of the state involvement in volleyball and football, 
he feels the state, particularly officials from Jakarta, should not impose local culture 
in any way and should only be involved marginally through providing financial 
assistance. Sayed and others feel protective of takro as it is seen as part of their 
cultural heritage, unlike volleyball and other international sports that are seen as 
foreign.  
Sayed: They have made a ‘Malay’ stage right next to the mosque…and now 
takro... it is disrespectful, it is not polite… there are always dance practices … 
they do not even stop for the call to prayer. They [the government] did not ask 
us where we wanted the stage. They just decided and put it where they liked… 
same with the Balai Adat40 … it’s just like Taman Mini!  
 
Sarah: How is it like Taman Mini? 
 
Sayed: It is not authentic. It is built by the government who thinks they know 
this culture … we did not build it ourselves … it’s not who we are. It’s for 
tourists, for government officials who come to Penyengat to look at. They 
paint it yellow41 and call it traditional. (13 Nov, 2005) 
 
                                                          
40 Balai Adat, or Traditional Hall, is a structure on the opposite side of Pulau Penyengat created in the late New 
Order during the beginning of move towards decentralization and ethnicization. It was originally built with the 
vague notion that the weddings on the island would occur there (they have not – islanders prefer to have weddings 
at home). It is symbolic of the time in many ways: it was built on the initiative of the state and designed in a style 
found in the Riau Province section of Taman Mini but not in the Riau Islands. It was also never finished and 
started to fall apart immediately since the contractor siphoned off money by using substandard materials and 
shoddy construction. In the post-Kepri era, it has been completely refurbished and a performance stage has been 
constructed next to it in anticipation of it becoming a second focal point after the square both for tourism and local 
cultural activities. (Pak Acay, 12 October, 2006) 
41 Yellow is the signature color of the Sultan of Riau. Since 2004, all of the Sultan’s existing buildings have been 
painted yellow, including the historical mosque, as well as new buildings built to imitate the architecture favored 
by the sultan in the 19th century. 
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Implicit in this comment is the understanding that Taman Mini is an 
inauthentic state-created version of Indonesia in which a grand display of architecture 
is always coupled with a stage of dancers. Although he frames his argument as being 
about Muslim morality (i.e. playing takro as well as dancing next to those at prayer, 
as will be discussed in the following sub-section), Sayed could not be described by 
anyone, including himself, as a devout Muslim. The root of his discontent appears to 
be that national understandings of local culture imposed on Pulau Penyengat residents 
are infringing upon, and even making a mockery of, what he feels is local ‘truly 
authentic’ culture.  
 As it became clear that the state was becoming more involved with cultural 
development in Pulau Penyengat, Sayed and about six or eight others attempted to 
create a grassroots organization through which the state would have to communicate. 
The organization was to be made up of villagers and would negotiate with the 
government about any state developments on the island on behalf of the villagers. 
While this role should have been fulfilled by the kelurahan, the group felt that the 
kelurahan represented the state to the people rather than the other way around and 
was therefore ineffective for their purposes. This group consisted primarily of men 
who had travelled within the country and the region and represented a small number 
of residents. They were all interested in stories of success and failure about other 
communities and spoke at length about Pulau Penyengat’s potential and how it could 
be developed for tourism yet still maintain some autonomy from the state. Rather than 
having ad hoc developments on Pulau Penyengat built to satisfy government officials 
in Jakarta and Tanjung Pinang, this group believed that a grassroots group made up of 
islanders could steer Pulau Penyengat’s development in directions that would be more 
empowering for residents. Through their efforts they had hoped that they would be 
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able to inspire in their fellow villagers the same nostalgia and passion that they felt for 
the pastimes lost in recent decades. They did not plan to rationalize takro by building 
specific spaces for it, introducing uniforms or leagues as they wished for takro to be 
played as they remembered it: just friends and neighbours playing in their gardens for 
fun in their free time. 
The efforts of this group have been largely ignored by other villagers partly 
because they lacked the expertise and funds to realize their ideas but largely because 
their fellow villagers did not take their ideas seriously without the backing and 
support of the state, an indication of the success of the state’s hegemony. After the 
state got involved in takro on the island, the group abandoned their efforts to nurture 
takro as a more casual, grassroots local pastime. However, the group’s effort reveals a 
tension in the state’s co-opting of ‘traditions’ for national purposes. 
 
7.4.3 Gerak Jalan 
In this section I examine Gerak Jalan, the national marching competitions 
held in villages and towns across the country and another way in which the state has 
encouraged structured play in citizens’ leisure time. Civilian marching was introduced 
by the Japanese who sought to ready Indonesians for battle. The boys in Figure 7.5 
are marching in Seinendan, the Japanese Youth Corps, in which they were instructed 
in the Greater East Asian ideology and received basic military training (Raben 1999). 








Figure 7.5 - Indonesian boys on a Japanese marching drill 
 
*image taken from Raben (1999) 
 
Gerak Jalan is a fascinating example of a performance of national identity in 
which the local community largely determines the character of the event. In contrast 
to other formal performances of national identity as examined in Chapters Five and 
Six, Gerak Jalan is voluntary. If citizens choose to participate, teams are able to select 
their own uniforms and style of marching. They are also able to organize themselves 
into teams of seven, demonstrating that the presence of the state is evident even in 
details such as the size of the contingent. According to the competition rules, the 
teams are judged on three qualities, spirit, discipline, and nationalism, and there is no 
official guidance provided as to how these should be interpreted. In what follows, I 
provide an ethnography of Gerak Jalan from August 2006. 
Teams of seven islanders each have been marching around the island in the 
evenings. They are practising their marching technique and improving their 
stamina for a competition. The marchers form three consecutive pairs, with a 
leader marching next to the first pair. Some of the teams receive advice from 
coaches, older retired men with military experience. (see Figure 7.7)  
 The atmosphere is festive. Spirits are high among the marchers. People 
watch the teams pass by from their yards or from a cafe. The teams are 
wearing casual sports clothes.   
There is a striking diversity to the marchers, although they are similar 
within one team. There are teams of children as young as five and six, 
teenagers, women and men into their fifties, teams of family members, and 
teams of people from work. The marchers pass by several times in one evening 
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and are taking the practices seriously, trying to keep formation, singing 
nationalist songs, and obeying commands from their leader. 
 
 
Figure 7.6 - Practicing for the marching competition - uniforms are unveiled on competition day 
 
 












Figure 7.8 - Mass Gerak Jalan lessons 
 
... 
Competition day has arrived. It is still early but the square is filling up with 
spectators and teams of marchers assembling for the 8:00 a.m. start time of 
the women’s competition. The men’s teams will flag off later that day at 2:00 
p.m. There is an atmosphere of excitement with everyone checking out one 
anothers’ uniforms. All teams are wearing matching outfits, though no two 
teams are dressed alike. Some are wearing smart tracksuits, others are 
wearing creative ensembles of matching sarongs, matching caps, scarves, 
























Figure 7.9 - Marching competition - at the starting line 
 
 
The historic mosque is the backdrop for the starting activities. A line has been 
painted onto the path with the word ‘start’ painted in English, next to which 
there are two rows of plastic chairs reserved for V.I.P.s. The Pak Lurah sits in 
one of the chairs while most of the others remain empty. The teams are lined 
up at the start line while the MC is hosting the event with a microphone and 
sound system. The first team, a group of girls around twelve years old dressed 
in mauve pants and white t-shirts, is standing at attention in the sun waiting to 
begin. The 30 teams are getting into formation in order of the number 
assigned to them. A few people are taking photos while the MC introduces the 
event with a formal speech and passes the microphone to the Pak Lurah of 
Pulau Penyengat to say a few words: 
 
I would like to offer my thanks to the organization of youths of Pulau 
Penyengat who organized this activity to commemorate the 61st 
anniversary of the Republic of Indonesia in this year of 2006. 
Hopefully activities such as this will raise the feeling of unity and 
friendship among all residents of Pulau Penyengat so that together we 
can unite the missions and visions of the people within the framework 
of development.... 
 
 After the speeches are over, a man at the start line flags off the first team with 
a black and white chequered flag and the marching begins. It is a false start, 
as something was not ready with the organizers. The girls are called back to 
start again. Official photos are taken by a civil servant with the kelurahan 
office. The teams are flagged off again and they begin to march while singing 




...as long as there is life in our bodies, we will continue to be loyal, 
continue to be ready to guard Indonesia, we will continue to be loyal, 
continue to be ready to defend our country..... 
 
Teams made up of little girls wearing their Senam Pagi Indonesia uniforms 
march by. Then a team of middle-aged women in smart matching tracksuits 
passes. They are serious and are marching dramatically as if they were as 
army troop:  
 
Left....left....left, right, left! Left....left....left, right, left! 
Left....left....left, right, left! [TURN RIGHT!] 
 
A group of teenage girls wearing funky costumes of bright pink t-shirt with ties 
and crooked caps passes, clapping and integrating dance moves into their 
marching while singing:  
 
Hello! Hello Bandung! The city that I fondly remember, it’s been a 
long time since I’ve met you, now things are like hell, come on 
brother, let us struggle to return once again..... 
 
The variety of costumes is remarkable. The teenage members on one team 
have sprayed their hair a matching green. Some wear head scarves with a 
matching flower pinned to the side, others wear matching bandanas. There 
are sarongs, flip-flops, matching shorts and t-shirts, leggings, face 
decorations such as stickers, glitter, matching make-up, and face paint used to 
create Indonesian flags on cheeks. Judges have been planted in secret 
locations along the route to ensure that teams maintain ‘discipline’ and 
‘spirit’ for the entire march. The teams are vocal for the duration of the two 
kilometre march, singing one of several patriotic marching songs and 
shouting military style commands. 
 
One!..........Two!.........Three!..........Four!...........One, two, three, four! 
Left....left....left, right, left!  
 
At the end of the route, teams cross a finish line painted (also in English) on 
the ground of the opposite side of the square. The final stretch of the path 
leading to the square is lined with spectators and there is a sense of 
excitement in the air as the teams come in. Photos and video are being taken 
of the marchers, though they do not break out of formation or change their 
marching style until they have crossed the finish line.  
 
There is a break of several hours after the last team finishes until the men’s 
competition begins at 2pm. While the females did one short loop of under two 
kilometres, the men are to walk a longer route around the island two times, as 
it is assumed that the men will not be challenged by so short a route. The 
teams assemble in a different part of the island to begin their slightly different 
route. Again, it is apparent that much effort and consideration has gone into 
the uniforms. The men’s teams wear smart tracksuits, white gloves, flip-flops, 
bright colours in their hair, sunglasses, bandanas (on their heads, necks, over 
one eye, around one leg), caps, sarongs, military attire, and so on.  
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 The men’s teams begin and spectators line the paths to check out their 
costumes and their style. It is extremely hot and the crowds are thinner that in 
the morning. 
A heavy metal team wearing sunglasses passes with the marching 
leader acting as lead singer, belting out patriotic songs in a raspy heavy metal 
voice. A group of tiny children who look about five passes by and looks tired.  
A group of young police officers marches by wearing sharp red and 
white tracksuits, white gloves and matching red and white running shoes.  
It has just been announced that the male teams will only make one lap.  
A group of teenage boys dressed in sarongs and sprayed white hair 
march by hunched over, acting like old men.  
 
 
Figure 7.10 - Watching Gerak Jalan 
 
 With over 30 female teams and just under 30 male teams participating, the 
total number of marchers was over 400. With 2,000 residents, 20% of the entire 
population of the island participated as marchers in 2006. There was no coercion 
involved in signing participants up: villagers formed teams and signed up voluntarily. 
I suggest that there are several reasons for the popularity of the event. Cash prizes for 
the top three teams in both the men’s and women’s competition attracted participants. 
However, the cash prizes were not nearly enough to cover the cost of the uniforms / 
costumes worn by many of the teams and certainly not a large sum after being divided 
by seven. The real draw for participants was the opportunity to perform for the 
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community. The theatricality of the event is clear to the participants: Gerak Jalan is a 
chance for villagers to present themselves in a way that their neighbours, friends and 
family do not normally see them. While the format of the competition appears to be 
rigid (e.g. marching in sets of seven), participants work within the given constraints 
and creatively interpret the judging criteria (discipline, nationalism and spirit) in a 
way that combines displays of national identity with more personal expressions. In a 
strategic move to boost their team’s chances, many marchers sought out 
comparatively wealthy individuals to act as sponsors who would pay for their 
uniforms. This was an opportunity for the sponsor to gain local prestige and for the 
marchers to obtain the desired ‘look’ for their performance.  
While there is a conscious layer to this performance in which participants are 
aware they are acting out an aspect of national identity as well as an aspect of their 
more personal identity, there is also a more subconscious layer in which participants 
are unquestioning that Gerak Jalan is an ‘Indonesian’ thing to do and take it for 
granted that the state is organizing their leisure time. Furthermore, Gerak Jalan, like 
other leisure activities, is citational as it has always existed in living memory on the 
island. It is a familiar format to participants and spectators that cites previous nation-
related marching activities and serves to normalize the relationship between marching 































Figure 7.14 - Marching competition uniforms: punk nationalists? 
 
 
7.4.4 ‘Unity in Diversity’ through dance 
Similar to takro, dance was (re)introduced as part of recent state initiatives 
following decentralization policies and ethnicization efforts after the formation of 
Riau Islands Province. On Pulau Penyengat, the state paid for a stage to be built on 
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the edge of the square and for a dance instructor from elsewhere in Riau, from whom 
the dancers have come to know their ‘traditional’ dances.  
A senior civil servant in the Ministry of Culture and Tourism at the provincial 
level explains the rationale underpinning the development of dance in Pulau 
Penyengat and the Riau Islands more widely: 
Have you been to Taman Mini? ... there are dancers who represent each 
province there. In one day you can see culture from Bali, Java, Sulawesi... 
every culture in Indonesia. ... Kepri is a new province... we need to cultivate 
our dance so people from around Indonesia will see, “Oh, that is what Kepri 
culture is.” ... We want to start children learning dance when they are young ... 
to improve the cultural environment on Penyengat. (Pak Acay, 15 February, 
2006) 
 
Dance lessons take place regularly on the stage in the square. Dance students 
include children of about 6 or 7 and teenagers, the oldest students just in their early 
20s. Sometimes the dancers are accompanied by a gendang [Malay drum] lesson, 
giving budding gendang players and budding dancers a chance to practice together. 
Due to the centrality of the main square and the numerous nearby cafes, practices 
often gather crowds of spectators, particularly evening practices accompanied by 
gendang playing. Since the dance classes are divided roughly by age and include 
males and females, dance practice is a time for friends and peers to interact socially.  
Where and when formal dance performances take place is usually determined 
by various levels of the state, although dancers also perform at the occasional 
wedding. The dance groups on Pulau Penyengat have been invited to perform at 
various functions by the provincial government in Tanjung Pinang such as 
Independence Day festivities, a promotional event for travel agents based in 
Singapore and Malaysia sponsored by the Kepri government, a recent ‘Festival 
Internasional Budaya Melayu’ (International Festival of Malay Culture), and for 
visiting dignitaries both in Tanjung Pinang and Pulau Penyengat. Dancers from Pulau 
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Penyengat have been sent to Jakarta to represent Kepri for televised national events at 
which each province is represented by a dance group in ‘traditional’ costume. In this 
event, a group of young dancers from each province is led to the stage for an 
abbreviated sample of a ‘traditional’ dance to provide the national audience with a 
taste of the breadth of cultures in Indonesia.  
Dance can highlight the often blurry line between work and leisure (Neulinger 
1981). However, the dancers on Pulau Penyengat consider their dancing as a leisure 
activity or hobi [hobby] rather than as work. Despite the range of events at which 
some dancers from the island have performed, most people taking dance classes on 
Pulau Penyengat do not perform for official functions. Overall, there are few 
performances – certainly too few for any dancer to earn a living without another 
source of income. Most of the time spent dancing is at practice on evenings and 
weekends on Pulau Penyengat’s stage.  
The state-funded stage in the square on Pulau Penyengat is one of many such 
stages in small communities across Indonesia where youths rehearse their ‘traditional’ 
dances for national events. The development of stages as venues for dance has been 
noted by Soedarsono (1968) as an effort to secularize dance and reclaim it for 
nationalistic purposes. As pointed out by Pak Acay, the two performance stages on 
Pulau Penyengat (at the Balai Adat and in the main square) are clearly patterned with 
Taman Mini’s provincial displays in mind, each of which features a stage, and 
demonstrates a national rationalization of dance. This illustrates the intimate 
intertwining of dance and the nation, even at the village level. 
The adornment of Pulau Penyengat dancers is a crucial aspect of their 
performance and marks a shift in what dancers wore in the past. While current 
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dancers’ costumes are elaborate and showy, costumes in the Old Order were more 
simple:  
When I was little dancers wore more simple clothes. The dancers can wear big 
gold headdresses now because these costumes can be bought in shops. These 
decorations (sequins) and cloth (lamé) are a new style... we did not have such 
cloth as this before. (Bu Erlina, 14 February, 2006) 
 
Significantly, the adults on Pulau Penyengat did not grow up learning dance. The 
Malay traditions the state is currently introducing on Pulau Penyengat never existed 
on the island previously or they did in a different form which died out. Because of 
this, the teacher was brought from Bintan Island and the dance moves are blended 
with other styles, particularly from Balinese dancing. Some villagers recognize this as 
inauthentic while others do not notice because they have nothing to compare it to. 
 
 













Figure 7.16 - Pulau Penyengat dancers 
 
For the Pulau Penyengat dancers, their costumes and dances must hold up 
against dances of the other provinces. This means learning the most showy, energetic 
dances to capture the attention of the audience, usually conceptualized as consisting 
of people other than residents of Pulau Penyengat. Since the New Order’s push to 
develop and codify national dance, the original meaning and context of the dances 
have been lost. Dances are now abbreviated blends to appeal to an outside, primarily 
government or local tourist audience. Since dancers mainly perform as part of state-
arranged events such as culture festivals in Riau and Jakarta, to entertain visiting 
dignitaries, and at provincial business events, the original contexts have been lost 
(Talamantes 2006). While the dances would originally have been performed in more 
local contexts, the staging of them next to other dances has affected the styles of 
choreography of the dancing and how performers imagine their dancing in the 
pantheon of Indonesian dance (Talamantes 2006). For example, the dances are 
abbreviated versions or excerpts of longer dances, often including only the most 
exciting and showy parts. The choreographers aim to have their dancers stand out 
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through the use of more flamboyant costumes and dramatic moves that will be visible 
from a distance at large performances or when the dancers are shrunk for a television 
audience. More subtle choreography that may be appreciated in more intimate 
gatherings is abandoned in favour of choreography intended to please an audience 
unfamiliar with the meanings and subtleties of the dance. 
The following is an ethnography of a small Riau Islands Province 
entertainment review performed at a hotel in Tanjung Pinang. The occasion was a 
weekend in which the Ministry of Culture and Tourism hosted a group of Singaporean 
travel agents in order to promote tourism in the province. The Pulau Penyengat 
dancers performed several dances for the travel agents to show off the cultural side of 
the Riau Islands: 
In the evening there is a banquet dinner for the travel agents in a cramped 
room at a ‘resort’ hotel near Tanjung Pinang. After the plates are cleared, the 
entertainment begins. A group of old men weave between the tables to get to 
the make-shift stage area at the back of the room. I had seen this group 
several times at weddings. They play one instrumental song with a violin, 
gendang [drum], and harmonium. As they begin their second song, the 
dancers are cued and enter the room in a line, weaving between tables to get 
to the tiny stage. The small group of teenage dancers wear shiny yellow and 
orange baju Melayu, costume jewellery and intricate crowns. They have 
theatrical make-up on that is meant to be seen from a distance, along with 
gold glitter on their faces. In the neon lights of the banquet hall and at close 
proximity, the ensembles appear garish. The dancers are performing a royal 
dance that symbolizes royal hospitality. They hold tempat sirih, or betelnut 
sets, what guests would have immediately been offered in a Malay home in the 
past. The dance symbolizes the welcoming of a royal visitor that would have 
been performed by court dancers for an honoured guest. In this case, the 
Singaporean tourists are the honoured guests and Riau Islands Province is the 
host. 
 The stage area is too small for the choreography. The dancers are 
unable to line up in formation as the dance requires so two of the dancers are 
positioned between tables. At one point in the dance there is a symbolic 
offering of the betelnut to the honoured guest. In this case, there are several 
dozen honoured guests so the dancer offers it to an older Singaporean man 
sitting near the stage. When the dancer is on her knee looking up at him with 
the betelnut set extended out, he takes a flash photo. The dance soon ends and 
the dancers file out of the room. 
 The next on stage is a professional singer. She sings a popular Malay 
ballad from decades ago that the travel agents all know and sing along to. 
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Next is a pop song in Mandarin. She then exits the stage. The entertainment is 
over and the travel agents have had a taste of what Riau has to offer.       
 
 
Figure 7.17 - Pulau Penyengat Dancer with betelnut set (same girl also in Fig. 7.11, far left) 
 
  
The above passage illustrates the current context for dance. The performances 
are abbreviated and the audience is unfamiliar with the meanings of the dance. The 
dancers are part of an overall strategy to develop Riau Islands Province as a new and 
unique part of Indonesia and as a tourist destination where one can see both ‘real’ 
traditional culture and global pop. 
There is the sense among some performers and audience members that the 
costumes and choreography are not actually authentic, but are the inventions of a 
dance instructor influenced by the dance of other provinces. 
See how they stick out their behinds? This is not true Malay style. This 
dancing is influence by Balinese dancing... Balinese people always stand in 
this position to dance. [bends over with bottom sticking out] We Malays dance 
standing straight up like this. (Ninik, 17 February, 2006) 
 
However, despite some suspicions about the authenticity of the dance, it is 
generally a source of pride for people in Pulau Penyengat. Through dance, a number 
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of Pulau Penyengat youth have travelled to perform, an opportunity that would have 
been otherwise impossible. So far, one group has performed on national television, 
something that brought the dancers prestige and the village pride. Many residents 
expressed pride that the dancers were carrying out Malay culture and traditions. Pak 
Deni expressed what many villagers felt about the dancing and its important role in 
preserving culture:  
We cannot forget about our culture in this modern era. We need to hold on to 
our traditions. It’s not good to just watch TV, play video games, play with 
handphones [mobile phones] … people have an obsession with these things … 
they don’t want to be considered kampungan [village-like]… (November 13, 
2006)  
 
Pak Deni is not conscious of any lack of authenticity in the dance and feels that as 
long as it is ‘Melayu’ it is budaya kita, or ‘our culture’. This comment reveals 
frustration in the tendency for villagers to reject aspects of traditional life as being 
kampungan [backward, boorish]. This comment also reveals how some villagers feel 
a sense of loss, yet blame villagers themselves rather than the state. To Pak Deni, the 
state in this case is resurrecting and supporting lost Malay culture on the island. Pak 
Deni is not concerned with how the island or province is represented nationally or 
internationally but how dance affects the cultural life of the village. While Sayed, as 
discussed earlier, expresses frustration at what he perceives as the lack of authenticity 
of ‘ethnic’ culture that has been (re)introduced by the state, Pak Deni and many other 
islanders see these changes as positive steps, regardless of how they were introduced. 
Many islanders, particularly middle-aged residents and older who have seen the rapid 
loss of cultural activities in their lifetime such as Pak Deni, see modernity as a force 
that is eroding traditional Malay ways of life. So while Pak Deni is generally critical 
of the state, he is willing to choose his battles and support state-initiated cultural 
activities on the island so long as they foster his understanding of Malay culture. 
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Indeed, while elements of doubt about the authenticity of the dance classes may be 
widespread, most are willing to overlook this for the Malay culture that the classes 
have helped bring to the island.  
Others agree that there must be a conscious effort to maintain or revive 
cultural activities on Pulau Penyengat but are more selective as to how this should be 
done and by whom. Sayed represents some of the descendents of the island’s royal 
family who feel entitled to control developments on the island to some degree. Some 
of these people feel they ought to have been consulted and criticize the dance classes 
as a way of expressing feelings of having been disenfranchised.  
 Similarly, Veronika, a woman in her mid-20s whose close friend is a dancer, 
also expresses frustration over several aspects relating to the state involvement on the 
island: the state’s lack of willingness to consult with villagers, the complacency and 
lack of motivation of villagers, and the state’s lack of support for non-cultural matters 
on the island (such as improved school facilities).  
People on Pulau Penyengat will not start dance classes on their own. ... People 
here cannot help themselves. ... Even though the classes are very popular and 
people enjoy watching them, we would not have them without the help of the 
government. ... we need the government too much... It would be better if we 
could start things ourselves because the government comes here and says “we 
want it like this or like that” and we cannot control it. Dance classes are good 
and they are popular but why is dance a priority? Is a library not more 
important than dance classes? Better if my daughter can read than dance!   
But the government people come here and change the island... they build a 
stage, build a Balai Adat [traditional community hall], build a tourist 
information building... but they do not ask us what we want. Only things they 
think tourists will like... (Veronika, 7 February, 2006) 
 
Sayed’s and Veronika’s comments reveal a frustration with the government’s 
relationship with the islanders and the increasingly high level of state involvement in 
Pulau Penyengat’s affairs combined with the frustration that the island is dependent 
on the state to develop such programs. While they support the idea of islanders 
learning Malay dance, they feel that this is something the community ought to be able 
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to organize themselves without state involvement. Veronika is particularly frustrated 
by her belief that the state has supported projects that showcase Pulau Penyengat as a 
Malay cultural showpiece when the community has more basic and urgent needs. 
While some people such as Sayed and Veronika are critical about the level of 
state involvement in Pulau Penyengat’s cultural affairs, others take pride in the recent 
cultural developments on the island for the same reasons that many take pride in 
Taman Mini.  
There are more visitors now than before... Indonesian tourists from Sumatra, 
Batam, Jakarta... There are government people and lots of new buildings. ... I 
feel proud that people from outside want to come to Penyengat. ... The next 
project is to build a public toilet for visitors – this is really important. (Pak 
Fazrul, 18 March, 2006) 
 
Penyengat looks very pretty, right? Very exotic! Many of the old buildings 
from before [buildings from the Riau Sultanate] have been fixed and 
renovated and there is more of a “Malay flavour” now. I take couples to be 
photographed on Pulau Penyengat now [for their wedding photos]. (Jojo, 16 
October, 2006)  
 
The development is good for Penyengat. The stage has been expanded because 
all the dancers could not fit on the old one. ... My son takes dance classes on 
Fridays – this is a good activity. Hopefully more children on Penyengat will 
learn to dance. (Rosyani, 20 October, 2006) 
     
Children and youth are the targeted group encouraged to join the dance classes 
organized by the state while married villagers in their mid-twenties and older do not 
join, although officially they are allowed to if they wished. As Bu Niar, a woman who 
works in one of two tiny souvenir shops on the island, located in a nook next to the 
performance stage, explained, the dance programs were for young people. When 
asked whether she would like to dance, Bu Niar and others felt that one needed a 
‘young body’ in order to dance:  
The bodies of dancers must be slim and graceful, not like me. They need to 
have energy… if our dancers were fat like me, everyone would laugh at 
Penyengat people! … They go to Jakarta and perform sometimes… some of 
them dance on TV too… they represent Penyengat people and Malays so they 
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have to look beautiful. … No use for me to dance – I’m already old and fat! 
(Bu Niar, 20 February, 2006).  
 
This comment makes it clear that the state targets particular citizens to represent an 
ideal through dance. This is reminiscent of the standardization required in televised 
Upacara Bendera events at the national level which screens students for their height 
and bodily dimensions to ensure uniformity and decrease individuality. In both cases, 
participation is limited to citizens whose bodies represent national ideals. Trim, 
orderly, and cultured yet under control, these ideal bodies function as a metonym for 
the nation. Bu Niar’s comment reveals her awareness that the dancers represent Kepri 
identity on a national level and that not just any ‘body’ can equally perform this role. 
The examples of the dancers and the student participants in the national-level 
Upacara Bendera illustrate that the state is present in citizens’ bodies, and that, in 
particular contexts, the state and citizens’ bodies merge.  
 
7.5 Silences of state leisure 
Significantly, the state has chosen only a narrow selection of recreational 
activities to support and develop on a national scale. It is necessary at this point to 
examine some of the activities that the state has not chosen to develop and why. 
Among the host of pursuits the state could have chosen to encourage in Pulau 
Penyengat, only volleyball and football, and in more recent years, dance and takro, 
have received dedicated, permanent spaces and continued state support in the form of 
funding, tournament organization and regular involvement / surveillance of visiting 
state representatives to the island. According to the state officials I spoke with in the 
Ministry of Sports in Tanjung Pinang as well as Senayan, the national sports complex 
in Jakarta, there are several reasons for the absence of other sports. The reason most 
cited is financial. According to a fitness trainer of the national baseball team in 
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Jakarta, there have been difficulties widely introducing most sports to the general 
populace because the equipment must be imported and is very expensive: 
In other countries, baseball is played by the poor, right? In Indonesia baseball 
is for the rich. Baseball gloves have to be imported and cost 500,000-800,000 
rupiah – each! Bats must be of international quality and are not made in 
Indonesia. What’s more is Indonesia is very crowded and baseball requires a 
lot of space. Where can kids practice even if they do have equipment? All of 
the national players here come from the middle or upper class … we don’t 
have a lot [of players] to select from. (Pak Agus, 7 May, 2007) 
 
Similarly, for many residents of Pulau Penyengat, badminton is considered to be a 
pastime of the rich due to the prohibitive cost of the necessary equipment. Badminton 
racquets are a luxury item many people are unable to afford or unwilling to prioritize 
in their household budgets. In contrast, in takro and volleyball, only one ball is shared 
by many people making the shared costs lower. 
Silat, the popular Malay martial art, has seen a resurgence in Indonesia with 
many silat clubs and competitions. However, the state has not been as active in 
promoting silat as volleyball. While I have not been able to confirm why, I suggest 
that there are several reasons. The first is that volleyball is an international sport 
which the Indonesian state perceives to bring international (especially Western) 
respect. The second is that it is understood as modern, it is seen as being able to 
inculcate modern values in its players, and it encourages behaviour valued by the state 
such as teamwork, conformity and discipline. National sports are Olympic sports, a 
western-centric value that is reflected down to the village level. While pencak silat 
has undergone a process of rationalization and standardization first under the Japanese 
and again in more recent years in Jakarta and in many towns and cities in Indonesia, 
pencak silat infrastructure and facilities are still not a part of Pulau Penyengat’s 
landscapes. Third, pencak silat is respected as a powerful form of fighting. Pencak 
silat, or silat practitioners, fight individually in battles that require physical strength 
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and cunning and, like the colonial governments before them, these are not qualities 
the state wishes to cultivate in its population. Volleyball, on the other hand, cultivates 
teamwork and uniformity in an international format. While teamwork and conformity 
are also ideologically constructed, both are valued by the state as positive 
characteristics, assuming they are not used against the state. During the Dutch 
colonial era and the revolution, there are tales of pencak silat being used against the 
enemy. The link between pencak silat and resistance to a dominant force has perhaps 
resulted in its deprioritization in state leisure planning.  
Pencak silat has not been continued as part of villagers’ leisure activities. I 
could not locate anyone who had skills beyond some rudimentary moves in pencak 
silat, although several older men were purportedly skilled when they were younger. 
Villagers see this as part of a general loss of traditional culture for which they 
primarily blame themselves or, the ‘youth’ for not showing adequate interest in their 
traditions. Some villagers expressed a deep sense of loss when asked about the 
practice of pencak silat.  
Our traditions are gone. In the past, all boys would learn pencak silat... they 
could protect their families. Now, who wants to learn? (Pak Sudirman, 16 
August, 2006)  
 
Others were more ambivalent, suggesting that pencak silat was no longer useful in the 
‘modern’ era: 
We do not need knowledge of pencak silat now – what is the use? We have 
locks on our doors for thieves. Sometimes people fight with a parang 
[machete used in the jungle]... it does the job much faster! [laughs] ... (Hendri, 
15 February, 2006) 
 
Others felt that there were more ‘modern’ things to do: 
now we have lots of things to do – watch TV, sit and talk ... we do not need to 




 By omitting pencak silat and other indigenous activities from funding, the 
state is revitalizing ‘tradition’ in the recuperated form of Taman Mini-ized culture, 
which narrowly proscribes the ways in which culture is to be expressed and 
recognizes a narrow spectrum of culture. As the residents of Pulau Penyengat (and the 
wider Malay community) have not continued many of their traditional leisure 
activities, the state is generally seen as a positive force for preserving and supporting 
local culture on the island, though there are some contrary views on the state’s roles 
among some villagers.   
 
7.6 Summary 
Leisure activities have been a key way in which the body and the nation 
intersect on Pulau Penyengat and an important way in which villagers participate in 
national activities. State-introduced leisure programs have generally been largely 
successful in encouraging particular performances of national identity as they 
generate much enthusiasm and a high level of participation. Because leisure activities 
are experienced by the population as fun and informal, the ideological dimensions are 
more successfully disguised than in the contexts of work and education, as discussed 
in Chapters Five and Six.  
As demonstrated in this chapter, many of the activities in which the people of 
Pulau Penyengat have been implicated have been state strategies to ‘modernize’ 
villagers through structured play. The notion that villagers are an inherently 
‘substandard’ population draws from colonial philosophy and has been maintained 
over time and across governments using similar strategies of control. Thus, strategies 
of population improvement are intertwined with nation-building efforts in Indonesia 
and have affected the leisure activities of residents on Pulau Penyengat. The 
(re)introduction of selected activities (volleyball, takro, marching, and dance) is not 
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innocent and villagers are keenly aware of the linkages between these activities and 
the nation: each activity is organized by the state and received support in the form of 
an official designated space and funding. Furthermore, excellence in these activities 
can mean participating in regional and national events in Jakarta.  
There is an unevenness of participation in national leisure activities on Pulau 
Penyengat that points to different expectations for different citizens based on their 
bodies. This selectivity betrays the activities as being not just for fun, but as also a 
manifestation of and metonym for the state. Unevenness also stems from residents’ 
participation across activities. While the state has provided spaces for several sports, 
villagers have rejected some, demonstrating that residents of Pulau Penyengat have a 
high degree of agency when it comes to choosing activities in which to participate. In 
the most regimented national activities such as Gerak Jalan, residents perform the 
activity in ways unintended by the state. While on one level, it is clear to participants 
that Gerak Jalan is an activity closely linked to the nation, citizens reinterpret the 
purpose and meaning in their local context, using national leisure activities to gain 






















Chapter 8  – Conclusion  
 
The central focus of this thesis has been the examination of how Indonesian 
national identity is constructed through the bodily performances of its citizenry. 
Through analyzing the state’s nation-building efforts on Pulau Penyengat I have 
investigated the ‘localization of production of subject positions’ (Philpott 2000: 177) 
in three realms of life: work, education, and leisure. My empirical analysis 
demonstrates how performance and performativity are key aspects of how national 
identity is perpetuated and challenged in Indonesia. State nation-building practices are 
not simply and unproblematically replicated, and this thesis has sought to examine 
how the state’s hegemonic attempts at uniformity were resisted, reinterpreted, 
renegotiated or were ‘lost in translation’ to varying extents between Jakarta and Pulau 
Penyengat.  
This final chapter summarizes the key arguments and empirical findings of the 
thesis and is divided into three sections. First, I review how each chapter addresses the 
research questions. Second, I summarize key conceptual ideas explored in this thesis. 
Third, I point out limitations of the research and offer several directions for future 
research. 
8.1 Chapter summaries  
In Chapter One, I broadly outlined the research problems I set out to examine: 
first, to understand how performance is used in the formation, dissemination and 
enforcement of Indonesian national identity and to analyze the state’s strategies in 
encouraging certain performances in its citizenry; second, to gain an understanding of 
the extent to which performances of national identity have changed over time; third,  
to examine how intended meanings of national identities are understood, accepted, 
resisted and reinterpreted by the citizenry. Within the context of Pulau Penyengat, a 
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small community far from Jakarta and, until recently, considered in a peripheral 
region, I set out to examine how concepts of national identity reached people and 
served to inculcate them with national ideology. While existing literature on Riau and 
Pulau Penyengat has focused on historical, cultural or geopolitical aspects, activities 
relating to nation-building have been neglected. I introduced performance and 
performativity as conceptual approaches to the study of national identity to explore 
the embodied dimension to nation-building. 
Chapter Two reviewed bodies of literature relating to my thesis topic, 
including ideology and power relations in landscape, performance and performativity, 
Indonesian nationalism and power in Indonesian society. Several key strands emerged 
from the literature that justified and guided my study. First, there have been 
increasing calls across disciplines to place more emphasis on dynamism, movement, 
and embodiment as well as the sense that identity, power, and landscape require 
active maintenance. While change is often initiated at a conceptual or policy level, its 
maintenance is fruitfully examined through grounded empirical study of people and 
their actions, particularly those that are commonplace and everyday rather than the 
spectacular.  
I highlighted the disembodied approaches to Indonesian nationalism and the 
tendency to focus on spectacular expressions of national identity in the capital city 
rather than the more everyday ways in which national identity affects people at the 
village level. This chapter also points out the overwhelming focus on Java by scholars 
of Indonesia, particularly with regards to nation-building before and after 
Independence and the lack of material written about the experience of the Outer 
Islands, particularly the Riau Islands. 
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Chapter Three provided a discussion of the methodologies I employed in my 
fieldwork and extends theoretical considerations to the specific context of Pulau 
Penyengat. I examined how my positionality and personality helped to form the 
methods employed. My fieldwork examined the various performances of identity as 
well as people’s interpretations of their performances through ethnography, 
interviews, group discussions, participant observation and recorded their activities 
through video and photographs.  
Chapter Four demonstrated some of the colonial influences on Indonesian 
nationalism both through borrowing from and as a reaction against occupying powers. 
Through geography, language, race, and national philosophy, I trace some of the key 
features of Indonesian nationalism that took root prior to Independence. 
 Chapters Five to Seven are empirical chapters that each explored different 
realms of life on Pulau Penyengat reflecting how villagers have been affected by state 
nationalizing policies since Independence.  
Chapter Five examined how work and national identity are linked and how 
certain villagers were encouraged to perform a version of national identity in the 
workplace. Through an empirical analysis of state workers, non-state workers and 
‘volunteers’, the chapter demonstrates that there is a sharp division between how civil 
servants and non-civil servants are expected to be involved in national activities. This 
analysis revealed that among civil servants, performances of national identity are 
uneven from the national level, the provincial level and Pulau Penyengat, within 
Pulau Penyengat itself and even within the same office. Directives from the state are 
interpreted in a range of ways that resulted in the imperfect maintenance of national 
identity. Furthermore, national performances are often strategically co-opted by non-
state workers for personal prestige rather than out of a sense of nationalism. 
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 Chapter Six investigated schooling as a site of performing national identity. In 
Pulau Penyengat, schools are where islanders most regularly experience the nation as 
performers. I focused my study on four areas that highlight how education and nation-
building are intertwined: uniforms, Senam Pagi Indonesia, Upacara Bendera and 
‘ethnic’ education. For many residents of Pulau Penyengat, schooling is the only time 
in their lives when they feel they play an active role in official national activities. It 
therefore constitutes a formative period for the inculcation of national identity. 
Through the four aspects of education on Pulau Penyengat that I examined, it was 
apparent that national performances were made familiar and normalized to students 
through repetition. The subconscious repetition of state values performed 
simultaneously with more conscious, strategic performances highlights the layered 
nature of performing national identity. Through these performances, a social hierarchy 
was maintained and students were taught their relationship to the state, to their 
teachers and to one another. An analysis of performances of national identity in the 
context of schools also reveals broad attempts at standardization and rationalization 
through clothes, group ceremonies and through promoting understandings of ethnicity 
that serve to simplify Indonesia’s ethnic diversity into homogeneous categories.     
 Chapter Seven considered how play and nation-building are intertwined on 
Pulau Penyengat. While leisure activities are more fun and voluntary than other 
performances of national identity, this chapter investigated how they can be highly 
politicized and intimately linked with national ideology. Focusing on volleyball, 
takro, Gerak Jalan, and dance, I examined how national ideology was translated into 
policies that targeted citizens through the creation of various sports facilities meant to 
encourage the participation of residents of Pulau Penyengat. My empirical examples 
revealed that state-initiated programs for leisure time attract residents’ participation 
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unevenly, primarily favouring younger residents, those in higher socio-economic 
classes, those with more predictable leisure time, for example those who work in 
offices over more seasonal occupations. Participation in state-initiated leisure 
activities on Pulau Penyengat is remarkably high and has resulted in increased 
feelings of being connected to the greater unit of the nation through tournaments, 
through the recognition that it is possible to advance from Pulau Penyengat activities 
to the provincial level, the national level and even to the international level 
representing Indonesia.     
8.2 Contributions and findings 
This thesis has sought to provide an understanding of how national identity is 
embodied using the concepts of performance and performativity. Across the three 
empirical chapters, a number of common themes have emerged. 
Many of the state’s nationalization strategies examined in this thesis have 
endured over time and across changes in leadership. While there has been open 
criticism and re-evaluation of past political regimes, the way in which residents have 
experienced the nation is characterized by a high degree of continuity. Many changes 
have been enacted through decentralization policies, providing greater autonomy to 
the provinces, several new provinces have been created, and there is arguably greater 
democracy in how leaders are selected both at the provincial and national levels than 
previously in Indonesia’s history. In the Riau Islands, the economy is strong from oil 
and manufacturing revenues. However, despite these significant national and regional 
changes, my research reveals that there is a great continuity in how residents on Pulau 
Penyengat experience the nation. The longevity of national traditions in the 
workplace, in the education system, and in citizen leisure time, even beyond the fall 
of Suharto, demonstrates how valued they are by the state in maintaining the concept 
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of ‘Indonesia’. Their longevity also implies that the many incursions by the state into 
Pulau Penyengat are not experienced as oppressive. As Parker (2003) observes in the 
context of Bali, ‘the state’ operates through village people rather than as an external 
oppressive force: it is neighbours, relatives, friends who constitute ‘the state’. While 
an exertion of power relations is indeed present, there is generally not a conscious 
lived experience of state oppression in Pulau Penyengat. The constant iteration of 
norms, however, recalls Butler’s performativity and illustrates how citizens are not 
necessarily conscious of ways they are dominated. Furthermore, as many 
performances of national identity in which residents of Pulau Penyengat are 
encouraged to engage are reinterpreted in a local context, the sense of an all-powerful 
state is diminished. Also, as locals are able to use many performances for personal 
advantage, there is little reason for national culture to have been rejected in Pulau 
Penyengat.  
My research demonstrates that the state uses coerced citizen performance as a 
key strategy for ideological inculcation relating to nation-building. Engaging the 
bodies of citizens for nationalistic purposes is a level of control that has several 
effects. It supplements what citizens have been taught in school about national 
ideology through the national curriculum. There is an experiential difference between 
learning about ethnic diversity, for example, from a poster on a classroom wall or in a 
text book and acting out the state’s notion of ethnic diversity through dressing in 
elaborate costumes in a public parade. Seeing one’s friends, family, neighbours and 
other Indonesians one does not know appearing to conform through uniforms and 
performance is a powerful and persuasive strategy that I suggest has been effective in 
normalizing the state’s national ideology to residents of Pulau Penyengat. Based on 
my empirical evidence, even when performers questioned, criticized or dismissed the 
291 
 
state’s methods, they unconsciously accept its central premise, making the inculcation 
of national identity largely successful. For example, while people may be critical or at 
least conscious of the arbitrariness of which uniform should be worn on which day, 
the premise that uniforms must be worn at particular times or places (or even at all), 
and the legitimacy of the state’s power to compel uniform wearing, is not questioned.  
Through examining performances of national identity on Pulau Penyengat, my 
research shows that existing conceptualizations of performance are inadequate to 
understand the layered and complex nature of embodied individual performative 
practices. While the main geographical approaches to performance form a dichotomy 
around the work of Goffman’s conscious subject and Butler’s unconscious subject, as 
my research illustrates, it is profitable to borrow from the work of both and to 
restructure them. Butler developed the concepts of performance and performativity 
specifically to denaturalize gender identities, and it can be argued that one’s national 
identity is a far more conscious and denaturalized aspect of the self than one’s gender. 
However, people are often unaware of the cultural forms they are citing as the 
meaning, through repeated performances, has been naturalized. Thus, a multi-layered 
agency with varying degrees of awareness and intentionality lies behind national 
performances. 
I do not wish to overstate the role of performance in Indonesian nation-
building in Pulau Penyengat over other forms of ideological inculcation, particularly 
school curricula, television, radio and music. However, adopting performance as a 
conceptual framework has provided an opportunity for a focused study of 
nationalization strategies that have been under-examined to date. One of the main 
contributions of this thesis is to focus on the embodied nature of national identity 
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rather than textual elements in order to examine how people live, experience, and 
constitute the nation. 
Empirical analyses of work, education, and play revealed that Pulau Penyengat 
society has experienced a broad trend towards increased rationalization as it has been 
brought into the fold of the nation over time. With an expanding national bureaucracy, 
there are more positions available for residents of Pulau Penyengat to find 
employment as state workers, and with every resident of Pulau Penyengat now 
attending school, the state has direct access to more citizens. Through many 
organized, state-initiated leisure activities such as volleyball, takro, dance classes, and 
marching competitions, more villagers are spending their free time in ways sanctioned 
by the state. 
Despite the strength and micromanaging approach of the Indonesian state, its 
nationalization strategies are not totalizing as hegemony is never complete. In 
interviewing villagers about their understanding of their performances of national 
identity, it is clear that performances are often less about a deep desire to express 
national identity than they are opportunities to cultivate personal prestige within the 
community. Non-state workers, for example, strategically decide to adopt state 
workers’ uniforms for personal reasons, a strategy that co-opts the trappings of the 
state for use in other spheres. I suggest that this strategy serves to reify state power 
rather than to challenge it. 
My research also illustrates the unevenness of nationalization across space and 
across the citizenry. A variety of reasons for the unevenness emerged through 
examining the empirical examples of work, education and play. First, the state targets 
different segments of the population for different activities and holds different 
expectations as to how different citizens should perform, resulting in different levels 
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of participation across the populace. Such unevenness often reinforces existing social 
hierarchies and makes it clear that citizens have unequal relationships to the state. 
Second, at each level of bureaucracy, there are opportunities for varied interpretations 
of state policies. By the time policies reach Pulau Penyengat, they have been filtered 
through numerous levels of bureaucracy down to the local island state representatives, 
each level of which may interpret state directives in a different way. Across the 
population, expectations vary as to who should participate and who should not and 
how one ought to perform in a given activity. Individuals’ conscious 
(re)interpretations as well as unconscious slippages also serve to contribute to an 
unevenness in the performances.  
 The audience is a crucial aspect of performance. As the empirical examples 
reveal, the participants are simultaneously the performers and the audience; they are 
intended to produce and consume the event while internalizing its meaning. The sight 
of groups of citizens brought together and dressed alike creates the appearance of 
solidarity and support for the state. The general public is also an important part of 
performances of national identity. Performances are staged in public places that are 
visually accessible to passersby. Communicating ideology is a key motivation behind 
the state’s desire for citizens to perform national activities in public places as the 
national spectacles created through performance require an audience or they are not 
staged at all. 
Performances of national identity are a component of the state’s belief that its 
citizens are somehow lacking and require ‘improvement’ and ‘modernization’, 
particularly those who live in villages. This logic assumes that being Indonesian is 
something that requires training through instruction and repetitive performance in 
contexts including, but not limited to, work, education and play. This belief in the 
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need to improve the quality of the citizenry was translated into various state initiatives 
examined in this thesis which have sought to control how citizens behaved through 
infrastructure and organized programs. 
8.3 Directions for future research 
Through the process of writing this thesis, several avenues for future research 
have emerged. First, through my research I recognized the profound impact that the 
Japanese have had on Indonesian national identity and cultures. A comparative 
analysis between other areas formerly occupied by the Japanese would be valuable in 
order to examine the extent to which they also adopted national performances 
introduced by the Japanese. A comparison with performances of national identity in 
Japan would also be important in helping to understand how much of pre-war 
Japanese state culture is carried out only in their former territories.  
Second, while I examined the performative aspect of national identity in the 
context of a small Malay community in the ‘Outer Islands’, other peripheral contexts 
would provide insight about the level of consistency in the process of nationalization 
in Indonesia as well as the varied way in which nationalization strategies are 
interpreted in various parts of Indonesia. A comparative analysis of a more central 
part of Indonesia would be helpful in understanding the unevenness of nation-building 
programs and the extent to which locals were expected to participate across the 
archipelago. 
Third, as a village analysis, my thesis examines a particular segment of the 
population and excludes many important groups. For example, in my examination of 
performances of national identity in the workplace in Chapter Five, my study is 
limited to only those professions common to Pulau Penyengat. There is enormous 
scope to examine how workers in other work situations such as factories and 
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agriculture are inculcated with national ideology. Factories in Batam in particular 
offer interesting avenues for study in that they are not traditional communities 
consisting of extended families and multiple generations, but are usually young 
people from across the archipelago. How the state reaches workers in non-traditional 
social environments (often employed by foreign companies) would provide further 
insight into how performances of national identity are uneven and are reliant on 
community social and bureaucratic structures for their implementation.  
 
8.4 Final comments 
 Performance and performativity are key ways in which to understand 
embodied Indonesian national identity. Not only is identity constituted by the abstract, 
it is also inculcated, maintained and challenged bodily through the performances of 
citizenry. While the Indonesian state’s official version of national identity appears in 
many ways to be homogenous and the result of hegemonic state norms, performances 
of national identity are uneven across space and across the population, as are their 
meanings and interpretations. As my research demonstrates, people on Pulau 
Penyengat, depending on the time and place, make conscious and strategic decisions 
to perform national identity in particular ways. At the same time, their performances 
are produced by power and they unconsciously cite practices which reproduce or 
subvert national identity. A reformulation of Butler and Goffman’s conceptualizations 
that acknowledges the multi-layered aspect of performance allows a more nuanced 
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Glossary of Acronyms and Non-English terms 
 
ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik 
Indonesia) 
Armed Forces of Indonesia 
bahasa       language  
baju kurung Malay women’s traditional clothes, long 
skirt and long tunic set 
baju Melayu Malay shirt (lit), refers to male and 
traditional clothes   
Balai Adat traditional community hall 
bangsa nation 
bapak or Pak     father, mister, sir 
batik refers both to the type of cloth and a shirt 
with a batik pattern, esp. worn by men on 
formal occasions or civil servants 
Bhinneka Tunggal Ika Unity in Diversity (Indonesia’s National 
Motto) 
bodoh stupid, ignorant 
bupati      district or regional head, below governor 
and above camat    
camat sub-district officer 
desa  village; the lowest administrative unit in 
Indonesia’s bureaucracy 
gerak jalan marching, held as village competitions 
Golkar (Golongan Karya) work groups (lit.); the government-
sanctioned dominant political grouping 
during the Suharto regime 
gotong-royong mutual community help 
Hari Kemerdekaan Independence Day (August 17, 1945) 
Heerendienst unpaid service to the lord in colonial 
times 
Ibu or Bu    mother, married woman, respected 
woman 
kabupaten  district (below province and above sub-
district in government hierarchy) 
kantor kelurahan village district office 
kampungan literally ‘village-like’, countrified, 
boorish 
kecamatan    subdistrict office 
kepala desa    village head 
Kepri    Propinsi Kepulauan Riau (Riau Islands 
Province) 
Kelurahan    village district 
Komanden Commander (used as the person directing 
the Upacara Bendera) 
kota    city / town 
lomba desa    village competition 
lurah      head of village, representing the state 
maju      progressive 
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merdeka     freedom 
orang laut sea nomads 
Pancasila ‘Five Principles’ of Indonesian state 
ideology: belief in one supreme god, a 
just and civilized humanitarianism, 
national unity, popular sovereignty 
guided by wisdom through consensual 
consultation and representation, and 
social justice. 
peci black velvet cap worn by working class 
Muslim men 
pembangunan development 
pencak silat Malay martial art 
PKK (Pembinaan Kesejateraan Keluarga) Committee for the Promotion of Family 
Prosperity  
PMP (Pendidikan Moral Indonesia) Moral Pancasila Education  
pompong    
  
canoe-like boat with a motor that seats 
about 20-40, found in the Riau Islands 
and used for transporting people short 
distances 
Propinsi Kepulauan Riau Riau Islands Province 
pulau    island 
raja  Literally ‘king’, on Pulau Penyengat 
refers to a descendent of the sultan 
romusha    
  
Japanese term for ‘volunteers’ during the 
occupation. Actually labor conscripts, 
many of whom died overseas on Japanese 
projects. 
Rukun Tetangga (RT)    A neighbourhood subgrouping consisting 
of about 30 households   
Rukun Warga (RW)   hamlet 
rumah adat      house of tradition, usually a village 
communal building in which traditional 
cultural activities take place 
rupiah   Indonesian currency ($1 Sing. = 5,200 
rupiah) 
SD (Sekolah Dasar) primary or elementary school 
Seikerei the act of bowing deeply in the most 
respectful way towards Japan  
sekolah school      
Senam Pagi Indonesia Indonesia’s morning exercise   
silat (also called pencak silat) Malay martial art 
SMA (Sekolah Menengah Atas) senior secondary school 
SMP (Sekolah Menengah Pertama)  lower secondary school 
songket traditional short woven sarong Malay 
men wear over pajama set 
sukarela    volunteer 
taiso      Japanese military-style exercises, usually 
carried out at school before classes began 
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(now Senam Pagi) 
takro an indigenous game played with a rattan 
ball, played like volleyball only using the 
feet using a badminton net 
tonarigumi    
  
the Japanese word for neighbourhood 
association - now RT, or Rukun Tetangga 






























Appendix 1 - Biographies of interviewees 
 
This Appendix provides brief biographies of the people I spoke with during my 
fieldwork. These biographies explain the social and economic status of the participant 
and together, the biographies present a sample of Pulau Penyengat society. I have 
tried to gather a roughly even number of females and males and a range of people of 
different ages and social and economic classes.  
 
Table A – School Children  
Name (Pseudonym) Sex Age Date(s) interviewed 
1. Gary M 9 10/05/05, 13/02/06, 20/05/06, 
16/08/06, 20/10/06, 07/04/07  
Gary is a chubby, happy well-liked boy who enjoys participating in many activities. 
He is easily enthused, and has strong sense of humour. He is known as being talented 
at karaoke. Gary was one of my primary child informants as he was very patient and 
happy to sit and chat. He was curious about what my research and asked many 
questions about it. Gary’s family is part of the new middle class of families on Pulau 
Penyengat who are not state-workers, but work in the growing number of private 
sector jobs. 
2. Sigit   M 10 10/05/05, 13/02/06, 20/05/06, 
20/10/06 
Sigit is best friends with Donny. They are in the same class and live nearby. Sigit is a 
sensitive boy who has dramatic mood swings. He enjoys following the rules and tries 
to fit in, although he struggles with his emotions. He often breaks down and cries 
when upset by something seemingly small and, for this reason, often seems younger 
than ten. Sigit is the youngest of many children and several of his older siblings have 
left Penyengat for jobs in Batam. 
3. Manis F 6 15/11/05, 13/02/06,  
Manis was four years old when I first met her. She is now six and has started school. 
She is Ika’s daughter and has grown up in the safe environment of Pulau Penyengat. 
She has only occasional telephone contact with her father and his family as they live 
in Jakarta. While Manis’s grandmother is ethnically Chinese, Manis is very dark and I 
have been told she has very Malay features. She is known for being bright, charming 
and funny. 
4. Tuti F 7 13/02/06 
Tuti lives with her grandparents for reasons I do not know, although this does not 
seem to negatively affect her socially. Tuti’s grandfather does mechanical repairs for 
motorcycles and autorickshaws on the island and runs a gas station in his front yard.  
5. Dina F 11 13/02/06 
Dina’s mother is a successful tailor and is therefore relatively well-off, with one of the 
only families on the island to have a domestic helper. Dina is a mediocre student who 
is more focused on socializing and her appearance than on her studies. She is part of a 
tight clique of popular pre-teen girls who try to dress trendy and act older than their 
age.   
6. Noor   F 12 13/02/06, 21/05/06, 
Noor is a tall athletic girl who is just beginning to be conscious of her clothes and 
appearance. However, she is known as being the fastest runner at her school and loves 
to challenge people to races that she inevitably wins. 
7. Ricki  M 11 7/04/07 
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Ricki is a boy who enjoys the company of dancers and performers. He does not have 
the body for Malay dancing (he is considered quite heavy) but often performs comedy 
routines as part of wedding entertainment, dressing up in drag as a flamboyant, high-
class older Malay lady. He does not play with children his own age and has no interest 
in school but is popular and well-liked among the adults and youths who take dance 
classes. Ricki’s family is poor and does not have a water pump so everyday Ricky or 
his older brother take a wooden wheel barrow cart several hundred meters to a 
communal hand pump to fill buckets up for washing and cooking.   
8. Zalmidian   M 9 7/04/07
Zalmidian is a loud kid who is often the instigator in naughtiness. He comes from a 
poor family and his dad is not around much and there is talk that he has left the family 
several times. Zalmidian seems to be looked up to by his friends but he often bullies 
them.  
9. Elli   F 8 08/04/07
Elli is a shy girl who cares frequently cares for her little brother, taking him around 
the island with her and her friends. Her mother is busy with another younger sibling 
who has been sickly and as a result Elli seems neglected.   
10. Dewi   F 9 08/04/07
Dewi is a quiet girl from a very poor family. She enjoys doing many things 
considered ‘boyish’, has short hair (unusual for Pulau Penyengat) and does not fit in 
with other children. She prefers to play with her younger siblings or sit quietly with 
the adults.  
11. Adit   M 12 7/04/07
Adit is a highly intelligent and thoughtful child who strives to do his best in school. 
He is curious about many things and watches documentaries on television and enjoys 
studying his globe. His father works on ships and is rarely around and his mother does 
not work. He is considered a promising student at school and stands out as having 
great potential, although he is from a low-status family. Adit wants to be a teacher 
when he grows up. 
12. Ismit   M 8 7/04/07
Ismit and his big sister Arista are good students and receive lots of support and 
encouragement from their parents to do well in school as a way of improving 
themselves and of one day getting a good job. Their father is some kind of business 
man / trader and their mother is a housewife. Ismit always has his hair combed and 
slicked down before going off to school with his uniform starched and ironed, in 
contrast to his classmates who are often dirty and have rumpled uniforms at school. 
13. Putri   F 7 08/04/07 
Putri’s mom owns a cafe near the square and eats there most days. Putri likes to watch 
television all day, and it takes some pressure for her to stop watching it. With the 
television on in the cafe, Putri lies on a pillow to watch after she gets home from 
school. Putri also like to watch volleyball and often follows her mom to her games. 
14. Ayu   F 8 08/04/07
Ayu is a responsible young girl whose mother sells snacks to supplement her father’s 
erratic income. Ayu’s mother sells snacks to the teachers at Ayu’s school and has Ayu 
take containers of snacks to school, then brings home the money to her mother. Ayu 
joined Gerak Jalan with several of her friends. 
15. Nurhasanah   F 9 08/04/07
Nurhasanah participated in Gerak Jalan and is also a Senam Pagi Indonesia leader. 
She aims to be a teacher like her cousins. Her father is a pompong driver and her 
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mother is a homemaker.  
16. Arista   F 10 08/04/07
Arista is pushed to study hard in school and not to watch too many cartoons. Like her 
brother Ismit, Arista is expected to work hard in school in hopes that she will one day 
be a teacher. Her mother sends her to school with her hair neatly braided with ribbons 
and her uniforms freshly pressed. 
17. Jefry M 13 07/04/07
Jefry is a middle class boy who enjoys playing takro, and is often seen practicing in 
the main square. Hi father has a position in the city government in Tanjung Pinang. 
 
 
Table B – Youths 
Name (Pseudonym) Sex Age Date(s) interviewed 
1. Ina F 19 17/02/06
Ika is attending the new (and only) accredited university in Riau Islands Province 
where she studies business. Ika is part of the growing movement of youth who are 
more Muslim in many ways that their parents’ generation. While Ika likes to shop and 
wear fashionable clothes, she does not leave the house without wearing a head scarf 
as a key part of her identity is being a ‘good Muslim girl’. She is wholesome, very 
helpful and strives to live by a strict moral code. 
2. Bella F early-20s  
Agustin plays on the national women’s volleyball team in Jakarta, the only elite 
athlete from Pulau Penyengat. She has lived in Jakarta for several years yet frequently 
comes back to Pulau Penyengat for holidays and weddings. She is very different from 
other young women on the island as she is extremely tall and dresses simply with no 
make-up and athletic clothes, rather than the tight jeans and skimpy tops worn by girls 
in her age group on the island. In this way, she is similar to her mother, who never 
wears make-up or jewellery, even to weddings, something that is highly unusual on 
the island. Agustin is a success story of how a villager can climb through the local, 
regional, provincial and national levels of sports. While people are proud of her, they 
do not make a fuss about her when she is home. Agustin is well-liked and gives off a 
positive energy. 
3. Uji M early-20s 17/02/06 
Uji hopes to work at one of the resorts on Bintan. He is currently studying English 
and hopes to be accepted into a several months long training program offered on the 
island, after which he may be offered full-time employment if successful. In his 
ambitions to work in a resort, Uji is not focused on a better life for himself so much as 
leaving the village, getting a relatively high-paying job that is lighter work than other 
fishing or factory work, and attracting girls with his status. Uji has a cousin who 
worked in a resort and is enchanted by the stories of wealthy foreigners and the 
relative social freedom that a job away from the village would bring. Uji plays takro 
in the square for a team on Pulau Penyengat. 
4. Zul  M 21 17/02/06
Zul is a dancer but has no other employment. He has trained on Pulau Penyengat for 
several years and has traveled to Malaysia and several places in Indonesia. Since his 
dancing performances pay very little, he relies on his parents for money.   
5. Santi F 19 17/02/06 
Santi has recently finished highschool and but does not have good enough grades or 
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enough money to go to the local university in Tanjung Pinang. Santi has an active 
social life and makes frequent trips to Tanjung Pinang to spend time with her 
boyfriend. She wants to sign up for an English class in the future so she can get a job 
in a hotel but has not made any solid steps towards finding a class or the means to pay 
for it. Santi is frustrating her parents who see her as wanting to get rich quick without 
working hard. 
6. Aling F early-20s  
Aling lives in a relatively isolated part of Pulau Penyengat. She has only been to the 
west coast of Bintan and would like to go to Singapore, Jakarta, Bali and England. 
She enjoys watching travel documentaries and wants to learn other languages but has 
no opportunities to do so.  
7. Ninik F 19 17/02/06
Ninik enjoys dancing and belongs to the ‘elite’ groups of young dancers from 
Penyengat who dress up in elaborate royal Malay costumes and perform a few times 
per month at government ceremonies, business events at hotels, and national events 
held regionally and in Jakarta. Ninik has been dancing since the government paid for 
a Malay dance instructor to come to Pulau Penyengat and built a stage for dancing 
several years ago. She is seen as being a skilled dancer and a pretty girl. Ninik comes 
from an average family background – her family is not a descendent of the royal 
family, but they are not among the poor families. 
8. Lela F 17 17/02/06
Lela is a high school student who wants to be a nurse. She is the youngest of many 
brothers and sisters who financially support her aged parents. 
9. Didi M 15 08/04/07 
Didi’s hobby is music and takes classes and jams at the ‘school of rock’ on Pulau 
Penyengat. He also takes gendang [Malay drum] lessons on the stage in the square 
accompanying the dance practice.  
10. Boy M 18  
Boy works as a coolie and as a guard. His guard job entails sitting / sleeping on the 
jetty in Tanjung Pinang where the boats to and from Pulau Penyengat dock and 
guarding the motorcycles owned by Pulau Penyengat residents. Because there is no 
convenient way to transport motorcycles from Penyengat to Bintan Island, residents 
who work in Tanjung Pinang park their motorcycles permanently on the jetty. With 
rising motorcycle theft, motorcycle owners on Penyengat have banded together to pay 
people to guard them all night. This is the lowest type of job with little pay and low 
social status. In his free time Boy goes fishing or prawn hunting and either gives what 
he catches to his family to eat or sells it in Tanjung Pinang. 
 
 
Table C – State Workers 
Name (Pseudonym) Sex Age Date(s) interviewed 
1. Pak Acay M late-40s 16/08/06
A former school teacher and principal, Pak Acay is now working for the Ministry of 
Culture and Tourism and is the driving force behind the developments in Pulau 
Penyengat. 
2. Pak Sudirman M mid-late 50s 17/08/06, 12/02/06 
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Pak Sudirman is the principal of one of the Sekolah Dasar (elementary school) on the 
island. He and his wife also run the most popular daytime café that lies across from 
the mosque. He strongly believes that Indonesians are naturally lazy, undisciplined 
and unintelligent but that these characteristics can be changed through physical and 
mental effort. He is strict at school with his teachers and students but very gentle and 
well-liked outside of school. 
3. Haja Taty F early 40s 15/02/06 
Haja Taty is a school teacher. Her husband, a civil servant, is a supportive of her work 
and wants all of his children to go to university and be professionals. Haja Taty likes 
Pulau Penyengat but feels people are lazy there, as there is not the energy to push 
people to better themselves. She claims that most people on Pulau Penyengat will not 
work if they have enough food for that day, not thinking about tomorrow until they 
need more food, when they will find work or go fishing.  
4. Hendri M early 30s 15/02/06 
Hendri is a married man and a new father who works for Pulau Penyengat’s 
Kelurahan office. He is a descendent from the royal family and has gained 
employment with the state through family connections. His wife is a housewife and he 
lives on one of the more modern, well-furnished homes on the island. 
5. Fatimah F 40s 18/02/06, 11/02/06 
Fatimah works as an elementary school teacher on Pulau Penyengat, teaching P.E. 
and several other subjects.  
6. Malik M early-40s 17/02/06
Malik is a descendent of the sultan and is a powerful figure on the island. His father 
was well-respected and a symbol of the island’s regal past. Malik has taken over from 
his father and used his father’s connections to carry out his vision for Penyengat. He 
completed an undergraduate degree in Yogyakarta, something that gives him prestige 
not only for being educated but for studying in the most nationally prestigious place. 
He also married a central Javanese woman who comes from a powerful and relatively 
wealthy family. Malik is not the official leader of the island as he was not elected but 
functions as the representative based on his connections in government. He has 
angered many residents who feel that he is speaking for them even though he is not 
close with the community. There is the perception (which is true) that he siphons off 
money from the government that has been earmarked for projects in Pulau Penyengat. 
7. Yani F early-20s 17/02/06
Yani is a teacher in training at a school in Senggarang, Chinese village a short boat 
ride away from Pulau Penyengat and Tanjung Pinang. She has a large family who 
lives in a cluster of houses set back from the sea, on a hot rocky patch off the paved 
path. Her family is not royalty. Her father is a pompong driver and her mother is a 
housewife. Both of her parents have encouraged her and her brother to strive for 
government jobs that provide a pension. Yani is social, very motivated and 
participates in a number of activities. She was the one to organize the winning team of 
family and friends in the Gerak Jalan, the marching competition, herself acting as the 
Komandan (Commander) for her team. 
8. Zuwirna F 22 7/05/06, 20/10/07 
Zuwirna attends an Islamic training college in Tanjung Pinang and hopes to open a 
small Islamic school on Pulau Penyengat. Her dream would be to go to Egypt to study 
Islam and Arabic but she has no funds for that and aims to marry her boyfriend in the 
coming year. She is very conservative in dress and values and is quick to judge and 
dismiss those who do not adhere to her values. However, Zuwirna is very focused and 
supportive of those she trusts and believes in. 
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9. Ani F early-40s 19/02/06
The only full-time staff at the Pulau Penyengat clinic. Trained as a nurse, Ani 
provides information about family planning, administers immunization shots, ... 
Because the clinic is small, has a low budget, and caters to chronic ailments of many 
villagers with little money, she tries to find low-cost solutions to common problems 
such as diarrhoea, constipation, arthritis, skin conditions, and so on. She grows many 
plants with medicinal properties to provide cheap alternatives to factory-made 
medicines. These plants are grown on Ani’s initiative and chopped and ground 
herself. Officially she is not supposed to do this, but realistically there are no other 
ways to provide medicine on the budget she is given and for what patients can afford. 
The state health practitioners who come to the clinic once per week and once per 
month are supportive of herbal medicines. Ani is from Bintan and did her training in 
Sumatra and was posted to the clinic in Pulau Penyengat. 
10. Yudi M 20s 12/05/06, 25/04/08 
Yudi works as a civil servant in Tanjung Pinang. Originally from Palembang 
(Sumatra), Yudi has been transferred to several places in Indonesia before Riau. He 
along with several other civil servants from Riau have been sent to Singapore for 
training over the past two years.  
11. Agus M 40s 07/05/07
Agus works at Senayan, the national stadium complex, as a fitness trainer. He spent a 
number of years in the U.S. for university and speaks English well. He is well-
connected and introduced me to several national athletes and national sports coaches 
and trainers. Agus has strong views on how Indonesia’s sports could improve, but is 
frustrated by the lack of political will to do so. He also critiques dated approaches 
used that are preventing Indonesian athletes from excelling. 
12. Haja Tuti M late-40s 17/02/06, 11/10/06 
Haja Tuti is an elementary school teacher and widow with no children. She lives a 
quiet life by herself and does not get involved in village gossip and activities. Her 
husband was a civil servant and she seems to live a comfortable life with her 
husband’s pension and her salary. 
13. Haz M 40s 16/10/06 
Haz used to work in a secondary school in Batam, where he taught Pancasila 
philosophy. He now works in some capacity for the state as part of the recent 
expansion of the Kepri tourism program, one of the many people drawing a shady 
salary from the as-yet non-existent tourism industry. He has a dynamic personality 
and is good at cultivating connections for his own benefit. I never saw him working 
but he is apparently well-off.  
14. Yuli F mid-20s  
Yuli is friends with and the former student of Pak Acay. Pak Acay has a large budget 
to improve Pulau Penyengat and has the discretion to decide how the money gets 
spent. He has hired Yuli in the vague area of Pulau Penyengat tourism, although she 
speaks no English and has no training in tourism. She receives a salary equivalent to a 
school teacher’s yet does not work. This is a source of contention among fellow 
islanders who are frustrated about the overt nepotism and the ‘salaries without a job’. 
 
Table D – Adults – non-state workers 
Name (Pseudonym) Sex Age Date(s) interviewed 
1. Bu Niar F early 50s 17/08/06
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Bu Niar is a married woman with four children. She is among the poorest on the 
island and lives with her family in a small wooden shack over the ocean along a piece 
of coast with few other houses. Most houses on the island are now made of concrete 
and built on the ground. That Bu Niar and her family still live in a house of wood over 
the sea indicates her level of poverty. Bu Niar is from another island in Riau and 
moved here after her marriage to her husband, a local. Her husband is a rickshaw 
driver, a job that carries no prestige. Bu Niar runs the only gift shop on the island, 
selling sea shells and knick knacks to the occasional Malaysian tourist. 
2. Pak Deni M mid-40s 18/03/06, 17/08/06, 13/11/06 
Pak Deni is a man in his mid-40s who has traveled around the world working on ships 
for most of his life. He is of Bugis ancestry and comes from a long line of sea men. 
Pak Deni married a local Penyengat woman. He has spent time as a captain on the 
small boat that ferries tourists between Singapore and Tioman Island on the east coast 
of Malaysia and currently does some piloting on ships in the Riau region. He is happy 
to be back on Pulau Penyengat living with his wife and daughters and is making 
additions on his home partly for more space for his family but also to one day be able 
to be able to host foreigners in his home as a homestay. He has a very international 
perspective and is the most alternative in his views of anyone I met on Penyengat. Pak 
Deni feels that Penyengat and the Riau Islands more broadly could easily have 
become part of Singapore or Malaysia if historical events had been different. He finds 
it amusing that there is a recent push from the state to portray Penyengat as a pure 
Malay place, pointing out that the Royal Family itself is a mix of Bugis, Arab, 
Chinese, and others. He sees it the state interest in Penyengat as opportunistic and 
financially motivated. He perceives the state as being aware of Penyengat’s power. 
Where it was once simply ignored, now that Riau is economically powerful and 
tourism potential is seen, he believes that the government simply wishes to control it. 
He sees great potential for Penyengat to develop its tourism, although he has joined 
the side who wishes to see development in local rather than government hands. He 
sees that many tourists and researchers come to Penyengat but he feels Penyengat 
does not benefit from them being there. He as many ideas about getting researchers to 
provide language lessons while they are here to better equip them for the tourism 
industry. 
3. Harry M early-50s 11/05/06
Harry is the 5th generation to run the main store on Pulau Penyengat. While there are 
many very small stalls around the island run out of peoples’ living rooms selling 
cigarettes, candy and instant noodles, Harry’s store has a wide range of household 
goods. Harry and his family are the only remaining Chinese family on Pulau 
Penyengat. He said he had not had any problems from Malays living on the island, 
although he told me in private that he felt the islanders were lazy. He and his family 
do not socialize with the islanders except in the shop. Their adult son also socializes 
with other Chinese Indonesians living in Senggarang, the Chinese village a short boat 
ride away, and Tanjung Pinang. He is part of many young Chinese Indonesians in 
Tanjung Pinang who strongly associate themselves with international Chinese culture. 
He listens almost exclusively to Chinese language music, takes mandarin lessons and 
has a Chinese Indonesian girlfriend. Aside from the shop, they are completely 
disengaged from Pulau Penyengat society. 
4. Jojo M late-30s 16/10/06 
Jojo is a make-up artist who is openly gay. He lives on Pulau Penyengat but also has 
his own home in Tanjung Pinang where he has his own studio. Jojo does make-up for 
television dramas and does bridal make-up and wedding decorations. At several of the 
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weddings on Pulau Penyengat I attended, he had done the bride’s make-up, arranged 
the bride and groom’s costumes and created elaborate set pieces for wedding photos 
and had photos taken by one of his photographers. He is well-liked on Pulau 
Penyengat and is close with his mother, who lives on with several of her other 
children and grandchildren. Jojo is flamboyant in his style of dress, often wearing 
make-up and women’s clothing. At weddings he frequently wears a flashy baju 
kurung, the traditional silk tunic and long skirt worn by Malay women.  
5. Sayed M early-30s 9/12/04, 07/02/06, 18/03/06, 
10/05/06
Sayed is a relative of Malik but leads the opposition to Malik’s plans for Penyengat. 
Where Malik seeks to get the state involved at all levels in order to quickly develop 
Penyengat into a tourist center, Sayed and his allies want to use local knowledge to 
develop the island slowly so locals, rather than outsiders, are in charge and to ensure 
locals benefit. Sayed is a highschool graduate and is not seen as particularly bright in 
the same way that Malik is. However, he has worked in several five-star resorts such 
as Club Med in Bali and in Bintan that have brought him money and a certain amount 
of prestige. He is seen as being experienced in the tourist industry, but is viewed as 
arrogant, immature, poorly connected with government and other powerful people, 
and uncommitted to the island in the long run. He had a long-term Japanese girlfriend 
that he met while he was a windsurfing instructor at Club Med in Bali. They were 
together since the first time I visited Penyengat and have recently married. He had 
travelled extensively with his girlfriend, a travel agent in Tokyo, taking vacations in 
Thailand, Singapore and Japan. Sayed wears expensive clothes and accessories and 
has rarely been on Penyengat over the past 10 years. For this reason, people don’t 
trust his motives or that he will even stay on the island. His girlfriend’s father has a 
position for him in his business but he committed two years to trying to make his 
plans for developing Penyengat work. The two years he gave himself have ended and 
he recently married his girlfriend with ceremonies in Japan and in Penyengat. He has 
recently moved to Japan where he will begin work. 
6. Rini F late-40s 12/11/06
Rini is a popular, active, energetic woman whose daughter is the volleyball player on 
the national team in Jakarta. Rini works as a part-time seamstress, although less 
frequently now as she does not need the money. Rini has a positive outlook and takes 
part in many state and non-state activities such as the marching competitions, 
volleyball matches, village-level state discussions, and she hosted several guests from 
Jakarta who came to Riau Islands and stopped briefly on Pulau Penyengat. She is 
reliable and someone other villagers turn to for support. Rini supports people who 
take action over words and has encouraged her children to focus too much on clothes 
and make-up at the expense of accomplishments. 
7. Yanto M mid-20s 17/08/06
Yanto is a young man who comes from a poor family on Penyengat. His father is a 
chronic gambler who left the family for several years when Yanto was 15. Because of 
this, he was forced to quit school and earn an income for his family. He worked as a 
coolie, in a factory in Batam, as a fisherman, a motorcycle taxi driver in Tanjung 
Pinang and currently works as a rickshaw driver on Penyengat and many evenings he 
catches prawns depending on the tides and sells them. Yanto is deeply motivated to 
improve his lot in life and works extremely hard. He purchased an old wooden house 
on the island which he paid for with his savings and loans from a bank and a trusted 
imam at the mosque. He recently paid back the loan and is now using his income for 
English lessons and obtaining his highschool equivalency. He dreams of attending 
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university but is not well-connected and is not unsure of how he will pay for it. 
Villagers admire his work ethic but often talk about him as perhaps rising too far 
above his station in life since he is ‘just a rickshaw driver with a gambler as a father’. 
Yanto is single and his Javanese girlfriend, a factory worker in Batam who had met 
him on a day trip holiday from Batam, recently broke off their engagement when he 
was working a lot to pay off his house. She married someone she perceived as having 
better prospects. 
8. Andi M mid-30s  
Andi is a single man from the lowest social and economic class on the island. He is 
friends with Yanto but does not share the same goals of becoming a self-made man. 
He lives with his widowed mother and several younger siblings and is considered 
unmarriageable due to his lack of education, his lack of solid income and what is 
perceived as his unattractive appearance. In Pulau Penyengat society, there is a certain 
amount of blame on those at the bottom, as it is often felt that it is because you are 
‘stupid’ and you somehow earned your social position. While Andi works hard as a 
rickshaw driver, a fisherman and a prawn catcher, he lacks the confidence in himself 
as well as the money to find skilled work or training. For example, while many young 
people from Penyengat have had experience working in resorts in Bintan or 
elsewhere, Andi is not considered suitable for such work as his body is scarred from 
hard work, he is missing teeth, cannot speak English and is therefore considered 
bodoh or ignorant/stupid. He has had little experience off of Penyengat and is the 
primary caregiver of his mother. 
9. Pak Fazrul M 42 18/03/06
Fazrul lives in the housing along the main square that is rented out at a subsidized rate 
by the mosque. He has converted his small front porch into a woodwork shop where 
he makes stands for flags. For the month leading up to Independence Day in August, 
all Indonesian buildings (including homes, businesses, places of prayer) are required 
to display an Indonesian flag so he is particularly busy in the months leading up to 
Independence Day. He sells the flag bases year round on the Island and in Bintan.  
10. Bu Desi F 40 07/05/06, 13/02/06 
Desi is a teacher in a supplementary Islamic school that some children attend after 
public school. Although the salary is extremely low, she is guaranteed a pension in 
retirement.   
11. Bu Erlina F 52 07/05/06
Erlina is a housewife and a widow who sells cigarettes and packages of instant 
noodles from her living room. Her children are grown up and send her money to 
support her so she lives a comfortable life. She is helping to raise her two 
grandchildren, one of her divorced daughter and the other of her son. Erlina is 
ethnically Chinese but was adopted by a Malay family as a baby. She has some 
contact with her genetic family and has recently developed an interest and pride in her 
Chinese side. She often wears typically Chinese jewellery such as jade bracelets and 
necklaces while always wearing her Muslim head scarf. 
12. Naked Man M 40s 28/11/07
The Naked Man is a local character who is known for never wearing a shirt and often 
no sandals as part of his personal philosophy. He is working class and involved in 
maritime activity. Known as a free thinker, he openly rejects the dominant norm when 
he feels it is not right. For example, he believes that followers of Islam are wrong to 
feel they need to cover up in mosques, or at all. Allah sees through all the costumes 
directly into the soul so he believes that there is no point in trying to hide behind 




13. Amelia F late-30s 07/05/06
Amelia is married to Pak Deni and is a housewife with a teenager, an elementary 
school age child and a newborn baby. While she feels frustrated that her daughters are 
‘lazy’ and do not work hard in school she feels that life is good on Pulau Penyengat 
and would never want to move away. Amelia and her husband have built a large 
addition to their home to accommodate their growing family. Both are ambitious and 
would like to eventually be able to open a homestay on the island to host visitors.  
14. Rosyani F mid-40s 20/10/06
Rosyani is a housewife who has made a small stall at the side of her house from 
which to sell small snacks, es campur [ground ice dessert] and drinks. Her stall is 
popular with children as she makes snacks kids like and it is along the path leading to 
two elementary schools. 
15. Wasriah F late-40s 20/10/06
Wasriah has several children and lives in mosque-subsidized housing along the square 
and has converted her front room into a cafe selling simple meals and drinks. She is 
hard-working and enterprising and is able to live a middle class-ish lifestyle on Pulau 
Penyengat. In pre-colonial times the row of houses rented out by the historic mosque 
used to house visitors who came to the island for religious purposes. The rent is 
extremely low by current standards (just a few dollars per month). 
16. Mega F late-20s 20/10/06
Mega is a young housewife who lives with her parents and at her mother-in-law’s 
house, a 10 minute walk away. Her husband works on a ship laying fibre-optic cable 
in the Pacific and is frequently away. When his ship comes to shore, it docks in 
Singapore for several weeks, during which time Erlina and their baby are able to 
come and visit. Because of her travel experience and her husbands’s comparatively 
high salary, Erlina enjoys a higher status than her family and friends. 
17. Akhmad M mid-30s 18/03/06
Akhmad has held a variety of jobs and currently works in a factory in Batam, 
although is able to come back to Pulau Penyengat frequently. He has never married 
and is seen as unattractive and kasar [rough, unsophisticated]. He works for a 
Japanese electronics company in Batam and has travelled to Japan for some training. 
He would like to move back to Pulau Penyengat but sees no job opportunities there 
for him. He says he is happy never to marry, a statement that (in Pulau Penyengat 
society) means he is lacking in morals and must be living a hedonistic life of sin in 
Batam, which he likely is, given the number of times he asked me if I liked karaoke 
(karaoke bars are places to meets prostitutes and buy drugs and alcohol). 
18. Subur M early-60s 18/03/06
Subur is descended from island royalty and is retired from his job as a clerk in the 
local government. He now putters around, does some work as a handyman, and 
manages the historic family home owned by his older brother who now lives in Batam 
with his family. This property was passed down from his father who was a Muslim 
cleric in the island’s historic mosque. The home has many family relics and hosted 
then-president Abdurahman Wahid on his quick visit to the mosque. Subur is father to 
Ady and is preparing for the marriage of his daughter.  
19. Ansur M late-40s 18/03/06
Ansur runs a ‘school of rock’ from his home on Pulau Penyengat, teaching rock music 
classes to children and youth who want to learn to play guitar, bass, or drums. He also 
rents out the instruments and room by the hour for practice space for bands. His 
332 
 
classes are popular and there are usually crowds of youth hanging around outside his 
home listening to jam sessions or waiting their turn on the instruments. Ansur has had 
experience playing in bands in various cities in Indonesia but enjoys living in his 
hometown of Pulau Penyengat. He is well-liked among the youth. 
20. Rahiz M mid-20s 21/10/06 
Rahiz comes from a poor family and has no father. He has little education and has 
been working as coolie, a bicycle rickshaw driver in the market area of Tanjung 
Pinang, and a deckhand on boat. He has few job prospects and has been considering 
trying to find work in a factory on Batam. 
21. Yusuf M 50s 18/02/06 
Yusuf is a musician and plays traditional Malay music in a group of mainly older 
men. They get hired for events such as weddings and increasingly for government 
events. During the day Yusuf putters around doing home improvements and looking 
after his grandchildren. 
21. Veronika F Mid-20s May/06,  August/06, 17/08/06
Veronika is a single divorced mother of a six-year-old and is one of my primary 
informants. During her marriage she lived with her Betawi husband in Jakarta. After 
separating, she and her daughter moved back to Pulau Penyengat to live with her 
mother. Veronika is known as being a intelligent young women with potential. She is 
also popular on the island as she is known as being kind and willing to talk with 
anyone and there is often a large group of friends and neighbours gathered there to 
chat with her. For these reasons, she is frequently courted by government groups and 
political parties to work for them. Veronika is a part of the P2KP, a government 
volunteer organization that is meant to tackle urban problems.  
 
Veronika’s mother is ethnically Chinese but was adopted into a Malay family as a 
baby, a common scenario in the region. Veronika herself is often mistaken for being 
Chinese by shopkeepers in Tanjung Pinang. This seems not to be an issue for 
Veronika or her mother. 
22. Adit M 50s 28/10/07 
Adit has been involved in the fishing industry his whole life. He still spends many 
months fishing and builds boats in the off-season. Adit is extremely hard-working and 
does not sit in the square to chat over tea. He always keeps busy with little projects 
and socializes little. 
 
Table E – Senior Citizens 
Name (Pseudonym) Sex Age Date(s) interviewed 
1. Pak Hari M 70s 17/08/06, 07/05/06 
Pak Hari is an old widower who lives with his children and grandchildren in a big 
house in Pulau Penyengat. He is one of the few seniors on Pulau Penyengat who is 
still lucid and is able to remember the Japanese occupation. He went to school for the 
first time when he was seven or eight under the Japanese Occupation and is happy to 
act out what he remembers from his lessons as a child, particularly songs, rituals, 
Japanese language. Pak Hari was a labourer during his working life, but has been 
retired for many years now. He is supported by his many grown children. While Pak 
Hari was too young to remember the Dutch occupation, he recalls the Japanese on 
Pulau Penyengat, their defeat and the arrival of the British and American warships 
that came to secure Riau until the Dutch were able to return. He worked for several 
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years in Singapore and travelled frequently between the Riau Islands and Singapore in 
the 1960s and 70s. Pak Hari used to play the gendang [Malay drum] when he was 
younger but has not played in years. 
2 Pak Agus M 70s 16/08/06
Pah Agus is a loud character who likes to joke and tell stories from the past. He talks 
over everyone around him partly because he is nearly deaf and partly because he feels 
that when he has something to say everyone should listen. He is a descendent of the 
sultan’s family and respected as an important and senior figure on the island and 
nearly all of his contemporaries are dead. I only met with Pak Agus a couple of times 
when he felt well enough to leave the house and have a cherished cup of tea in the 
square. He was confident and eccentric, wearing old dress shoes, shorts, a singlet and 
a peci with a towel around his neck. Although he is generally dismissed as a crazy old 
man, I found him to be insightful, articulate and lucid. Unfortunately he was usually 
unable to hear my questions so he just talked about what came to his mind. 
3. Bu Eti F late-60s  
Bu Eti is a widow who was born on Pulau Penyengat. Although she has four children, 
they have moved away and she now has no close family on Pulau Penyengat and 
relies upon the charity of several relatives, neighbours and the mosque for her 
survival. She also has a small table set up from which she sells cigarettes, candy and 
water. She has never attended school as she was poor, was needed at home and her 
parents were afraid to let her stray far from home when the Japanese were on Pulau 
Penyengat for fear that she would be attacked by Japanese soldiers.  She is suffering 
from dementia that makes her deeply anxious at times. 
4. Bu Erlina F 70s  
Bu Erlina was an old woman who sold Malay kue [small snacks that are eaten for 
breakfast] every morning from about 5am to about 8am. As a lower class person 
whose children have moved away or are also poor, Bu Erlina worked all of her life 
until her death in 2006 while I was on the island. I had many conversations with her in 
the early mornings about her experiences living her life on Pulau Penyengat. With a 
loud and teasing personality, Bu Erlina often bluntly told the truth to people when 
others would be too polite to say anything. She would regularly tell people they were 
getting fat or their children were naughty or someone’s husband was straying. 
 
(also see Barrell 1980; Duncan and Duncan 1988; Duncan 1990; Mitchell 1994; Kong 
and Yeoh 2003: 14-15) 




















Appendix 2 – Questions for Interviewees 
 




Home village / ethnic identity: 
Job: 
Married / children: 
 
Work 
• Where do you work? How long have your worked there? 
• Do you like your job? What job would you most like to have if you could 
choose? 
• Can you describe your job? (what time do you start / finish, work duties, days 
off, mandatory / voluntary workplace national rituals and where do these 
activities take place?) 
• What are the national holidays in Indonesia? Who gets a holiday on these 
days? Do you? What do you do on these holidays?  
• What do you wear to work? What do you like / dislike about work uniforms? 
• When you wear your work uniform, do you feel different from when you wear 
regular clothes? Do people treat you differently? Do you feel you must behave 
differently? 
• What sorts of national programs have you experienced / seen / taken part in at 
work? When? How often? Where do they take place? Are these mandatory or 
optional? Who participates and who does not? Do you enjoy these activities?  
What do you like / dislike about them? 
• Why do you think civil servants perform national rituals at work? 
• What aspects of your job do you like / dislike? What aspects are boring? 
 
Education 
• What is your school schedule? (start, end, breaks, etc) 
• What is your favourite part of school? What is your least favourite? 
• What do you wear to school? What happens if you do not wear that? Why do 
you think you wear that? 
• What are the national holidays in Indonesia? Who gets a holiday on these 
days? Do you? What do you do on these holidays? What do you wear? 
• Why do you think civil servants perform national rituals at work? 
 
Leisure 
• What do people on Pulau Penyengat do in their free time? What do you 
like to do in your free time? 
• Are you involved in any organized / team activities? Why / why not? 
• Who organizes these activities? Why do you think they are organized? 
• Who participate in which activities? 







• What do you think when you look at these photos? 
• What do you think the purpose is behind this activity? 
• Who do you think this activity is geared towards? Who do you think is 
excluded from this activity? Why? 
• Do you participate in this activity? Why / why not? 
• How did you feel when you were participating in this activity? (Explain) 
• Do you think others perform this activity in the same way as people on Pulau 
Penyengat? Are there differences? 
• Is there anything else you would like to add? Anything you did not get a 
chance to say? 
 
 
Reminder to take notes on the following42: 
• Where does the performance take place? What performances occur where? 
• Is there an (intended) audience? What is the relationship between the audience 
and performers? How did the audience react to the performance? What is the 
role of the audience in adding meaning to the performance? 
• What are some of the aesthetic aspects of the performance? 
• What are the exciting / boring / interesting moments? 
• How is the space of the performance used at different times? 
• What are the performers wearing? What are the connotations / meanings of 
their clothes? 
• What is the relationship between off-stage and on-stage? 
• Are performances individual or group?  
• What is the relationship between performers? 
• To what extent are performances scripted and to what extent is there room for 
improvisation? What is the ‘correct’ way to perform? 
• What is the variety of roles for the performers? Are these hierarchical roles or 
equal? Are there leaders? Who are they? How do the leaders perform 
differently from the other performers? 
• What is the pace of the performance? 
• What is the quality of the gestures? How enthusiastic are the performers? 
• What is the story being told in the performance? Are the performers aware of 
this story? Do they have other interpretations?  
• What is the performance citing or referencing in its style, structure, etc?  
• How should this performance be notated? (video, camera, notes) 
 
                                                          
42 In their book Performance Analysis, Counsell and Wolf (2001: 229-32) provide an excellent 
guideline to aid the researcher in analyzing performances. 
